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Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes 
continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro 
dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum 
theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian 
Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a 
stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian 
particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual 
configurations. Instead, individual configurations are actualized independently of 
each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the 
universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of 
the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. 
Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. 
 
For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their 
empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can 
be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the 
acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering 
MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of 
communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. 
 
The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his 
“Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that 
Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In 
particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between 
brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in 
light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on 
time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static 
configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts 
in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. 
Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or 
configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of 
sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro 
state. Hence, worlds may overlap. 
 
I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint 
macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase 
space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move 
solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state 
crossing the boundary between different macro regions. 
 
I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. 
Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, 
impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number 
conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping 
worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct 
worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is 
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Prelude: Zeno’s arrow 
 
 
For a moment, nothing happened. 
Then, after a second or so, nothing continued to happen. 
–– Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy 
 
 
In a moment, nothing happens. In particular, nothing moves. Zeno’s arrow is 
testament to that: in any given moment, it doesn’t move. So it moves never. It 
doesn’t move at all. 
 
And yet, arrows move. At least so it seems. 
 
In any given point, a circle has a unique tangent. A point by itself has no tangent. 
What’s the difference between a point, and a point on a circle? A point is a point, 
one should think, and rightly so. Why does a point on a circle have a tangent, but 
not a point on its own? That’s to mistake one thing for another. It’s not the point on 
the circle that has a unique tangent. It’s the circle that has a unique tangent in that 
point. Hold that point fixed and take away the circle. The tangent disappears. 
 
The velocity of the arrow in any given moment is like the tangent of the circle in any 
given point. Hold that moment fixed and take away the other moments. The 
velocity disappears. 
 
The circle consists of a continuum of points, including the tangential point. Take one 
of them, left or right of the tangential point, and draw a straight line through them. 
Let the new point approach the tangential point. In the limit, the line is the tangent 
of the circle in that point. You can’t construct a tangent like this from a single point, 
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because a single point isn’t part of a continuum of points on which you could 
approach that single point. 
 
Take two moments of the arrow’s flight. They are separated by a finite time 
interval. Look at the positions of the arrow at these moments. Between the two, 
the arrow was displaced, by a certain amount, in a certain direction. Divide this 
displacement by the length of the time interval, and you get the average velocity 
over that time interval. Let the time interval approach zero. The limit is the 
instantaneous velocity of the arrow at that moment in time. You can’t have an 
instantaneous velocity like this from a single moment, because a single moment 
isn’t part of a continuum of moments on which you could approach that single 
moment. 
 
Crudely put, one of the basic posits of Bohmian Mechanics says that particles, 
despite behaving non-classically, at any moment have an instantaneous velocity. 
They move on continuous, deterministic trajectories, like an arrow. One of the basic 
posits of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics contests this. It says that particles don’t have 
an instantaneous velocity, ever. There are no continuous, deterministic trajectories. 
This is the core difference between Bohmian Mechanics and Minimal Bohmian 
Mechanics. 
 
This thesis is about Minimal Bohmian Mechanics and the claim that arrows can 
move despite particles having no instantaneous velocity. The matter is somewhat 
intricate, as you will see, but the overall insight is this: although, according to 
Minimal Bohmian Mechanics, things don’t move on continuous trajectories on the 
fundamental level of description, on a higher, emergent level of description, they 
exhibit continuous motion. This is made possible by what I call the emergence of for 
all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the 
discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of particles. 
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Similar accounts have been devised before. Most famously, John Bell discussed a 
predecessor of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics, but immediately rejected it, for 
reasons to be made explicit below. I hold that his dismissal was premature. Almost 
as famously, Julian Barbour has developed a fundamentally timeless cosmology, 
quite similar in spirit to Bell’s theory. Although Barbour doesn’t immediately reject 
his own theory, I hold that both, Bell’s and Barbour’s account, are deficient in some 
respects. With my presentation of emergent world histories in Minimal Bohmian 
Mechanics, I propose a way to overcome these deficiencies. 
 
Let’s make the arrow fly. 
 
I. Introduction and overview 
 
This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical 
purposes (FAPP) continuous, quasi-classical world histories, containing FAPP-
continuous macroscopic phenomena, from the discontinuous, stochastic micro 
dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic 
quantum theory, recently put forward by Patrick Dürr and me. It results from 
excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and 
reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for 
the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there 
are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, 
individual configurations are actualized independently of each other, carving out 
the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, 
by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function 
are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on 
MBM, are actualized sequentially. 
 
Along the way of developing my approach of emergent world histories, I will be 
discussing several, interrelated topics. First, I will give a short introduction to MBM 
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(II), using standard BM as the background against which it stands out. I will discuss 
BM’s solution of the eminent measurement problem (II.1) and its empirical 
equivalence with orthodox QM (II.2). The transition from standard BM to MBM will 
be made by excising the guiding equation from the former and reinterpreting the 
quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic law, governing MBM’s 
fundamentally random, discontinuous particle dynamics (II.3). I will argue that MBM 
is empirically equivalent with standard BM, and thus with QM, despite its lack of 
continuous, deterministic particle trajectories. Since many proponents of BM take 
the latter to be a primitive ontology (PO) theory, and regard this as somewhat 
crucial, I will argue that MBM can be made compatible with the PO approach, given 
certain restrictions on the interpretation of its WF (II.4). MBM to some extent 
resembles Bell’s “Everett (?) theory”. The latter was immediately rejected by its 
creator on the charge of leading to the problem of temporal solipsism (II.5). I will 
locate the root of this problem in Bell’s identification of instantaneous 
configurations with worlds: on his construal, each world contains one, and only one, 
configuration. Accordingly, each world is likely to be instantiated only once. 
Barbour’s time-capsule approach, at first sight, suggests itself as a possible solution 
to the problem of temporal solipsism. Time capsules are a special type of 
configurations: they contain consistent records of past events that, according to 
Barbour, suffice for the reconstruction of consistent histories from within individual, 
static configurations. However, Barbour’s time-capsule approach provides no 
account of how temporally remote configurations are linked. Like Bell, Barbour 
identifies individual configurations – albeit special ones – with worlds. Thus, his 
approach isn’t suitable to solve the problem of temporal solipsism within the MBM 
framework (II.6). 
 
In order to tackle this issue, I will propose to adopt a notion of worlds different from 
the one put forward by Bell and Barbour. To introduce this notion, I am going to 
discuss the viability of my approach for solving what I call the discontinuity problem 
of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM) in (III). Following the usual 
presentation of the framework (III.1), the available phase space of a system is 
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partitioned into a finite set of disjoint macro regions, corresponding to different 
macro states (III.2). This construal of macro regions leads to the discontinuity 
problem of BSM: upon the micro state evolving from one macro region to another, 
it crosses boundaries between them, thereby instantiating different macro values 
associated with these macro regions. As a result, the usual framework of BSM 
invariably models change of macro values, whenever they change at all, as a jump 
discontinuity (III.3). I argue that this is especially problematic for those who take 
BSM to be a fundamental theory (III.4). The discontinuity problem has not been 
made explicit in the literature so far, although there are some hints to be found, to 
the effect that the usual way of partitioning phase space into disjoint sets with 
sharp boundaries is not considered entirely unproblematic by the community (III.5). 
Hence, I will present its consequences in a series of examples (III.6, III.7, III.8). I will 
consider two seemingly obvious approaches to tackle the problem, removing the 
underlying assumptions of the standard framework. As we will see, none leads to 
acceptable results (III.9). Thus, I will introduce a new framework for BSM (III.10) 
that allows carving up phase space, not into disjoint macro regions, but potentially 
overlapping worlds, defined as sets of phase points sufficiently similar to a given 
micro state, i.e. instantiating macro states indistinguishable from a given macro 
state. Worlds thus construed, other than macro regions, can overlap consistently. 
As a result, the need to model the change of macro values as discontinuous jumps 
can be avoided. I argue that the spirit and basic features of BSM remain intact 
despite replacing macro regions with worlds. In particular, worlds, like macro 
regions, can be compared with other worlds (and the entirety of available phase 
space) in terms of their volumes, thus allowing for similar accounts of equilibrium 
states and approach to equilibrium as usual. 
 
In the next chapter (IV), I will make use of this notion of worlds to solve a similar 
discontinuity problem as it arises in MBM. There, it is put into sharp relief: not only 
do remote configurations instantiate different macro states, but individual 
configurations aren’t linked up by continuous trajectories. That is, not even on the 
level of the microscopic description must a continuous evolution be assumed. This 
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lack of continuity in the micro evolution of the universe, following Bell, leads to the 
problem of temporal solipsism. To circumvent it, one could simply adopt the 
Everettian notion of worlds, understood as entire, decoherence-induced world 
branches. In particular, if MBM should turn out to be many worlds in denial, such 
that the particle configuration turns out to be superfluous theoretical structure – 
as, according to Brown, is the case in BM – this move would be appropriate. 
However, MBM features fundamental particles. At least in this respect, it is a bona 
fide Bohmian theory. In Bohmian theories, the natural basis for construing worlds 
are particle configurations, not the WF (IV.1). Also, Brown’s criticism of standard 
BM doesn’t carry over to MBM. The latter is not many worlds in denial; its particles 
are not superfluous theoretical structure. Rather, they are the substance material 
stuff is made of (IV.1.1). With particles playing the role of a substance in MBM’s 
ontology, an account of psychophysical parallelism should take them to be the 
physical aspect of the psychophysical. Thus, worlds should be construed from 
particle configurations (IV.1.2). Accordingly, I will introduce the notion of worlds as 
sets of particle configurations into the framework of MBM (IV.2). For this, I make 
use of a nontransitive relation – sufficient similarity – already familiar from the 
previous chapter on BSM. In order to make my approach work, I discuss the issue of 
superpositions in MBM (IV.3), and the import of the microscopic-macroscopic 
distinction on the construal of worlds (IV.4). I will argue that Barbour’s time-capsule 
approach is not suitable for the purpose of construing worlds, and ultimately, world 
histories (IV.5). It is deficient, in particular, when taking into consideration the 
background assumption – a more than minimal version of psychophysical 
parallelism – he makes, and which I share: for the impression of macroscopic 
change to emerge, Barbour, in accordance with our current best theories, relies on 
brain processes to happen. However, brain processes cannot be had from within 
individual, static configurations. While not logically being ruled out, time capsules 
alone don’t seem to provide an adequate solution to temporal solipsism. 
Accordingly, worlds should not be identified with Barbourian time capsules, but 
with sets of configurations that are sufficiently similar in the sense of not 
amounting to macroscopic differences for a given macroscopic object within a 
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configuration (IV.6). Before finally introducing worlds capable of forming FAPP-
continuous world histories into the framework, I examine some preliminaries 
regarding the entities worlds are supposed to consist of, and the space they inhabit 
(IV.7). In particular, issues revolving around particle identity, impenetrability and 
particle number conservation will be discussed (IV.7.1). With the appropriate notion 
of worlds thus developed (IV.8), world histories, FAPP-continuously linking up 
remote worlds in configuration space and time, can emerge (IV.9), thereby solving 
the issue of temporal solipsism while being compatible with a more than minimal 
psychophysical parallelism (IV.10). 
 
II. A short introduction to Minimal Bohmian Mechanics1 
 
To start off with a very quick overview, let me state the core features of Minimal 
Bohmian Mechanics. MBM can be considered a descendant of Bohmian Mechanics 
and the Everett interpretation (henceforth “Everett” for short) of non-relativistic 
Quantum Mechanics (QM). It is a Bohmian theory in the sense that it features a 
similar ontology as BM, namely particles endowed with definite locations in physical 
space at all times. These particles in 3-space are regarded as fundamental in a sense 
to be made explicit. Nevertheless, MBM does not necessarily fall under the 
primitive ontology approach, although it can be understood as a primitive ontology 
theory, as we will see shortly.2 For convenience, I will often refer to the particle 
configuration represented by a point in 3N-dimensional configuration space, 
sometimes called the super-particle3, rather than to the N-particle system in 3-
dimensional physical space. This does not imply some kind of ontological order 
between the two: The N-particle system in 3-dimensional physical space and the 1-
 
1
 Patrick Dürr (Oriel, Oxford) and I currently have a paper on MBM under review. For various 
reasons, I cannot fully reproduce it here. Instead, I will outline MBM in a significantly shortened and 
simplified manner appropriate for our present purposes. For a more detailed account, the reader is 
referred to the paper mentioned. Until publication, the manuscript is available upon request. 
2
 The primitive ontology approach shall be explained in paragraph II.4. For reasons to be elaborated 
there, I am hesitant calling MBM’s ontology a primitive ontology sensu stricto without further 
qualification. 
3
 Or “universal particle” or “world-particle” in Albert’s terminology, cf. Albert (1996, 278). 
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super-particle system in 3N-dimensional configuration space are one and the same 
thing, merely represented differently. The super-particle, i.e. the configuration of 
the N-particle system as a whole, is actualized at a single point in configuration 
space. MBM deviates from orthodox BM in that neither particles in 3-space nor the 
super-particle move on continuous trajectories. Instead, configurations are 
actualized at random, following the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (QEH), 
understood in MBM as a physical law stochastically restricting the actualizations of 
the super-particle in accordance with the probabilities given by the Born rule (BR): 
The super-particle jumps through configuration space, following the probability 
density associated with the universal wave function (WF). The WF itself, as usually, 
evolves deterministically according to the standard Schrödinger equation (SE). 
 
From these jumps of the super-particle through configuration space, together with 
the branching structure of the WF induced by decoherence, stems the main feature 
MBM inherits from Everett, namely its many-worlds character: at different times, 
the super-particle actualizes different configurations and, a fortiori, instantiates 
different world branches. The disposition for a given configuration to be actualized 
is encoded in the WF, with its probability – understood as a (single-case) propensity 
– given by the BR. MBM’s actualizations are genuinely, irreducibly chancy, but 
weighted: individual actualizations are always probabilistically restricted by the QEH 
in such a way that they collectively approximate Born statistics. 
 
A more detailed picture of MBM will emerge from a comparison with standard BM. 
Alterations of BM’s formalism, and a reinterpretation of probabilities in terms of 
propensities, as just mentioned, lead to the formulation of MBM. MBM turns out to 
be empirically equivalent with orthodox QM, as required of every viable alternative 
theory. Before giving a quick outline of standard BM, however, a few remarks about 
terminology are in order: 
 
It is important to be clear about which theory we refer to when speaking of 
(standard) Bohmian Mechanics. In particular, Bohmian Mechanics as put forward by 
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Dürr et al. (1992), despite its name, must not be confused with Bohm’s original 
theory as set out in his 1952 papers (Bohm 1952a,b). The latter goes under different 
names. Sometimes it is called “the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics”, or 
simply “the Bohm interpretation” (Hiley 2009, passim), sometimes “causal” or 
“ontological interpretation” (cf. Friebe et al. 2015, 195). Goldstein (2017, §5) refers 
to it as “the quantum potential formulation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory” or “the 
quantum potential formulation of Bohmian mechanics”. Cushing heads chapter 4 of 
his 1994 book “Bohm’s Quantum Theory”, but usually refers to it simply as “Bohm’s 
theory” (Cushing 1994, passim).4 I shall follow Cushing in calling this theory “Bohm’s 
theory”, or alternatively “Bohm’s original theory”, where the emphasis is called for. 
All these names refer to a theory that is different from what I, in accordance with 
Dürr et al. (1992), call Bohmian Mechanics, both formally and ontologically. Cushing 
(1994, §2.1, 9, emphasis in original) remarks that “a scientific theory can be seen as 
having two distinct components: its formalism and its interpretation”, where 
“formalism means a set of equations and a set of calculational rules for making 
predictions that can be compared with experiment”, and “interpretation refers to 
what the theory tells us about the underlying structure of these phenomena (i.e., 
the corresponding story about the furniture of the world – an ontology). Hence, one 
formalism with two different interpretations counts as two different theories”. 
Adopting this distinction, Bohm’s original theory and Bohmian Mechanics turn out 
to be decidedly different theories, for they differ in both formalism and 
interpretation. The former involves a quantum potential5 that contributes to a force 
acting on the particles (Bohm 1952a, 170): “the particles moves [sic] under the 
action of a force which is not entirely derivable from the classical potential […] but 
which also obtains a contribution from the ‘quantum-mechanical’ potential”. In 
Bohmian Mechanics, by contrast, the quantum potential plays no fundamental role. 
There are no fundamental forces acting on Bohmian particles (Goldstein 2017, §5): 
“Bohmian mechanics as presented here is a first-order theory, in which it is the 
 
4
 However, he also refers to it (ibid., 47) as “the causal interpretation”. 
5
 And restrictions on particle momenta to render the theory empirically equivalent with QM, see 
Bohm (1952a, 170), Cushing (1994, 43 and 45). 
 10 
velocity, the rate of change of position, that is fundamental. It is this quantity, given 
by the guiding equation, that the theory specifies directly and simply. The second-
order (Newtonian) concepts of acceleration and force, work and energy do not play 
any fundamental role. Bohm, however, did not regard his theory in this way. He 
regarded it, fundamentally, as a second-order theory, describing particles moving 
under the influence of forces, among which, however, is a force stemming from a 
‘quantum potential’.” Considering their different interpretations, i.e. their different 
ontologies, it becomes obvious that Bohm’s original theory and Bohmian Mechanics 
are not the same theory. The former, with its quantum potential generating a force 
on particles, provides “a story about the furniture of the world” quite different from 
the story told by the latter. As reported by Hiley (1999, 117), Bohm agrees with this 
assessment: “It should be noted that the views expressed in our book [Bohm & 
Hiley 1993] differ very substantially from those of Dürr et al. (1992) who have 
developed an alternative theory. It was very unfortunately that they chose the term 
‘Bohmian mechanics’ to describe their work. When Bohm first saw the term he 
remarked, “Why do they call it ‘Bohmian mechanics’? Have they not understood a 
thing that I have written?” […] It would have been far better if Dürr et al. (1992) had 
chosen the term ‘Bell mechanics’. That would have reflected the actual situation far 
more accurately.” Indeed, a lot of terminological confusion could have been 
avoided. However, that horse has left the barn. Goldstein et al.’s theory is 
standardly referred to as Bohmian Mechanics, and I will adhere to that terminology. 
 
II.1 Bohmian Mechanics as a solution to the measurement problem 
 
BM sets out to complete the formalism of QM and thus to provide a solution to 
what is generally referred to as “the measurement problem” of QM, arising from 
the general presence of superposition states.6 Maudlin (1995) provides a concise 
statement of, as he calls it (ibid., 7), the “problem of outcomes”. He presents three 
 
6
 This is not to say that the solution of the measurement problem was the motivation behind the 
development of BM from the historical beginning, but merely that it is one of the main motivations 
for adopting BM today. 
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propositions at most two of which can be true at the same time. The fact that the 
conjunction of these propositions is inconsistent constitutes the measurement 
problem. Paraphrasing Maudlin: 
 
(A) The WF provides a complete description of the physical properties of a 
system 
(B) The WF always evolves according to the SE 
(C) Measurement outcomes are always determinate. 
 
To see why (A), (B) and (C) can’t all be true, think of the following example of the 
measurement of the spin of an electron, in a certain direction. The outcome of such 
a measurement is determinate if (ibid.) “at the end of the measurement the 
measuring device is either in a state which indicates spin up (and not spin down) or 
spin down (and not spin up)” in that direction. 
 
Before the measurement, the device is in its pre-measurement ready state, 
|"#$%&⟩!.7 Let’s say it is a device that measures spin in z-direction, and we prepare 
an electron with spin up in that direction, written as |↑"⟩#. The expression |↑"⟩# ⊗
|"#$%&⟩!  denotes the state of the total system, consisting of the electron and the 
measuring device, before the measurement. After the measurement, the state of 
the total system will be |↑"⟩# ⊗ |*+⟩!, with |*+⟩!  indicating that the measuring 
device shows the outcome “up”, as expected of a properly working device. 
 
If we prepare the electron to be in the state |↑$⟩#  (spin up in x-direction), say, it will 
be in a superposition of z-spin states, which can be expressed as |↑$⟩# = 1/√2 
|↑"⟩# + 1/√2 |↓"⟩#. Accordingly, the pre-measurement state of the total system is 
|↑$⟩# ⊗ |"#$%&⟩! = 31 √2⁄ |↑"⟩# +	1 √2⁄ |↓"⟩6 ⊗ |"#$%&⟩!  
Proposition (B) above tells us that this pre-measurement state of the total system 
evolves into the post-measurement state 1 √2⁄ |↑"⟩# ⊗ |*+⟩! + 1 √2⁄ |↓"⟩# ⊗
 
7
 Except for minor adaptations, I follow Maudlin’s example and notation. 
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|%789⟩!. But being in this state, the measuring device isn’t in a determinate state 
of either showing the outcome “up” or the outcome “down”. It’s in a superposition. 
According to (A), this is a complete description of the physical properties of the 
system. So, assuming that (A) and (B) are true, the evolution of the system 
according to the SE results in the system being in an indeterminate state, and this 
state is the complete description. This contradicts proposition (C). 
 
Ways out of this predicament are to abandon one of the three propositions. 
Everettians will deny that (C) is true. Proponents of collapse8 theories reject (B). 
Bohmians hold that the WF isn’t a complete description of the physical properties 
of a system. They thus abandon (A) and attempt to complete the description with a 
definite particle configuration. 
 
BM, with its completion of the state description by adding a definite particle 
configuration, indeed can provide a solution to the measurement problem. In light 
of the severity of this problem, this provides good motivation to consider Bohmian 
theories as viable alternatives to orthodox QM and its various interpretations. 
However, for a theory, or a class of theories, to be viable alternatives to a given 
theory, it is not sufficient to solve some problem of the latter, be that as important 
as it may. Being a viable alternative requires empirical equivalence with the theory 
to be replaced. In the following sections, I will therefore first provide a general 
description of BM and establish its empirical equivalence with orthodox QM, and 
then give an account of MBM’s empirical equivalence with BM. Via the transitivity 
of empirical equivalence, MBM can be said to be empirically equivalent with QM, iff 
it is empirically equivalent with BM, and BM is empirically equivalent with QM. So 




 As Maudlin notes (ibid, 8), it would be better to speak of non-linear evolution instead of collapse, 
since there are theories in which the evolution of the WF is always non-linear. However, so-called 
collapse interpretations are the most prominent amongst those featuring a non-linear evolution of 
the WF. 
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II.2 A general description of BM and its empirical equivalence with QM 
 
BM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It describes a universe consisting of : 
particles and their deterministic, continuous evolution in space. The particle 
configuration ;% at time < is given by the definite particle positions of the : 
particles at that time. BM adheres to the standard, non-relativistic SE, describing 
the evolution of the universal quantum wave function Ψ for a universe of : 
particles. The guiding equation (GE), featuring Ψ, describes the evolution of the 
universal particle configuration ; in terms of continuous trajectories of the 
Bohmian particles. Given some initial configuration ;%!, i.e. the initial spatial 
positions of all : particles at initial time <&, the GE determines the configuration for 
all times <', before and after <&. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis (QEH) states 
that (initial) ensembles of identically prepared subsystems of the universe, each 
with the WF ψ, typically, i.e. almost always, are in fact Born distributed with 
theoretical distribution ?%( = |ψ|), approximating the empirical distribution ?#*+ 
for large ensembles of identically prepared subsystems.9 This requires that ours is a 
typical universe, and that in typical universes, typical ensembles are Born 
distributed. 
 
Justifying the typicality approach to BM is a rather intricate matter. I am unable to 
engage with it here. However, the alleged typicality of our universe 
notwithstanding, since BM is a deterministic theory and contains the assumption 
that particle positions are always definite, its probabilities for finding an individual 
particle at a definite location are often construed as a measure of the ignorance of 
an observer about the precise locations of particles, especially their initial 
distribution.10 While the typicality approach explains why one finds the distribution 
 
9
 Cf. Goldstein (2012, 66): “The theoretical distribution is an idealization providing a good 
approximation to the empirical distribution, !"#$ ≈ !%&, in the limit of large ensembles of 
subsystems.” 
10
 See, e.g., Bell (1987b, 112): “the only use of probability here is, as in classical statistical mechanics, 
to take account of uncertainty in initial conditions.” Likewise, Passon (2010, 53): “The result of the 
experiment is random only for us, because we don’t know the initial conditions.” (My translation.) 
Callender (2007, 364) acknowledges this fact – “When speaking of probabilities in a deterministic 
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of particles in ensembles of identically prepared systems as |ψ(;)|), it does not do 
away with the ignorance interpretation of probabilities for the position of particles 
in individual systems. For them, an observer can only provide probabilities to be 
here or there, because they don’t know where the particles actually are. But since, 
according to BM, they must be at a definite location, which evolves 
deterministically according to the GE, these probabilities do not reflect a 
fundamentally stochastic nature, but the observer’s ignorance.11  
 
Especially if one regards BM to be a “quantum theory without observers” (cf. Allori 
et al. 2008, passim), it prima facie seems unclear whose ignorance about the initial 
configuration it is that is reflected in BM's QEH. Also, shouldn’t probabilities be 
construed as fundamental and objective in a theory that features them at its heart 
and claims to be objective, without observers? My intuition tells me that they 
should. But irrespective of whether your intuition agrees with mine on that matter, 
it is clear that on MBM’s irreducibly stochastic actualization dynamics, probabilities 
are construed as fundamental and objective. If you share my intuition, you might 
regard this as an advantage MBM has over BM. 
 
QEH and the GE together guarantee empirical equivalence between BM and QM. 
For example, the particle positions measured at the screen of a repeated double slit 
experiment will (almost certainly) approximate the distribution expected according 
to BR. The GE ensures that this is always the case: If an ensemble of initial 
 
theory one often hears it said that the probabilities are ‘epistemic,’ i.e., due to ignorance” – but 
rejects the ignorance interpretation. 
11
 With respect to this ignorance interpretation of probabilities, BM resembles Bohm’s original 
theory, (cf. Bohm 1952a, 166): “In contrast to the usual interpretation, this alternative interpretation 
permits us to conceive of each individual system as being in a precisely definable state, whose 
changes with time are determined by definite laws, analogous to (but not identical with) the classical 
equations of motion. Quantum-mechanical probabilities are regarded (like their counterparts in 
classical statistical mechanics) as only a practical necessity and not as a manifestation of an inherent 
lack of complete determination in the properties of matter at the quantum level.” As the reason for 
this practical necessity, he cites “uncontrollable disturbances” (ibid., 171): “In the usual 
interpretation, however, the need for a probability description is regarded as inherent in the very 
structure of matter […], whereas in our interpretation, it arises […] because from one measurement 
to the next, we cannot in practice predict or control the precise location of a particle, as a result of 
corresponding unpredictable and uncontrollable disturbances introduced by the measuring 
apparatus.” 
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configurations already approximates the Born distribution, it will also approximate 
the Born distribution at earlier and later times, because the dynamics given by the 
GE preserves the initial distribution. Hence, in the experiment just mentioned, if the 
ensemble was (approximately) Born distributed at its preparation, it will be at the 
time of measurement at the screen, and vice versa. In other words, regarding 
observable phenomena, BM comprises the same claims as QM does: the theories 
are empirically equivalent. 
 
Apart from their positions, the usual dynamical properties of particles – the 
properties that can change over time – are contextual in BM. Spin is an example of 
such a contextual property of a particle, a quantity that supervenes on the 
complete state description WF + configuration. It is a way of describing the 
particle’s behaviour in certain contexts. Accordingly, the spin of a particle is 
determined by its behaviour under certain experimental conditions, e.g. in a Stern-
Gerlach experiment. Recall that also in orthodox QM, a spin measurement 
ultimately is a position measurement: one of two detectors registers an event, 
while the other doesn’t. Whether this is interpreted as a Bohmian particle ending 
up in said detector, or as a wave function collapsing onto the corresponding 
eigenstate upon measurement, makes a difference in metaphysics and ontology, 
but, empirically, amounts to the same phenomenon. Again, the theories exhibit 
empirical equivalence. 
 
So much for this quick outline of BM and its empirical equivalence with QM. It shall 
provide the background against which, in the following section, MBM is discussed. 
In particular, I will establish MBM’s empirical equivalence with BM, and a fortiori 
with QM. 
 
II.3 From Bohmian Mechanics to Minimal Bohmian Mechanics 
 
In essence, MBM is the somewhat elaborate claim that the GE is not strictly 
necessary for a Bohmian theory, i.e., that a Bohmian theory without a GE is viable, 
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in the sense that it is internally consistent and empirically equivalent to standard 
BM – and hence orthodox QM – and metaphysically adequate. 
 
To be more precise, MBM, formally, retains the SE (including the WF) and QEH from 
BM, but not the GE. In addition, it reinterprets QEH as a stochastic law for the 
actualization of configurations. Together, the SE, the WF and QEH guarantee 
empirical equivalence: the SE provides the dynamics for the WF, and the WF as 
featuring in the QEH restricts the distribution of particles in ensembles, in the same 
way it did in BM for the so-called “initial” distribution. But while in BM, the role of 
the QEH is most obvious for this initial distribution, MBM makes its role explicit for 
all distributions, at all times. Recall that, in BM, particle positions are evolved by the 
GE in such a manner that the distribution is preserved. If an ensemble is Born 
distributed once, it is for all times.12 But note that, under the condition that QEH is 
assumed for all times instead of merely some initial time <&, the WF, SE and QEH 
alone, i.e. without the GE, provide sufficient theoretical structure to guarantee Born 
distribution at all times. More colloquially: If we feel justified to assume QEH for 
some arbitrary point in time, why shouldn’t we feel justified to assume it for any 
point in time, calling the distribution at this time the “initial” distribution, if so 
desired? Of any distribution, QEH will tell us that it approximates Born statistics. 
One might be compelled to reply that it is simpler to assume QEH just for one 
instant and let the dynamics do the work. But note that this requires an additional 
assumption itself, namely the deterministic particle dynamics as represented by the 
GE. In effect, we are replacing two assumptions – that QEH holds for the initial 
configuration, and that the GE evolves the configuration from there on, such that 
 
12
 Not taking into account the possible relaxation of non-equilibrium probability distributions into 
equilibrium as shown by Valentini, which requires the assumption that the initial probability 
distribution is suitably coarse-grained (Valentini 1991, 8): “The proof rests on the assumption of no 
‘micro-structure’ for the initial state, as for the classical case. Specifically, we assume the equality of 
coarse-grained and fine-grained quantities at the initial time t=0, i.e. we assume #$(0) =
#(0), |ψ(0)|'$$$$$$$$$$ = |ψ(,)|'.” As Norsen (2018) shows, this allows for the evolution of the probability 
distribution not only from non-equilibrium to equilibrium, but also from equilibrium to non-
equilibrium. Given we do not assume QEH and instead follow Valentini’s derivation, it cannot be 
claimed that an ensemble is Born distributed at all times, if it is Born distributed once. However, for 
MBM, we assume QEH, such that the claim still holds. 
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the ensemble always approximates Born distribution – by one assumption, namely 
that the QEH holds for all configurations, at all times. Arguably, the exchange is 
worthwhile: While avoiding the assumption of a suitable GE, including the 
metaphysical baggage this brings with it, we merely extend the assumption that the 
QEH holds for (at least) one instant to the assumption that it holds for all instants. 
As long as there is no strong reason against it, this seems fair. After all, standard BM 
includes the same claim of the ensemble always being (approximately) Born 
distributed, if it ever is. The difference between BM and MBM is how we arrive 
there: MBM assumes applicability of the QEH at all times. BM arrives there via the 
assumption of the applicability of the QEH at some (initial) time plus the assumption 
of an appropriate particle dynamics (GE) that guarantees Born distribution at all 
other times as well, given Born distribution at the initial time. 
 
Let’s elaborate. Does the GE play an indispensable role in the preservation of Born 
distribution over time? According to MBM, it doesn’t. In BM, the GE serves a dual 
purpose: The first is to evolve the positions of individual particles deterministically. 
The second is to do this in such a manner that the ensemble distribution at all times 
is compatible with the restrictions imposed by QEH, given the initial distribution is. 
QEH in BM is exactly that, “the assumption that the initial (t = 0) configuration of a 
quantum system was random with distribution B, [i.e. Born distribution].” (Norsen 
2018, 5) Regarding its first purpose, it is easy to dispense with it, if one doesn’t 
insist on determinism.13 Regarding its second purpose, within the framework of 
MBM, the GE is unnecessary as well. Taking the QEH as restricting not only the 
initial configuration, but the random actualizations of configurations in general, 
ensembles of actualized configurations will (approximately) show the required Born 
distribution. Postulating trajectories, then, is superfluous. Following Norsen’s (2018) 
 
13
 Even proponents of BM, despite regarding BM as (Goldstein et al. 2011, 12) “the simplest 
satisfactory version of quantum mechanics”, don’t feel particularly committed to determinism: “The 
circumstance that it uses point particles and is deterministic does not mean that we are dogmatically 
committed to point particles or determinism; also indeterministic theories with another ontology 
may very well be satisfactory.” In the same spirit, they (Dürr & Teufel 2009, 9) reject the statement 
that “the aim of Bohmian mechanics is to restore determinism in the quantum world. That is false. 
[...] What is ‘out there’ could just as well be governed by stochastic laws [...]. It happens to be 
deterministic, which is fine, but not an ontological necessity.” 
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presentation of equivariance, one could say that with the equivariance of ? = |Ψ|), 
“the usual quantum ‘probability density’” (ibid., 4) or “wave function ‘intensity’” 
(ibid., 5), the equivariance of the “particle probability distribution” B, in MBM is 
ensured, quite trivially, via the QEH. Additional dynamics preserving the initial 
distribution over time isn’t necessary. Either way, equivariance is achieved, and it is 
equivariance that is responsible for the fact that the actual, empirical particle 
distribution “tracks” the probability density. Because both theories have this 
feature, they are empirically equivalent, and a fortiori, because of the empirical 
equivalence of BM and QM, MBM and QM are empirically equivalent as well. In 
conclusion, for empirical equivalence with QM, trajectories are not needed. 
 
This argument by itself might not convince everyone to adopt MBM over standard 
BM. One might have extra-empirical reasons to prefer a theory with continuous, 
deterministic trajectories, despite them not being strictly necessary. In particular, 
one might argue with Bell that a fundamentally stochastic dynamics of the 
configuration leads to a temporal form of solipsism. This issue will be discussed at 
length. For now, I am not going to take sides on the matter. My present claim is 
merely that MBM is a viable alternative to BM, given one doesn’t insist on a 
deterministic, continuous particle dynamics, because empirically, the two theories 
are equivalent. 
 
How, then, do particle configurations in MBM evolve in such a manner that QEH 
holds at all times? This is due to QEH restricting the random, discontinuous particle 
dynamics that replaces the GE. In MBM, the particle configuration – i.e. the super-
particle – of the universe is assumed to instantaneously jump through 3N-
dimensional configuration space, in accordance with QEH. Accordingly, the N 
Bohmian particles locate and dislocate themselves in 3-dimensional physical space. 
Without requiring any external triggering mechanism – after all, the universe by 
definition is all there is, such that there is nothing external to it – these jumps of the 
super-particle are spontaneous. The disposition for certain configurations to be 
actualized is encoded in the WF, and the respective probabilities (propensities) as 
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given by BR – being a measure of a fundamental feature of the universe, namely 
said disposition – are objective. In contradistinction to BM’s deterministic particle 
dynamics, actualizations in MBM at any time are fundamentally random. They are 
stochastically independent from each other: B(;% ∩ ;%() = B(;%) ∗ B(;%().14 There 
is no link between actualized configurations at different times. In Bell’s (1987b, 135) 
words: “there is no association of the particular present with any particular past.” 
But as has been argued, this link, which would be provided by trajectories in BM, is 
not necessary for empirical equivalence with orthodox QM. The stochastic dynamics 
of the super-particle, following the probability density as it jumps, is sufficient, 
because it adheres to the restrictions imposed by QEH, and being in accord with 
QEH at all times is sufficient for being empirically equivalent with QM. 
 
Having established the empirical equivalence of MBM, BM and QM, despite the 
former’s lack of continuous trajectories, I shall now turn to two interrelated issues: 
MBM’s classification as a primitive ontology theory, and its solution to the problem 
of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. Many proponents of 
BM deem a theory’s classification as a PO crucial for it being bona fide Bohmian. In 
light of this, we must ask whether MBM can be made compatible with the PO 
 
14
 Some remarks are in order regarding the stochastic independence of MBM’s actualizations at 
different times. At first blush, the stochastic independence of actualizations may seem 
counterintuitive. Underlying this impression is the following thought: the probability density 
distribution over configuration space is determined by the WF. The latter evolves deterministically, 
governed by the SE, so the probability density at one time isn’t independent of the probability 
density at another time. The actualization at one time might be informative about the probability 
density at that time, and via the latter’s deterministic evolution, about the probability density at 
other times. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude, the actualization of ,%!  at -) isn’t 
stochastically independent of the actualization of ,% at -. This reasoning is misleading, however. In 
responding as follows, I hope to make clear that MBM’s actualizations indeed are stochastically 
independent. 
On MBM, there is no collapse of the universal WF upon the actualization of a configuration. If there 
was, an actualization would suddenly change the WF and hence the probability density distribution 
for subsequent actualizations. Because there is no such collapse, the probability density distribution 
governing the actualization of ,%!  at -′ isn’t influenced by the actualization of ,% at -. We may 
therefore take the probability of the joint event to factorise. The stochastic independence of 
actualizations is not affected by the lawlike dependence between probability density distributions at 
different times. The latter are related to each other via the deterministic evolution of the WF, 
governed by the SE. But this has no bearing on the fact that actualizations at different times don’t 
affect each other. 
I thank Jiji Zhang (Lingnan) for pressing me on clarifying this point. 
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approach. After presenting the PO approach, I will argue that this is indeed possible, 
but that, in order to also solve the problem of communication, our interpretational 
freedom with respect to the WF is restricted. In particular, subsuming MBM under 
the PO paradigm seems to require abandoning the view that the WF encodes a 
disposition. 
 
II.4 MBM as a PO theory and the problem of communication 
 
As just noted, MBM can be understood as a primitive ontology theory, when 
imposing certain restrictions on the interpretation of the WF. In principle, at least in 
my view, nothing much hinges on this classification. However, since proponents of 
BM often regard applicability of the PO framework as crucial for a theory to be 
Bohmian, I want to show that MBM can be made compatible with it, thereby pre-
empting the criticism that MBM is not a viable alternative to BM because it cannot 
be classified as a PO theory. Abandoning an ontologically thick, dispositionalist view 
of the WF (and instead adopting an ontologically thin stance towards the WF) opens 
up this possibility. 
 
II.4.1 What makes a PO theory? 
 
To tackle this issue, we first need to be clear about the central features of the PO 
approach. What makes a PO theory? Following the literature, the PO approach 
imposes a strict distinction between primitive and non-primitive elements of the 
ontology of a theory. It is only the primitive elements that are fundamental and 
make up/compose non-fundamental physical objects. Allori (2015, 107f.) writes: 
“what constitutes physical objects, the PO, […] lives in three-dimensional space or 
space-time and constitutes the building blocks of everything else. In the formalism 
of the theory, the variables representing the PO are called the primitive variables. In 
addition, there are other [non-primitive] variables necessary to implement the 
dynamics for the primitive variables”. Pertaining to fundamental theories, the 
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primitive variables (ibid., 109) “are ontologically primitive, given that they represent 
matter and they provide the fundamental entities the theory describes.” 
 
In order to make the notion of PO more precise, this fundamentality claim should 
be spelled out. It consists of two separate claims: (1) The PO is fundamental in the 
sense that all other physical objects are composed of its elements. (2) The PO is 
fundamental in the sense that it itself is not ontologically dependent on further, 
non-3D entities. 
 
I shall refer to the kind of fundamentality claimed in (1) as fundamentalCMB: The 
primitive entities are fundamentalCMB in that they form the complete minimal basis 
(CMB) for composed physical objects.15 That is to say, the PO contains all and only 
those 3D entities from which all other physical objects are made. The qualifications 
“complete” and “minimal” are of some importance. The former (“complete”) 
specifies the PO such that it contains all the elements necessary to make up other 
physical objects. The reason for imposing this completeness requirement should be 
immediately obvious: if the PO were not complete, not all other physical objects 
could be composed from its elements. The latter (“minimal”) specifies the PO such 
that it contains only those elements. I.e., the PO does not contain entities beyond 
those necessary to compose all other physical objects. The reason for imposing this 
requirement is fairly obvious, too: Without insisting on the PO being minimal in 
order to be fundamental, we could simply regard the set of all physical objects, 
including composed objects, to be the PO.16 With the PO being fundamental, this 
would render composed objects fundamental as well. At best, this amounts to an 
empty notion of fundamentality. At worst, it is an outright contradiction. In any 




 I thank an anonymous reviewer of my paper with Patrick Dürr for pressing on this further 
specification of the PO in terms of a complete minimal basis. 
16
 Cf. Tahko (2018, 1.3): “We have included a minimality condition in the definition of (CMB). This is 
an important addition, because otherwise we could take the set of all the entities in the world and 
call it complete, given that this set as well would include all the fundamental entities. So, according 
to (CMB), the complete minimal basis must include all and only the fundamental entities.” 
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The kind of fundamentality claimed in (2) shall be referred to as fundamentalODEP. 
Since it contains the notion of ontological dependence on non-3D entities, we must 
flesh out the meaning of this notion. Esfeld & Oldofredi (2018, 11) demand that the 
elements of the PO be fundamental (i.e., fundamentalODEP) in the sense that “they 
are not reducible to more elementary notions”. Ontological independence, then, 
simply means to be irreducible in this sense. However, this seems to be not precise 
enough, for ontological independence in terms of irreducibility can mean several 
things. For example, an entity can be said to be irreducible if it isn’t instantiated by 
a non-3D entity playing its functional role17, or if it isn’t identical to a non-3D 
entity.18 
 
Demanding irreducibility only with respect to non-3D entities requires an 
explanation. Arguably, it already would be a blow to a PO theory if its PO should 
turn out to be reducible to 3D entities, and hence to “more elementary notions”. 
But that blow wouldn’t be fatal. It would still be possible to revise the theory, such 
that it contains as its new PO those 3D entities to which its former PO turned out to 
be reducible. As long as the new PO is not reducible any further, it can be regarded 
as fundamentalODEP. The revised theory, then, remains a PO theory. Reducibility to 
3D entities thus might be an inconvenience, but it doesn’t hinder the PO approach 
in principle. However, reducibility of the PO to non-3D entities is fatal to the PO 
approach. In this scenario, the theory can’t simply be revised such that it contains 
as its new PO those entities that turned out to be fundamental, because the PO 
approach doesn’t allow for non-3D entities in the PO. Hence, demanding 
 
17
 On Everett, particles, just like macroscopic objects, are reducible in this sense: They are structural 
patterns, instantiated by the (non-3D) universal WF, playing the functional role of such objects. As 
such, they are useful ways of describing reality, albeit at a non-fundamental level (cf. Wallace 2012, 
Ch. 2). Fundamentally, all there is is the universal WF. 
18
 In addition to these options, one might be tempted to spell out reducibility in terms of 
supervenience. An entity, then, would be reducible if it supervenes on a non-3D entity, i.e., if change 
in the former cannot be had without change in the latter. However, while supervenience seems 
necessary for reducibility, it is unclear whether supervenience suffices for reducibility, such that the 
latter could be spelled out in terms of the former. As McLaughlin & Bennett (2018, 3.3) put it: 
“Everyone agrees that reduction requires supervenience. […] The more interesting issue is whether 
supervenience suffices for reduction”. It lies outside the scope of this thesis to engage with this 
debate. I will therefore not further discuss supervenience as a candidate sufficient for spelling out 
reducibility of the PO. 
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irreducibility only with respect to non-3D entities seems apt: the PO must be 
ontologically independent in that it is not reducible to non-3D entities, e.g. the 3N-
dimensional WF. That is, no non-3D entity may be playing the PO’s functional role 
or be identical with it. 
  
In light of this restricted demand, there is another type of ontological dependence 
that should be mentioned, because it plays a somewhat special role in the context 
of classifying theories as PO theories. One could argue that entities are not 
fundamentalODEP if they have proper mereological parts. That is to say, 
fundamentalODEP entities should be mereologically simple. At first blush, a PO not 
being mereologically simple seems to be fixable just as easily as general 
dependence on 3D entities: if elements of the PO turn out to have proper 
mereological parts, the theory can be revised, such that the new PO consists of 
those proper mereological parts. The PO still wouldn’t be reducible to non-3D 
entities. However, an issue arises if there can’t be mereological simples in the PO, 
such that it can never be fundamental. Consider the GRW matter density theory 
(GRWm), usually classified as a PO theory: with the matter density being 
continuously spread over physical space, every mereological part of it has further, 
proper mereological parts. As Esfeld (2018, 174) diagnoses, “the matter density 
stuff, being gunk, is infinitely divisible”. Being infinitely divisible, the matter density 
cannot be fundamentalODEP, not because it itself has proper mereological parts, 
which would be fixable by revising the theory such that the parts are regarded as 
the PO, but because its proper mereological parts have proper mereological parts as 
well, and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, it is impossible to arrive at a revision featuring a 
truly fundamentalODEP PO. To resolve this issue, we can either decide to not regard 
GRWm as a PO theory, or to allow for fundamentalODEP entities not being 
mereologically simple. I leave this for the proponents of the PO approach to decide. 




To sum up: the primitive ontology of a theory consists of those and only those 3D 
entities that are fundamentalCMB – i.e. that form a complete minimal basis – to all 
other physical objects, and that are fundamentalODEP, i.e. that are not reducible to 
other, non-3D entities, in the sense elaborated. 
 
II.4.2 Is MBM compatible with the PO approach? 
  
Prima facie, MBM’s particles aren’t reducible to non-3D entities: they are not 
instantiated by non-3D entities playing their functional role, aren’t identical to non-
3D entities, and don’t have proper mereological parts. That is to say, they are 
fundamentalODEP. In this respect, MBM seems compatible with the PO approach. At 
least for now. 
 
But are MBM’s particles fundamentalCMB as well? This depends on the ontological 
status and role ascribed to MBM’s WF. If the latter, under a given interpretation, 
turns out to be part of the complete minimal basis and hence of the primitive 
ontology, then, under this interpretation, MBM cannot be a PO theory, since the PO 
approach doesn’t allow for non-3D entities in the PO, which the WF is. 
 
An interpretation of the WF, however, must not simply be chosen at will, such that 
the theory can be classified as a PO theory. A further requirement is imposed, 
namely that the theory be able to solve the “problem of communication”19 arising 
from the (Ney 2012, 11) “two-space reading of Bohmian mechanics” (and likewise 
of MBM), i.e. arising from the fact that (ibid.) “the theory posits the existence of 
two physical spaces: a high-dimensional configuration space occupied by the 
wavefunction, and a separate, three-dimensional physical space occupied by the 
many particles that make up our tables, chairs, and the other objects of our 
manifest image of the world.” In short, to render MBM a PO theory, the 
interpretation of its WF must meet two demands at the same time: it must solve or 
 
19
 As it is called e.g. in Suárez (2015) and references therein. 
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circumvent the problem of communication while not considering the WF to be part 
of the complete minimal basis. This, I hold, can only be achieved under a 
“nomological” interpretation, i.e. when the WF is regarded as a law, or lawlike. To 
see this, let’s have a look at the problem of communication. 
 
II.4.3 The problem of communication 
 
In standard BM, the N individual Bohmian particles, with position being their only 
non-contextual dynamical property, are located in ordinary, 3-dimensional physical 
space, and make up all physical objects, while the WF lives on 3N-dimensional 
configuration space, restricts their initial distribution and guides the evolution of 
their positions via the GE. This is the two-space reading of BM – particles living in 3-
dimensional physical space, the WF living in 3N-dimensional configuration space – 
ultimately resulting in the problem of communication: 
 
On the one hand, the WF’s role in the theory suggests interpreting it as a real, 
physical object, e.g. a field. After all, how can an abstract, purely mathematical 
object, defined on likewise abstract and purely mathematical configuration space 
influence fundamental, real objects, i.e. particles, in physical 3-space? To explain 
this influence, the WF should be considered a real part of the complete, physical 
state description and its evolution, at least in the sense that it has an effect on the 
fundamental stuff (Ney 2012, 11): “For even on this two-space reading of Bohmian 
mechanics, where the particles are ontologically fundamental, it is still true that it is 
states of the wavefunction that determine these particles’ behavior over time. The 
particles themselves only have positions. And what they do at later times according 
to this theory, i.e. what positions they move to over time, depends on the 
wavefunction.” Featuring in the GE, the WF guides the movement of particles on 
their trajectories through physical space (in a non-local manner). Likewise, it 
restricts their (initial) distribution, as it features in QEH. The central role the WF 
plays in the formalism, and for the empirical adequacy of BM, renders it difficult to 
immediately dismiss it as a purely mathematical artefact without any ontological 
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significance. As Bell (1987a, 128, his emphasis) writes: “No one can understand this 
theory until he is willing to think of E as a real, objective field rather than just a 
‘probability amplitude’. Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in 3N-space.”20 
 
On the other hand, how to account for the influence this real physical object has on 
the fundamental particles, given the different spaces they live in? How does a 
physical object in 3N-dimensional configuration space tell the stuff in 3-space what 
to do? This is the problem of communication. As Suárez (2015, 10f.) notes, “this is 
generally a problem for any account on which the wave-function in configuration 
space ‘dictates’ features of physical 3D space that are responsible for the motion of 
particles, whether it be a multifield, forces acting in the space, a quantum potential 
located in that space, or directly the motions of the 3D particles themselves. […] 
How does the wavefunction in configuration space guide the particles in physical 
space?” 
 
There are several ways MBM can deal with this problem of communication. For 
example, one can regard the super-particle in configuration space as the 
fundamentalODEP referent of MBM’s ontology while not claiming such 
fundamentality for the Bohmian particles in 3-space. Such a move would 
immediately solve the problem (by circumventing it): adopting Albert’s super-
particle view, the fundamentalODEP referent of the theory is put into the same space 
as the WF, i.e. 3N-dimensional configuration space. In contradistinction to the “two-
space reading of Bohmian mechanics”, this can be called the one-space reading of 
MBM. The super-particle actualizes instantaneous, definite configurations in 
configuration space, with the actualization disposition encoded in the WF, living on 
the very same space. The problem of an entity living in one space influencing 
another, living in a different space, no longer arises. At the same time, through the 
configuration being definite at all times, particle positions in 3-space are definite as 
 
20
 Note that this remark applies to BM as well as to Bohm’s original theory with a quantum potential 
(cf. Suárez 2015, 10f., as quoted in the following passage.) Bell himself, in his 1987a as well as in his 
unpublished paper from 1971 (see II.5 below), refers to Bohm’s work of 1952. 
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well, allowing for the composition of physical objects. Bohmian particles in 3-space, 
hence, remain fundamentalCMB. However, if we want MBM to be compatible with 
the PO approach as presented above, this option leads to a dead end: while, with 
adopting the super-particle as the fundamentalODEP referent of the theory, Bohmian 
particles in 3-space remain fundamentalCMB, they are no longer fundamentalODEP, for 
they either are secondary to the super-particle, or, at best, identical with it. Also, 
the super-particle being fundamentalODEP conflicts with the PO approach, 
demanding that the PO should be entirely 3-dimensional. This can only be resolved 
if we think of the super-particle not as the fundamental referent of the theory, but 
as a mere representational variation, describing the configuration of the Bohmian 
particles in physical 3-space, such that the latter remain fundamentalODEP and 
fundamentalCMB. But then, the solution of the problem of communication via the 
super-particle view is blocked, for we arrive at two distinct spaces after all. 
 
A possible solution to this problem, of course, would be to relax the requirements 
imposed on PO theories, such that either non-3D entities may figure as primitives, 
or that 3D entities are not required to be fundamentalODEP. However, construed as 
above, this is incompatible with the PO approach. 
 
II.4.4 Disposition or law? 
 
So, taking the super-particle to be MBM’s fundamental referent is of no avail to the 
problem of communication. We hence shall stick with the usual Bohmian particles. 
In this case, the second option for solving the problem of communication must be 
sought in the interpretation of the WF. In what follows, I will consider dispositional 
as well as nomological interpretations. So far, dispositionalism was assumed for 
MBM’s actualizations of particle configurations, more or less implicitly, without 
pointing to an alternative reading. To make up for this, let me be explicit now: 
dispositionalismMBM is the view that, at any given time, the holistic N-particle 
system has a certain disposition, encoded in the WF, to actualize certain 
configurations. Note that the N-particle system is holistic in virtue of the particles 
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sharing this disposition: they aren’t completely independent of each other. Rather, 
the N-particle system exhibits a genuinely quantum-mechanical feature – 
entanglement – that doesn’t supervene on the individual properties and spatial 
distribution of the individual particles. In other words: the N-particle system as a 
whole has a feature that can’t be reduced to the features of the individual particles. 
The latter, thus, aren’t ontologically independent of the former. On 
dispositionalismMBM, the problem of communication is straightforwardly avoided: 
the 3N-dimensional WF encodes the disposition for the actualization behaviour of 
the N-particle system as a whole, represented as a point in 3N-dimensional 
configuration space. But because of that, dispositionalismMBM isn’t compatible with 
the PO approach: the particles in 3-space aren’t fundamentalODEP, and the super-
particle isn’t 3-dimensional. Neither are suitable candidates for a primitive 
ontology. 
 
When adopting dispositionalismMBM, it seems, MBM isn’t compatible with the PO 
approach. But dispositionalism certainly isn’t the only option to interpret the WF. 
Chen (2019) provides a survey of several realist interpretations of the WF, amongst 
them nomological interpretations (ibid., 8): “nomological interpretations hold that 
the wave function is nomological, i.e., on a par with laws of nature.” He 
distinguishes “two kinds of nomological interpretations of the wave function: the 
strong nomological interpretations and the weak nomological interpretations.” Dürr 
et al. (2012, 12.3) discuss the possibility of the former for BM (ibid., 266): “one 
should think about […] the possibility that it’s nomological, nomic – that it’s really 
more in the nature of a law than a concrete physical reality.” Likening it to 
equations of motion in classical mechanics, they suggest an analogous 
interpretation of the WF (ibid., 267), as “just a convenient device in terms of which 
the equations of motion can be nicely expressed. We’re suggesting that you should 
regard the wave function in exactly the same way.” Esfeld’s “quantum 
Humeanism”, following Chen, is an example of a weak nomological interpretation. 
Esfeld (2014, 455) holds that it is the primitive ontology approach to quantum 
physics that first of all enables quantum Humeanism: “the background that enables 
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Humeanism to stand firm is the development of what is known as primitive 
ontology theories of quantum physics.” Apart from the matter distributed in 
ordinary space(-time), there is, according to Esfeld, nothing but a law “as that what 
fixes (in a probabilistic or a deterministic manner) the temporal development of the 
distribution of matter in physical space, given an initial configuration of matter. 
That’s all. In particular, the quantum mechanical wavefunction is part and parcel of 
the law instead of being a physical entity on a par with the primitive ontology.” For 
his Humean approach, however, this law must not exist independently of the PO, 
but supervene on it (ibid., 456): “the Humean has to regard the law as supervening 
on the distribution of matter throughout the whole of space-time, that is, the entire 
mosaic of ‘local beables’ or local matters of particular fact.” As such, it is part of the 
“best system” systematizing these “local matters of particular fact” (ibid., 459): “For 
the Humean, the universal wavefunction and the dynamical law that appear in a 
physical theory such as Bohmian mechanics or the GRW theory are part of the best 
system, that is, the system that achieves the best balance between being simple 
and being informative in capturing what there is in the physical world. That system 
– and everything that belongs to it – supervenes on the entire distribution of the 
local matters of particular fact throughout the whole of space-time.” 
 
It is neither my intent to arbitrate between different options of nomological 
interpretations of the WF, nor to advocate nomological interpretations in general. 
That being said, 
for those insisting on the PO approach, both, weak and strong nomological 
interpretations, are options worth considering for the interpretation of MBM’s WF. 
Neither fall prey to the problem of communication, nor put non-3D entities into the 
primitive ontology. Imposing these demands, a nomological reading of the WF 
seems to be the most promising way to classify MBM as a PO theory (while solving 
the problem of communication). Is this a conclusive argument to the effect that 
MBM’s WF must be read this way? Certainly not. For one, there might be other 
options beyond the ones presented in this paragraph. Second, the aim of the 
exercise was to show that MBM can be made compatible with the PO approach. It 
 30 
can, but that, in itself, is merely responding to a demand, rather than justifying it. 
Those who deem it crucial that a theory be compatible with the PO approach may 
go for a nomological interpretation. Others may adopt a different one, 
dispositionalismMBM, for example, which provides a solution to the problem of 
communication by endowing the particles with a real, non-3D property, but, 
because of that, isn’t compatible with the PO approach. I will abstain from arguing 
in favour or against the alternatives: in my view, the interpretational openness of 
MBM is not a bug, but a feature. 
 
Irrespective of this interpretational issue, MBM’s metaphysical adequacy can still be 
questioned. The problem we are going to discuss in the following section harkens 
back to the roots of MBM, Bell’s “Everett (?) theory”, and has been dubbed 
“temporal solipsism”. Challenging the latter’s metaphysical adequacy, it is the 
reason for Bell’s dismissal of the theory, and hence deserves some attention. At first 
glance, it stands to reason that MBM, like Bell’s Everett (?) theory, is undermined by 
temporal solipsism. That this is not the case, we will see now. 
 
II.5 A bit of history: Bell's Everett (?) theory and temporal solipsism 
 
Despite its empirical equivalence with BM, and its solution to the problem of 
communication, MBM still faces the objection brought forward by Bell (1987b, 136): 
“Everett’s replacement of the past by memories is a radical solipsism – extending to 
the temporal dimension the replacement of everything outside my head by my 
impressions.” This shall be called “temporal solipsism”. Doesn’t temporal solipsism 
undermine the adequacy of MBM? After all, the present configuration is not 
connected to any past or future configuration. So it seems that any talk of my 
existence past or future is vacuous, a mere illusion, just like, according to the 
ordinary solipsist, the external world is nothing but illusory. To address this issue, 
let’s have a quick look at the historical origin of MBM – Bell’s “Everett (?) theory” – 
and why Bell rejected it immediately. 
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The first outline of a theory similar to MBM is to be found in the last section (5) of 
Bell’s Quantum mechanics for cosmologists. There, Bell (ibid., 133ff.) presents what 
he calls “the Everett (?) theory”, which “will simply be the pilot-wave theory 
without trajectories”.21 He characterizes the Everett (?) theory as follows: 
 
“Instantaneous classical configurations F are supposed to exist, and to be 
distributed in the comparison class of possible worlds with probability |ψ|). But no 
pairing of configurations at different times, as would be effected by the existence of 
trajectories, is supposed. And it is pointed out that no such continuity between 
present and past configurations is required by experience.” 
 
Here, Bell provides the general idea of a Bohmian theory without a GE. We are 
given the essential ingredients that make a theory Bohmian: possible 
configurations, i.e. configuration space (“the comparison class of possible worlds”), 
an instantaneous configuration F and the QEH for the distribution of ensembles of 
configurations as |ψ|). Despite not mentioning the GE – or rather, its omission – 
explicitly, he is eager to make clear that trajectories do not figure in the theory: 
configurations are taken to be instantaneous and “no pairing of configurations at 
different times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is supposed.” 
 
After some remarks in which he compares his Everett (?) theory with the traditional 
account, Bell goes on to formulate a critique of the idea he just had introduced 
(136): 
 
“In our interpretation of the Everett theory there is no association of the particular 
present with any particular past. And the essential claim is that this does not matter 
 
21
 To do actual history justice, it should be noted that, as Bell himself points out in a footnote, the 
origins of Quantum mechanics for cosmologists date back to an unpublished paper (On the 
hypothesis that the Schroedinger equation is exact, http://cds.cern.ch/record/956196) presented at 
Pennsylvania State University in September 1971, reproduced in Epistemological Letters in July 1978 
and revised in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (1987a). Large parts of the final 
version were taken over from the original paper, including Bell’s worries about temporal solipsism, 
although in the earlier version, the exact phrasing “radical solipsism” is not to be found. 
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at all. For we have no access to the past. We have only our ‘memories’ and 
‘records’. But these memories and records are in fact present phenomena. [...] 
Everett’s replacement of the past by memories is a radical solipsism – extending to 
the temporal dimension the replacement of everything outside my head by my 
impressions. [...] If such a theory were taken seriously it would hardly be possible to 
take anything else seriously.” 
 
After a quick comparison with creationism, Bell concludes his remarks on the 
Everett (?) theory. He quickly does away with, even ridicules the idea of a Bohmian 
theory without a GE (ibid.): “So much for the social implications. It is always 
interesting to find that solipsists and positivists, when they have children, have life 
insurance.” It can hardly be argued that his treatment is thorough, taking his MBM-
like idea seriously.22 This is where Dürr and I disagree with Bell. We hold that MBM 
is not only empirically equivalent to QM – as discussed above and not contested by 
Bell – but that it is also metaphysically adequate. Temporal solipsism is not an issue. 
Showing the latter, i.e. showing that FAPP-continuous and consistent world 
histories can arise from a fundamentally stochastic, discontinuous micro dynamics, 
and explaining how this works, is the main objective of this thesis. In my 
presentation, I will expand on the presentation given in Dürr & Ehmann (ms). There, 
Dürr and I discuss Barbour’s proposal of time capsules, replacing the latter with a 
coarse-grained notion of worlds in terms of Everettian world branches and 
supplement it with an argument about their quasi-persistence to tackle the issue of 
temporal solipsism. While I agree with the in-principle viability of the time-capsule 
approach, I will critically evaluate Barbour’s construal of psychophysical parallelism, 
and the latter’s compatibility with the claim that individual, instantaneous 
configurations are sufficient for the experience of sentient beings. I present a 
detailed account of how FAPP-continuous, consistent world histories emerge from a 
 
22
 Barbour (1999, 300f.) agrees with this judgment about Bell’s premature dismissal of the theory: 
“This is all very entertaining – and I too have children and life insurance – but these are just the kind 
of ad hominem quips that were tossed at Copernicus and Galileo. I do believe that Bell came close to 
a viable cosmological interpretation of quantum mechanics, and should have kept faith with his title 
('Quantum mechanics for cosmologists'). But he left the cosmologists with nothing.” 
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random, discontinuous micro dynamics that surpasses the presentation in Dürr & 
Ehmann (ms). But before I can do that, we need to have a look at Barbour’s 
approach. 
 
II.6 Barbour: Temporal solipsism? Time capsules!  
 
Amongst contemporary philosophers of physics, Julian Barbour is probably the one 
who takes Bell’s idea more seriously than anyone else. However, the timeless 
cosmology he develops in his 1999 book The End of Time departs significantly from 
both Bell’s Everett (?) theory and MBM. In his theory, there is no universal time. 
Everything there is, is eternal and static. In particular, configurations aren’t 
actualized sequentially, one “at a time”, as is the case in the Everett (?) theory and 
in MBM. In Barbour’s cosmology, there is no time, so configurations, too, are 
eternal and static. There is no configurational change over time (ibid, 39): “If we 
could see the universe as it is, we should see that it is static. Nothing moves, 
nothing changes”. Accordingly, experience of time has to arise from within such 
eternal, static configurations (ibid., 53): “The instant is not in time, time is in the 
instant.” To account for the experience of time flow, of things moving, he therefore 
introduces the notion of time capsules (ibid.): “I shall outline, through the notion of 
time capsules, a theory of how a static universe can nevertheless appear to teem 
with motion and change.” 
 
Neither Dürr and I in our paper on MBM, nor I in this thesis, commit to Barbour’s 
assumption of a fundamentally static universe, in the sense of a universe without 
fundamental, universal time. For MBM, we assume universal time. At each point in 
time, one configuration is actualized. As opposed to Barbour’s cosmology, MBM’s 
configurations are not eternal. Despite this important difference, Barbour’s time-
capsule approach is a candidate for tackling the issue of temporal solipsism. 
Barbour is well aware of Bell’s Everett (?) theory and his criticism regarding 
temporal solipsism (cf. ibid., 300). In fact, he devotes an entire section of his book 
(299ff.) to the theory. Therein (299), he identifies Bell’s notion of instantaneous 
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configurations containing records with his notion of time capsules: “[…] 
configuration points that can be called records. Although Bell did not use my term, 
such points are manifestly time capsules.” More generally, he introduces time 
capsules as follows (31): “Any static configuration that appears to contain mutually 
consistent records of processes that took place in a past in accordance with certain 
laws may be called a time capsule.” 
 
One must think of such time capsules as configurations containing within them the 
complete history of a process up until that configuration, in the form of 
“snapshots”. Barbour (ibid., 292) provides the following analogy: “Doting parents 
take daily snapshots of their child and stick them day by day into a progress book. 
The progress book after each successive day is like each successive point along the 
track in the big configuration space: it is the complete history of the child up to that 
date.” Other examples of records present in time capsules are geological formations 
(30) – “all geological formations, rock strata in particular, are now invariably 
interpreted by geologists as constituting a record (to be interpreted) of past 
geological processes” – or the particle tracks in a cloud chamber (299) – “alpha-
particle tracks […] have the obvious interpretation that they are records of alpha-
particle motion” – all telling of a coherent history of events, apparently following 
some principles of time evolution that can be described in terms of laws of nature. 
 
In addition to their structural richness and internal consistency, time capsules are 
supposed to be “sought out” by the WF (300): “[Bell’s] ‘Everettian’ interpretation is 
this: time exists, and the universal wave function Ψ evolves in it without ever 
collapsing. Because Ψ has the propensity to seek out23 time capsules, it will 
generally be concentrated on them. Real events are actualized as follows. At each 
instant of time, Ψ associates a definite probability […] with each configuration. At 
 
23
 Barbour’s talk of the WF having “the propensity to seek out time capsules” is a bit obfuscating. (He 
repeatedly uses this metaphor, cf. Barbour 1999, 251, 296, 298, 300, 308, 316, 324.) What he means 
is that the probability density associated with the universal WF is concentrated over configurations 
that are time capsules, such that, at any time, the probability to be actualized is much higher for 
configurations that are time capsules than it is for configurations that are not time capsules. 
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any instant, just one event is actualized at random in accordance with its relative 
probability. The higher the probability, the greater the chance of actualization. 
Since time capsules have the highest probabilities, they will generally be selected.” 
 
II.6.1 Explaining experiences 
 
For his own, timeless cosmology, Barbour’s demand that time capsules are 
predominant is intertwined with “an assumption in the hallowed tradition of 
Boltzmann: only the probable is experienced.” (ibid. 266, his emphasis.) This 
assumption is controversial. When is a configuration probable enough to be 
experienced? Why, above all, should it be the case that only highly probable 
configurations are experienced at all? Barbour provides no good justification for his 
assumption. Nevertheless, at least at first sight, he has reason to make it despite: 
the vast majority of configurations in configuration space doesn’t admit of any 
experiences at all, and of those that do, the vast majority doesn’t admit of the 
reconstruction of FAPP-classical, coherent histories. Given that all configurations in 
his timeless cosmology are eternal, they are all actualized “at the same time” 
(which, in a timeless cosmology, can only be a figure of speech), which means that 
all possible experiences are actual. But if all possible experiences are actual, then by 
far most actual experiences are of incoherent histories. Yet, obviously, our own 
experiences are of the ordered kind – of consistent memories and records, 
admitting of the reconstruction of FAPP-classical, coherent histories. This seems 
unexpected. Our experiences, by all likelihood, should be incoherent. 
 
Barbour’s assumption that the coherent time capsules are predominant, and that 
only the predominant configurations are experienced, allows him to reconcile the 
expectations derived from the theory with our experiences. Prima facie, this 
explains why we have the experiences we happen to have. 
 
Given one demands this kind of explanation from Barbour’s timeless cosmology, 
one should also demand it from MBM. Other than Barbour, however, in order to 
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provide such an explanation, we don’t have to assume that only the probable is 
experienced. On MBM, only one configuration is actual at a time. No matter how 
improbable its actualization is, once it is actualized, and contains experiencing 
beings, then these beings will have the experiences they just happen to have.24 So 
when we demand for MBM that time capsules are assigned the highest probability 
to be actualized by the WF, what we want to achieve is that those configurations 
admitting of coherent histories are predominantly actualized, as opposed to being 
the only ones admitting of experiences in the first place. On MBM’s sequential 
actualization dynamics, this is enough to reconcile theoretically derived 
expectations and our actual experiences. Barbour’s controversial assumption isn’t 
required. 
 
Except for this difference, the rest of the reasoning goes quite similar for both 
theories. Time capsules should be assigned the highest probability to be actualized 
by the WF, because otherwise, e.g. assuming an equidistribution of probability over 
the totality of configuration space, almost all actualized configurations containing 
records at all would be configurations containing records that don’t allow for the 
reconstruction of coherent histories, for such configurations vastly outnumber the 
rather special time capsules. As Barbour puts it (ibid., 289): “among all possible 
worlds, the dull, disordered, incoherent states are overwhelmingly preponderant, 
while the ordered states form a miniscule fraction. But such states, sheer 
implausibility, must be presupposed if history is to be made manifest”.25 Of course, 
 
24
 This is true under Barbour’s further assumption that individual, internally static and eternal time 
capsules are sufficient for experiences to arise. A critique of this assumption will be spelled out later. 
For the present purposes, we can safely assume that it holds. 
25
 The situation is reminiscent of the problem of Boltzmann brains. Given that the present state of 
our universe results from a random fluctuation out of equilibrium, we should expect ourselves to be 
Boltzmann brains: beings endowed with the necessary structure to hallucinate our experiences – 
including records, memories and anticipations of the future – but with not much more, for 
fluctuations into states that only contain such minimal beings hallucinating ordered structure and 
coherent records are much more likely than fluctuations into states where all the ordered structure 
and coherent records we seem to observe actually exist. (Cf. Carroll 2017.) Even worse: by far most 
Boltzmann brains fluctuating into existence should be “batty”, such that the structures and records 
they hallucinate are disordered and incoherent. (Cf. Norton 2015.) Likewise, if MBM’s actualization 
probability was equal for all configurations, we should expect most sentient beings to be Boltzmann 
brains, and most Boltzmann brains to be of the batty type. In fact, the analogy is quite to the point. 
Just replace the random fluctuations as supposed for the Boltzmann-brain scenario with random 
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by far the largest portion of configuration space consists of configurations that 
don’t contain any records from which histories, coherent or not, could be 
reconstructed. The primary reason for demanding that time capsules are assigned 
the highest probability is not to ensure that in most actualizations, records are 
present, but to ensure that most actualizations in which records are present admit 
of a coherent history. 
 
We must also revisit the issue of psychophysical parallelism: given strict dualism is 
not assumed, there has to be some “physical counterpart of psychological 
experience” (Barbour 1999, 302). Barbour follows Bell in his assumption that this is 
to be found in the configuration, i.e. in particle positions. From this assumption, he 
draws the following conclusion (ibid., 302, my emphasis): “it is clear from the way 
[Bell] makes memories and records responsible for our idea of the past, rejecting 
any ‘thread’ connecting configurations at different times, that subjective awareness 
of both positions and motions of objects must be derived from the structure in one 
instantaneous configuration. The self-sentient configurations must be time 
capsules. Not only the kingfisher but also the appearance of its flight must be in one 
configuration, for nothing else would be logically consistent”. Later on, I will contest 
this. It is not the case that subjective awareness of motions must arise from one 
configuration, and that nothing else would be logically consistent. I will argue that 
Barbour’s claim contradicts our best understanding of the emergence of mental 
phenomena, and that he is aware of that: for all we know, the sentience of a 
sentient being arises not from one of its configurations, but from processes, 
involving change between several configurations. Barbour, pointing to the relevancy 
of brain processes (cf. ibid., 266), expresses a similar view. While he is right that 
upon “rejecting any ‘thread’ connecting configurations at different times, […] 
subjective awareness of both positions and motions of objects must be derived 
 
actualizations as featured in MBM. Given equal probability, of those randomly actualized 
configurations only few contain beings capable of experiences. And of those, in turn, almost all 
contain only batty Boltzmann brains. Were it not for the probability density to be distributed 
nonuniformly, we indeed should expect that amongst all brains instantiated, almost all are batty 
Boltzmann brains. Again, this is not logically ruled out by our experiences, but unexpected. 
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from the structure in one instantaneous configuration”, I reject the antecedent for 
MBM: even assuming a stochastic, discontinuous micro dynamics as features in 
MBM, on a higher-level description, a “thread connecting configurations” can be 
had, namely in the form of world histories. 
 
But first things first. For this introduction it shall suffice to assume that the criterion 
of psychophysical parallelism is met, i.e. that sentient beings arise from time 
capsules in such a way that a singular, instantaneous configuration is sufficient for 
their subjective experience. Given the probability density indeed concentrates on 
time capsules, we can expect that the experiences and memories of most actualized 
beings are of the regular, consistent kind, like ours are. Our history in its regularity, 
then, is nothing special. 
 
But how is this predominant actualization of time capsules spelled out in MBM? 
Here comes into play the branching of the WF into FAPP-classical world branches, 
induced by decoherence, which accounts for the many-worlds character MBM 
inherits from the Everett interpretation.26 With the WF being concentrated on 
FAPP-classical world branches, the actualization probability of configurations in the 
support of FAPP-classical world branches is overwhelmingly large compared to 
those in the support of non-classical branches. It is those configurations in the 
support of FAPP-classical world branches that contain mutually consistent records 
admitting of coherent histories, and that are called time capsules in Barbour’s 
terminology. Now, since the actualization probability of configurations in MBM is 
given by the probability density |Ψ|), the super-particle, over the course of many 
actualizations, traces out FAPP-classical world branches, with overwhelmingly high 
probability. In other words, it almost always instantiates time capsules. We mustn’t 
wonder why we find ourselves in such a “special”, structurally rich configuration 
with consistent records, for, although such configurations might be special in the 
 
26
 Everett’s heritage is the many-worlds feature, not decoherence per se. The latter is by no means 
exclusive to Everett. Cf. Schlosshauer (2007, Ch. 8), discussing the role of decoherence for several 
(types of) “interpretations” (read: interpretations and alternative theories), or Bacciagaluppi (2016). 
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sense that they take up only a tiny volume in configuration space, their 
actualization, taking into account the branching structure of the WF and the 
resulting actualization probabilities, isn’t special at all. 
  
II.6.2 Fine-tuning for life and rare time capsules: an analogy 
 
The arguments presented above made use of the probability density being 
concentrated on configurations admitting of coherent histories in order to explain 
the regularity of our experiences. However, it can be put into question whether 
such explanations are necessary and called for. 
 
Let me try to flesh this out with an analogy between the rarity of time capsules and 
the fine-tuning for life of our universe. The parameters (e.g. constants of nature) 
defining our universe seem to be fine-tuned for life. Friederich (2017, 1.1.1) 
provides, amongst others, the following example of fine-tuned constants of nature: 
“The strength of gravity, when measured against the strength of electromagnetism, 
seems fine-tuned for life [...] If gravity had been absent or substantially weaker, 
galaxies, stars and planets would not have formed in the first place. Had it been 
only slightly weaker (and/or electromagnetism slightly stronger), main sequence 
stars such as the sun would have been significantly colder and would not explode in 
supernovae, which are the main source of many heavier elements [...]. If, in 
contrast, gravity had been slightly stronger, stars would have formed from smaller 
amounts of material, which would have meant that, inasmuch as still stable, they 
would have been much smaller and more short-lived”. 
 
Now consider the space of possible universes – a parameter space in which each 
relevant parameter is represented by a dimension. For example, the gravitational 
constant is represented by a dimension, and can vary over a range of different 
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values.27 Likewise other universal constants. Each point in this parameter space 
represents a possible universe. 
 
This parameter space, then, comprises a huge “number” of possible universes, all 
set up with different values for the relevant parameters. That only “few” (a small 
volume in parameter space, assuming there is an appropriate measure for that) of 
these possible universes admit of life like ours is the essence of the claim that our 
universe is fine-tuned (cf. Barnes 2012, 529). For our purposes of constructing an 
analogy, we may assume that this is indeed the case, as suggested by Friederich’s 
example. Under these conditions, if one actual universe would be selected at 
random from the vast space of possible universes, it would be highly improbable 
that this randomly selected universe is one of the few capable of harbouring life as 
we know it. This, as Barnes (ibid.) puts it, is what makes the claim that our universe 
is fine-tuned for life interesting: “it makes the existence of life in this universe 
appear to be something remarkable, something in need of explanation. The 
intuition here is that, if ours were the only universe, and if the causes that 
established the physics28 of our universe were indifferent to whether it would 
evolve life, then the chances of hitting upon a life-permitting universe are very 
small.” 
 
Standard explanations of fine-tuning for life are the deliberate creation of our 
universe by an intelligent designer, or the actual existence of a multitude of 
different universes. I am not going to engage in the debate about which to prefer. 
The point here is to make an analogy: on the one hand, a space of possible 
universes, only few of which admit of life; on the other, a space of possible 
configurations, only few of which admit of coherent histories. For MBM, we assume 
that this latter space is actually explored; the super-particle jumps through 
configuration space. Accordingly, to construct the analogy, we assume that the 
 
27
 The terminology sounds a bit oxymoronic. How to imagine a varying constant? Of course, in this 
context, being a varying constant means being (effectively) constant in a given universe, but varying 
over parameter space. 
28
 Barnes calls the parameters specifying a universe its “physics”. 
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former space is explored, too; a multitude of different universes from the space of 
possible universes is brought into being.29 
 
Given this multitude of universes is actual, it isn't surprising that the universe we 
inhabit, featuring just the right set of parameter values, exists. In the space of 
possible universes, there are universes featuring different sets of parameter values, 
most of them not allowing for any sentient beings at all. We certainly inhabit a 
special universe, with parameters suitable to us. It indeed is fine-tuned for our 
existence, but it is just one amongst the many possibilities explored. Further 
explanation for its fine-tuning seems called for only if we assume that there is only 
one universe. But if we assume many universes, as we do for this analogy, it is to be 
expected that some actual universe(s) will have the right conditions to bring about 
life like ours. Analogously, if we assume many configurations being actualized, as 
we do for MBM, no special concentration of the probability density over time 
capsules is necessary in order to explain our experiences. As it turns out, the 
arguments above, involving a special concentration of the probability density, 
attempt an explanation for something that is already explained. 
 
Let’s pause here for a moment. I have just pushed back against the idea that an 
explanation of our experiences must be given in terms of a special concentration of 
the probability density. But, in a sense, I still gave an explanation, albeit a different 
one, drawing on the fact that, on MBM, many configurations are actualized, one 
after another. One might wonder whether any explanation of us having the 
experiences we happen to have is needed at all. 
 
II.6.3 Explaining the need for explaining experiences: a conjecture 
 
Certainly, there isn’t always a need to explain the occurrence of an unlikely event, 
like the actualization of the time capsule we inhabit, or the existence of the fine-
 
29
 As a side note, for the following argument, it doesn’t matter whether these universes exist in 
parallel or one after the other. 
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tuned-for-life universe we inhabit (Friederich 2018, 2.2): “Even if fine-tuned 
conditions are improbable in some substantive sense, it might be wisest to regard 
them as primitive coincidences which we have to accept without resorting to such 
speculative responses as divine design or a multiverse. It is indeed uncontroversial 
that being improbable does not by itself automatically amount to requiring a 
theoretical response. For example, any specific sequence of outcomes in a long 
series of coin tosses has low initial probability (namely, 2-. if the coin is fair, which 
approaches zero as the number : of tosses increases), but one would not 
reasonably regard any specific sequence of outcomes as calling for some theoretical 
response”. 
 
Indeed, being surprised by the occurrence of an improbable event and then 
inferring that this event likely is one of a sufficiently long series of past events 
would be falling prey to the inverse gambler’s fallacy, originally described by 
Hacking (1987). Rowbottom (2015, IX.1) characterises it as follows: “[The inverse 
gambler’s fallacy] involves mistakenly inferring what happened in the past […] 
because of what happens in the present. Or more precisely, in game-like scenarios, 
it involves the assumption that results at some point in time are dependent on 
earlier results in some way.” In other words, the (false) premise at work when 
committing the inverse gambler’s fallacy is 
(IGF*) If an unlikely event occurs, then it likely is part of a long series of past 
events 
Given that an unlikely event occurs, and IGF* is assumed, the (false) conclusion 
(C*) The unlikely event likely is part of a long series of past events 
follows. In light of this, it seems best to abstain from any attempts at explaining 
unlikely events by inference to a past series of events. 
 
That being said, the occurrence of unlikely events, at least psychologically, can be 
surprising, and people tend to feel the need for an explanation.30 Let me try to 
 
30
 There is some empirical evidence suggesting that in fact, people tend to commit the inverse 
gambler’s fallacy, see Oppenheimer & Monin 2009. 
 43 
make sense of this apparent need for explanation, for the case of our universe’s 
fine-tuning for life, and, by analogy, for our time capsules “fine-tuning” for the 
experience of a coherent history, exploiting Friederich's coin-tossing example. 
 
In a series of ten tosses of an ideal, fair coin, I should not expect any specific 
sequence over any other specific sequence. The specific sequence HHHHHHHHHH, 
or the specific sequence HTHTHTHTHT, is just as likely as the specific sequence 
THTTHHHTTH (which I have just generated tossing an actual coin). For each 
individual coin toss, H and T both have probability 
/
)
, independently of the other 







They are all equally (un)likely. I’d commit the inverse gambler’s fallacy if I inferred 
from a sequence of all heads that it likely is part of a long series of sequences. 
 
However, flipping a coin ten times, as I did, I'd still be quite surprised by the 
outcome HHHHHHHHHH, while I wasn't surprised by THTTHHHTTH, the actual result 
I got. The former sequence triggers the (psychological) need for an explanation. 
Why is that so? Both specific sequences have the same probability. I really shouldn't 
be more surprised by one than by the other. One really shouldn't require an 
explanation while the other doesn't. 
 
Here is my conjecture. The reason that I am surprised by HHHHHHHHHH but not by 
THTTHHHTTH might have to do with coarse-graining sample space into sets, 
resulting in a partition of sample space, in this case, into equivalence classes. Let me 
explain. Glossing over the specific order of Hs and Ts in sequences, i.e. only being 
concerned about the relative frequency of Hs and Ts, the latter sequence above is 
representative of a much larger set of sequences than the former. I'm surprised not 
because I got one specific sequence instead of another, equally likely sequence, but 
because I got a sequence from a tiny set instead of a sequence from a 
comparatively large set. (With all possible sequences being equally likely, the 
probability of ending up with a sequence from a certain set is the probability of 
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ending up with a specific sequence times the number of sequences in that set.) 
There are 252 sequences containing exactly five Hs. They form an equivalence class. 
No other equivalence class (with the equivalence relation “containing the same 
number of Hs”) in the sample space of possible sequences is larger. So having five 
Hs in ten tosses is the expected frequency. There are 210 sequences with exactly 
four Hs, and 210 with exactly six. 120 each with three or seven Hs, and so on. 
What's so surprising about the occurrence of the all-heads sequence, I figure, is that 
there is only one sequence in its equivalence class, while other equivalence classes 
are much bigger. The further the relative frequency of H’s and T’s deviates from the 
expected frequency, i.e. the smaller the relative size of the equivalence class the 
sequence is part of, the more surprised I am. My surprise is rooted not in the fact 
that a specific sequence occurred instead of another specific sequence, but in the 
fact that a sequence from the smallest equivalence class occurred instead of one 
from the bigger classes.31 
 
I can imagine that this is why examples in presentations of the inverse gambler’s 
fallacy usually are set up as they are. Hacking, e.g., construes an example with a 
gambler inferring from a roll of two dice showing double sixes that this roll most 
likely was part of a longer series of rolls. Why does Hacking construe the example 
with double sixes? Why not with a two and a four, say? It’s just as likely a 
combination as two sixes are. However, an example with such a seemingly common 
combination would feel strange, wouldn’t it? Why does it seem common, while 
double sixes don’t? My hunch is that we’re coarse-graining the sample space of 
possible outcomes into equivalence classes with respect to “being a double”. Then 
all the double somethings are put into a set, and all the rest into a different set, and 
since the former set is much smaller, the double somethings look surprising and in 
need of an explanation, motivating the unwarranted inference. 
 
31
 Even sequences with the expected frequency might psychologically be surprising. For example the 
sequence HTHTHTHTHT, or HHHHHTTTTT. These look surprisingly ordered, as if they had been 
generated by applying a (deterministic) rule. So, to provide a tenable account for why some 
outcomes are psychologically surprising while others aren’t is probably a bit more complicated than 
my simplified example suggests. However, for conveying the basic idea and making my point, it 
should be enough. 
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Let’s look at another, even more illustrative example. Suppose a dart is randomly 
thrown once at a board with 32x32 equally sized squares. Only one of them is red, 
all other 1023 squares are green. Each square has the same probability of being hit 
as any other. But glossing over the fact that the squares are individual squares and 
partitioning the board under the equivalence relation “having the same colour” 
results in two equivalence classes, one much larger than the other. Suppose that 
the dart landed on the one red square. It isn’t surprising that it landed on any 
specific of those 1024 squares. (If the squares all had different colours, or all the 
same colour, none would stand out.) But it is somewhat surprising – at least I would 
be surprised – that it landed on the single red square, and not on any of the 1023 
green ones. This is what reeks of conspiracy. 
 
Now, the question seems to be whether my surprise, on which my suspicion of 
conspiracy and demand for an explanation are based, is justified or not. Am I 
justifiably surprised that the dart landed on the red square? This, it seems, is a 
matter of perspective. Looking at the squares individually, on the “lower”, not 
coarse-grained level of description, the situation presents itself as an 
equidistribution; all squares have the same probability of being hit. Because of that, 
being surprised by a specific square being hit isn’t justified. On the higher, coarse-
grained level of description, i.e. on the level of colours, probabilities aren’t 
equidistributed; not all colours have the same probability of being hit. But if being 
surprised by an unlikely outcome, given there is a much more probable alternative 
(as opposed to many equally unlikely alternatives), is justified in general, then being 
surprised by the red square being hit, given all other squares are green, is also 
justified. 
 
This puts me in an almost paradoxical situation. One and the same event, a specific 
square being hit, seems surprising or unsurprising, depending on whether I choose 
to coarse-grain for colour or not, i.e. on the partition I impose on sample space. If I 
do coarse-grain for colour, then I expect a green square to be hit almost always. The 
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red square being hit on a single throw thus triggers a need for explanation.32 If I do 
not coarse-grain for colour, I don’t expect any outcome over any other outcome, 
and thus won’t ask for an explanation. But with my expectations depending on 
coarse-graining, prospects of justifying my surprise seem forlorn. That is, unless the 
partition I impose itself is justified – if it is a “natural” partition, so to speak. 
 
To get terminology out of the way, I call a partition “natural” iff it recovers actual, 
higher-level similarities and differences between the elements of sample space. To 
be more precise, a partition is natural iff it groups together those and only those 
elements that are equivalent with respect to an actual, higher-level property. For 
example, the partition of the dart board into colour equivalence classes is called 
natural because it recovers the actual, higher-level similarities and differences in 
colour of the squares: all and only red squares are grouped together in a set, all and 
only green squares are grouped together in another set. 
 
You can see where this is going. Arguably, coarse-graining the parameter space of 
possible universes with respect to hospitability for life, or coarse-graining MBM’s 
configuration space with respect to suitability to bring about the experience of a 
coherent history, result in natural partitions, too. Like the colour partition of the 
dart board, they recover actual, higher-level similarities and differences between 
the elements of these spaces. Like with the dart board, I shouldn’t be surprised that 
any one of all the possible universes from parameter space was selected over any 
other. But being surprised that the one and only actual universe is hospitable to life 
seems to be justified. 
 
32
 A possible explanation for why the red square was hit, and not any of the green ones, is that the 
dart wasn’t thrown randomly after all. It was Peter ‘Snakebite’ Wright, the current World Darts 
Champion, deliberately aiming for the red square. Another possible explanation is that the dart in 
fact was thrown randomly, but many times over. Throwing often enough, it will eventually land on 
the red square. In both these cases, I wouldn’t be surprised by the red square being hit. Interestingly, 
both explanations involve me being mistaken about the initial setup: to make them work, I must 
revoke my assumption that the dart is thrown at random, or that it is thrown only once, respectively, 
and replace it with a different assumption. Note that assuming a proposition isn’t the same as 
inferring it. In particular, assuming that the dart was thrown many times isn’t to be mistaken for 
inferring that it was thrown many times. 
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So much for my conjecture about why certain outcomes seem surprising and 
psychologically demand for an explanation, while, when looking at the underlying 
sample space, all outcomes are equally likely. Even assuming the actualization 
probability density being flat over MBM’s configuration space, the fact that my 
configuration was actualized does not demand for an explanation any more than 
the actualization of any other possible configuration. That I am still surprised by this 
actualization, and thus demand an explanation for it, is due to the partition I impose 
on configuration space: there are possible configurations, called time capsules, that 
allow for the experience of a coherent history, and there are other possible 
configurations that don’t. Coarse-graining with respect to suitability to bring about 
the experience of a coherent history recovers these higher-level similarities and 
differences. The resulting partition is thus natural. It tells me that only a small set of 
possible configurations are time capsules, while all others aren’t, and that time 
capsules thus are much less likely to be actualized than non-time capsules. 
Assuming there is only one configuration actualized, I’d feel very justified in being 
surprised that this one configuration was a time capsule, despite the fact that I 
know that each specific configuration is as likely to be actualized as any other 
(assuming actualization probability density being flat over configuration space). 
 
Being justifiably surprised of, and thus demanding an explanation for, the 
actualization of a time capsule at some specific point in time, may I justifiably infer 
that, most likely, many configurations have been actualized before it, i.e. that the 
actualization of that time capsule most likely is part of a long series of 
actualizations, or would I fall prey to the inverse gambler’s fallacy? Indeed, I would. 
Said time capsule could be the first configuration ever actualized, or the fifth, or the 
10123th. Luckily, however, I don’t need to make this inference. The dynamics of 
MBM already tells me that uncountably many configurations are actualized in any 
finite time interval. This is built into the theory. I don’t need to infer the likely 




II.6.4 Is MBM empirically incoherent? 
 
On MBM’s dynamics, the occasional actualization of time capsules is expected, even 
without a special probability density distribution. However, the decoherence-
induced branching structure of the WF is relevant in a different matter. Barrett 
(1996) brings forward the charge of empirical incoherence against Bell’s Everett (?) 
theory. He calls a theory empirically incoherent (ibid., 50) if it “fails to predict the 
existence of reliable records of an observer’s measurement results to which the 
observer has epistemic access”, and claims that the records present in time 
capsules are indeed unreliable, in the sense that the records contained within a 
given time capsule, e.g. our present one, typically are incompatible with records in 
previously actualized time capsules (ibid., 55): “the current particle configuration is 
independent of any past or future configurations […] This means that one’s records 
of measurement results would typically change in a pathological way over time and 
hence be wildly unreliable as records of what actually happened.” He provides the 
following example: 
 
“Suppose […] that an observer J measures the F-spin of a spin-1/2 system K that is 
in a superposition of F-spins […]. Suppose that the observer gets the result F-spin 
up for the outcome of her first measurement. Now what happens if the observer 
carefully repeats her measurement? The linear dynamics tells us that the quantum-
mechanical state after the second measurement will be  
L|↑, ↑	⟩4|↑⟩5 + N|↓, ↓⟩4|↓⟩5 
So what is the classical configuration after this measurement? […] If	J does in fact 
get ‘F-spin down’ for her second measurement, the classical configuration will now 
be one associated with the second term of the above state, which means that J’s 
‘record’ of her first measurement will now read ‘F-spin down’, and it will thus 
appear, based on an examination of her records, that her two measurements did in 
fact yield the same result. More generally, one can show that the classical 
configuration would almost always be such that one’s records would exhibit the 
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statistical correlations predicted by the standard theory whenever it makes 
unambiguous predictions.” 
 
Barrett regards Bell’s Everett (?) theory – and a fortiori MBM – as empirically 
incoherent, because, at least prima facie, it’s records can be expected to be 
unreliable in this sense. However, he seems to overlook the import decoherence 
has on this matter. With decoherence, the WF branches into FAPP-classical world 
branches. Configurations are actualized at an arbitrarily high rate (see below), so 
consecutive actualizations of different time capsules within a world branch, because 
of the latter’s FAPP-classicality, can be expected to be mutually consistent with 
respect to the records they contain. So, contrary to Barrett’s fear, at least within a 
given branch, MBM’s records are epistemically accessible and reliable. They won’t 
be illusory in the sense of providing evidence contradicting what actually happened 
in the past. MBM thus satisfies Barrett’s requirements for empirical coherence. The 
charge of empirical incoherence is avoided. 
 
II.7 Temporal solipsism solved? 
 
This brings us back to the issue of temporal solipsism. Recall Bell’s complaint that “if 
such a theory were taken seriously it would hardly be possible to take anything else 
seriously”. One might still think that the theory is metaphysically deficient. After all, 
considering the vastness of configuration space, it is very unlikely that precisely the 
one time capsule I inhabit right now, this unique configuration, will be actualized 
again, even if the probability density is concentrated on time capsules, and 
consecutive time capsules within a world branch contain mutually compatible 
records. Consequently, I should exist for only one instant, such that all my 
memories of the past and anticipations of the future are rendered mere illusions. 
Even worse, not only my memories, but all records are meaningless – 
bedeutungslos in Frege’s sense33: they point to a past that never existed. Annual 
 
33
 Cf. Frege (1892). 
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rings in trees, the pictures of me as a child, geological formations including the 
fossils found in them, they all have been created at one instant, and cease to exist 
immediately after. In light of this, Bell likening the Everett (?) theory to Creationism 
seems understandable. 
 
However, this problem arises only if time capsules are identified with individual, 
unique configurations, such that for any pair of actualized configurations ;',7, with 
;' ≠ ;7, different time capsules PQ' ≠ PQ7  are instantiated, which is the case 
according to Barbour’s presentation of Bell’s Everett (?) theory (302): a time capsule 
is supposed to be “one instantaneous configuration”. By contradistinction, 
“worlds”, as mentioned earlier, are a coarse-grained concept. To provide a 
preliminary delineation: unlike time capsules, worlds do not consist of only one 
configuration. Instead, worlds are regions of finite volume in configuration space, 
comprised of all configurations instantiating macro states that are indistinguishable 
from a given macro state, i.e., worlds result from coarse-graining with respect to 
macroscopic features. The procedure will be explained in greater depth later. 
 
Let’s denote such a macro world R, and the fact that one of its configurations is 
actualized at some time < by (; ∈ R, <).34 Since the set of configurations in R is a 
finite region in configuration space, the probability of some configuration from R 
being actualized at a specific < = <'  depends on the size of that region and the 
probability density as given by the BR for that region and time: 




Because worlds correspond to a region of finite volume in configuration space, this 
probability might be small, but is always non-zero (given the probability density 
over this volume isn’t zero): 
∀<: 0 < B(; ∈ R, <) 
 
34
 -, here, refers to universal time, i.e. the time parameter of the SE, describing the evolution of the 
universal WF. 
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Now take some finite time interval Y ⊂ ℝ. With the probability of ; ∈ R being 
actualized at any arbitrary time < already being greater than zero, the probability of 
it being actualized within the time interval Y, consisting of uncountably many 
instants, must be greater than zero as well: B(; ∈ R, Y) > 	0. 
We can then select at random some P instants from Y: </, … , <: ∈ Y. Think of P as 
the number of instants at which some configuration is actualized within the given 
time interval Y, such that ^ = :
;
 is the actualization rate (in actualizations per time 
span) for the time interval Y. For example, if we select P = 1000 instants from a 
time interval Y of one second, the actualization rate is ^ = /&&&
<
. Note that ^ → ∞ 
for P → ∞ and finite time intervals. Because actualizations of configurations in 
general are stochastically independent – recall that B(;% ∩ ;%() = B(;%) ∗ B(;%() 
– actualizations of configurations within a given world at different times are 
stochastically independent as well: B(; ∈ R, < ∩ ; ∈ R, <=) = B(; ∈ R, <) ∗
B(; ∈ R, <=). Despite this stochastic independence, we can expect that 
configurations from our world are actualized time and time again, contra Bell’s main 
worry: with the actualization probability B(; ∈ R, <') for a configuration in R to 
be actualized at <', the expectation value for some ; ∈ R to be actualized during Y 
is the sum over the individual actualization probabilities at each instant <'  of the 
selected P instants </, … , <: ∈ Y: 
a[; ∈ R; </, … , <:] =eB(; ∈ R, <')
'
= B(; ∈ R, </) + ⋯+ B(; ∈ R, <:) 
As can be seen, this expectation value depends on the number P of actualizations 
during Y, i.e. on the actualization rate. If ^ → ∞, a → ∞	as	well: 
a[; ∈ R; </, … , <:]
>→@l⎯⎯n∞ 
So, under the assumption that, during a finite time interval, arbitrarily many 
configurations are actualized, configurations from our world R can be expected to 
be actualized arbitrarily many times in the same, finite time interval as well. 
 
What’s the import of these considerations on our question at hand? Is Bell’s worry 
regarding the alleged temporal solipsism of MBM off the table? Indeed, as we have 
seen, on MBM’s construal of worlds, configurations within a world aren’t actualized 
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just once. In particular, configurations from the world inhabited by you and me are 
actualized infinitely many times. We can be reassured that they will be actualized 
again, and already have been actualized before, many times over. So, this particular 
worry is averted. 
 
However, temporal solipsism can be understood as comprising more than the fear 
that any particular configuration is instantiated only once. Concerns may also arise 
about the temporal connection between different configurations at different 
instants of time. While Bell’s original unease was particularly focussed on the 
“replacement of the past by memories” (Bell 1987b, 136), he at least hinted at a 
similar issue regarding the future, recall his comment about solipsists having life 
insurance (ibid.). His worries about the past being a mere illusion carry over to 
future configurations as well: in both directions of time, the connection between 
different configurations, in particular temporally remote ones, seems problematic. 
Recall that time capsules in Barbour’s account are supposed to be static (Barbour 
1999, 31): “Any static configuration that appears to contain mutually consistent 
records of processes that took place in a past in accordance with certain laws may 
be called a time capsule.” But Barbour, by his claim that external, universal time 
does not exist, not only is forced to speak of static time capsules in the sense of 
internally unchanging configurations. Individual configurations are static in this 
sense by construal. Other than that, configurations are also supposed to be static in 
the sense of being “not in time” or “eternal”. So there are no time capsules at 
different times in Barbour’s account. Yet, assuming for MBM, by contrast to 
Barbour’s timeless cosmology, that there are different configurations actualized at 
different times, there are temporally remote worlds, for example the world 
instantiated right now and the temporally remote world where I have children and 
life insurance, and the even more remote world where my future family benefits 
from said insurance. Likewise, the past world where I, as a young boy, am sitting in 
my bedroom playing with Lego and video games, knowing nothing about Barbour’s 
concept of time capsules or even his book, which hasn’t been written at the time. 
The world I inhabit now contains records of this earlier one – memories, 
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photographs, tape recordings. However, the relation is not symmetric. As 
Butterfield (2002, 319) puts it: “one time capsule can contain records of another, 
without the other similarly containing records of the first”. There was no record of 
my future self contained in the old world, just as there are no records of my 
children in the world I inhabit now. How are these instantiations of different worlds 
at different times linked up, over significant time spans in particular?35 On their 
own, neither the fact that configurations from our world are actualized many times 
over, nor that consecutive time capsules within a world branch contain mutually 
consistent records, provides an answer to this question. In our paper, Dürr and I 
have tackled this issue by abandoning the original, Barbourian notion of static time 
capsules and resorting to Everettian world branches, which, for different instants of 
time, contain different, instantaneous configurations in their support, but 
themselves must not be considered instantaneous or static: they reach over 
extended time intervals, and hence comprise a history of configurations. And since 
world branches are a consequence of decoherence36, this history is FAPP-classical, 
i.e. internally consistent. Because of that, records of the past, and likewise 
anticipations of the future, do point towards real instantiations of our world branch 
(Dürr & Ehmann ms, 35): “They permit inferences to our macro-world’s history; 
within each atto-second, infinitely many temporal fragments of it are realized. On 
 
35
 Sticking with a timeless view, the question would have to be rephrased: How are worlds at 
different positions in configuration space linked up, such that they form a common history? For 
example, how is the world with my tea cup sitting on my desk related to the world with my tea cup 
on the floor, shattered into pieces? The answer Barbour would give is that the world with the broken 
cup contains records of the world with the unbroken cup – and likewise, for explaining how a 
sentient being can have the impression of perceiving the cup falling, records of the states in 
between. As we will see, the situation proves to be somewhat simpler for a model including 
universal time. 
36
 Decoherence is a process that effectively suppresses interference effects via entanglement of a 
quantum system with its environment (Schlosshauer 2014, 1): “Realistic quantum systems are never 
completely isolated from their environment. When a quantum system interacts with its 
environment, it will in general become entangled with a large number of environmental degrees of 
freedom. This entanglement influences what we can locally observe upon measuring the system. In 
particular, quantum interference effects with respect to certain physical quantities (most notably, 
‘classical’ quantities such as position) become effectively suppressed, making them prohibitively 
difficult to observe in most cases of practical interest. This is the process of decoherence, sometimes 
also called dynamical decoherence or environment-induced decoherence. Stated in general and 
interpretation-neutral terms, decoherence describes how entangling interactions with the 
environment influence the statistics of results of future measurements on the system.” 
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MBM, historical records aren’t illusory or deceptive: They correctly describe a 
branch of reality (quite literally: an Everettian branch – that is, a quasi-classical 
history).” With world branches not only being instantiated many times over, but 
also forming quasi-classical histories, Bell’s temporal solipsism is warded off. While 
the fundamental picture still comprises independent, discontinuous actualizations 
of configurations, on a higher level of description, worlds branches (quasi-)persist. 
 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the quasi-persistence of world branches 




Figure 1.37 The universal WF provides the probability density (yellow) for actualizations of 
configurations (red). Actualizations happen in accordance with the probability density, the super-
particle thereby carving out the WF in configuration space. The latter decoheres into world branches. 
For illustrative purposes, only two branches are depicted. Depending on the actualization rate /, 
configurations form a more or less dense history. From left to right, increasing actualization rates are 
shown. In the limit of / → ∞, every world branch is instantiated infinitely many times in any finite 
 
37
 This figure first appeared in Dürr & Ehmann (ms). 
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time interval. For suitable combinations of temporal coarse-graining and actualization rate, they quasi-
persist. 
 
This approach needs to be spelled out in greater detail than could be done in Dürr’s 
and my paper on MBM. Combining elements of Barbour’s time-capsule approach 
with elements from the Everettian theory, worlds correspond to finite volumes in 
configuration space. They are sets of (possible) configurations all of which 
(counterfactually) instantiate a macro state that is indistinguishable from a given 
macro state. Worlds, in some respect, resemble Barbourian time capsules, yet are 
importantly different: while each time capsule is a single configuration, finite 
volumes in configuration space are sets containing infinitely many configurations. In 
this respect, i.e. regarding their extension through configuration space, they more 
closely resemble Everettian world branches than Barbourian time capsules. 
However, they also differ from the former: Everettian branches do subsume 
histories of macroscopic change. Not so worlds. They, in themselves, are not 
histories of macroscopic change, since they only contain configurations that are 
macroscopically indistinguishable from a given macro state. In this respect, worlds 
are more like internally static time capsules. Nevertheless, we will see in a later 
chapter how world histories, i.e. successions of worlds, collectively instantiating 
macroscopic change, are formed from individual, internally unchanging worlds. 
Spelling out in greater detail how worlds are connected over extended time spans 
promises to be rewarding in several respects. For one, it will be beneficial to MBM 
and its acceptance as a viable alternative to BM and other non-relativistic quantum 
theories in that it provides a deeper, more thorough understanding of how world 
histories are formed from MBM’s fundamentally discontinuous dynamics of 
randomly actualized configurations. For another, the kinship of worlds and time 
capsules, both being internally (quasi-)38static, promises greater compatibility with 
Barbour’s theory.39 At the same time, the investigation will help to formulate a 
 
38
 The qualification ‘quasi-‘ applies to the notion of worlds, since they do comprise different 
configurations, such that actualizing one configuration within a world and then another within the 
same world amounts to microscopic change, while, at the same time, no macroscopic change occurs. 
By contrast, time capsules are individual configurations, which renders them static simpliciter. 
39
 At least, I see no a priori reason for Barbour to not coarse-grain configuration space into worlds. 
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constructive criticism of the latter, possibly contributing to its improvement. I think 
there is good reason to be critical of Barbour’s claim that the perception of 
macroscopic change can emerge from one individual, static configuration. In fact, 
based on our best scientific understanding, one may doubt that any kind of 
experience of sentient beings is possible from within only one such configuration. 
The presumption is that, in order to generate experience, in particular the 
perception of change, macroscopically relevant physical change is necessary, at 
least for beings the psychological states of which are instantiated by physical 
processes. Of course, there is no conclusive argument providing proof that we are 
such beings. But why throw overboard our best biology and neuroscience if we can 
have the cake and eat it, too? The suggestion I am going to put forward might solve 
this issue: we can have both, internally quasi-static worlds and the relevant 
macroscopic change as well, through the emergence of world histories. 
 
The question that needs to be answered in order to make this proposal work is the 
following: how can world histories comprising macroscopic change arise from 
discontinuous instantiations of individual, internally quasi-static worlds? To tackle 
this problem, I will now delve into a related issue within Boltzmannian statistical 
mechanics (BSM). There, the standard way of partitioning phase space into disjoint 
macro regions corresponding to different macro states has unexpected 
consequences: upon traversing boundaries between macro regions, the continuous 
evolution of the micro state leads to a discontinuous change of the macro 
properties instantiated by the system in question. In fact, within the standard 
framework of BSM, whenever macroscopic change is modelled, it is modelled as 
discontinuous. This is at odds with the expectation that the thermodynamic 
evolution of a system, if not always, at least sometimes is continuous, and that 
BSM’s models should be able to reflect that. This, I call the discontinuity problem. In 
the following chapter, I will make explicit the conditions that apply to the usual way 
of partitioning phase space. After exposing the discontinuity problem in detail and 
presenting three arguments against sharp boundaries between macro regions in 
phase space, I discuss some possible solutions to the issue at hand. Amongst them, 
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the conceptual shift from disjoint macro regions to overlapping worlds defined via a 
similarity relation shall turn out to be fruitful. The account thus developed – apart 
from some minor adaptations – almost straightforwardly carries over to the 
problem of the emergence of world histories in MBM, thereby hinting at a deeper 
connection between (the revised framework of) BSM and MBM, rooting from the 
shared concept of worlds and the coarse-graining relation between the realms of 
the micro- and macroscopic. 
 
III. Smoothing out Boltzmannian statistical mechanics: On the 
viability of an alternative partitioning of phase space into 
overlapping worlds 
 
A core concept in the usual framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics is the 
partitioning of phase space into non-overlapping macro regions, i.e. disjoint sets of 
micro states. Macro regions are of finite, non-zero volume, and stand in a one-to-
one correspondence with different macro states.40 Given a finite volume of phase 
space to be partitioned, there is a finite number of macro regions in a partition. 
Macro states are specified via particular macro values, e.g. for temperature, volume 
and pressure of a gas. In general, macro states are defined and specified via 
particular macro values taken on by macro variables: Following Werndl & Frigg 
(2015b, 1225), a system “can be characterized by a set {p/, … , pA} of 
macrovariables (r ∈ ℕ). The p'  assume values in [macro value space] t', and 
capital letters u'  denote the values of p'. A particular set of values {u/, … , uA} 
defines a macrostate JB+,…,B,.” 
 
Boundaries between macro regions are construed as being sharp: under a given 
partition, each micro state is a member of one and only one macro region. Since 
macro regions stand in a one-to-one correspondence with macro states – that is, 
 
40
 Cf., e.g., Callender (1999), Frigg & Werndl (2012), Werndl & Frigg (2015b), Goldstein et al. (2017). 
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there is a bijection between the set of macro regions and the set of macro states – 
each micro state instantiates one and only one macro state, and micro states from 
different macro regions instantiate different macro states. Also, once fixed, a given 
partition doesn’t change (Hemmo & Shenker 2012, 53 and 56): “The partition of the 
state space into macrostate regions is fixed in time”; “the partition of the state 
space into macrostates […] is time-independent”. This partition of phase space into 
a finite number of macro regions with sharp, fixed boundaries is conceptually 
puzzling, for it results in models that are unable to describe continuous macroscopic 
change: whenever macroscopic change is modelled within the framework of BSM, it 
is discontinuous. BSM’s models predict that every time the micro state of a system 
crosses the boundary between two macro regions, a discontinuity in the system’s 
macro values results. However, models that describe macroscopic change as always 
discontinuous are at odds with our expectations: a system’s macroscopic evolution 
as described by thermodynamics involves continuous change of its macro 
properties – of the temperature value, for example – so we wouldn’t expect to 
encounter discontinuities whenever a system’s macro properties change. 
 
Likewise, continuous evolution of the micro state should not lead to discontinuous 
change of the macro state, i.e., should not lead to a discontinuity in the evolution of 
macro values. Yet, as the framework of BSM is set up, continuous change of the 
micro state sometimes (i.e. upon traversing boundaries between macro regions) 
does lead to discontinuous change of the macro state. In fact, the models resulting 
from the framework of BSM predict that, whenever there is macroscopic change, it 
is sudden and of a jumpy nature: during its wanderings through a macro region, the 
micro state always and invariably instantiates the same, unchanging macro state, 
according to the framework’s models. As soon as the micro state moves into a 
different macro region, however, it suddenly instantiates a different macro state: 
since boundaries between macro regions are construed as sharp, macro values 
jump upon traversal of the micro state from one macro region to another. By 
contrast, since macro regions and macro states stand in a one-to-one 
correspondence, and macro states, in turn, are specified by a set of macro variables 
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taking on constant macro values, the latter remain completely unchanged as long as 
the micro state travels within a macro region. This results from the definition of 
macro states via “particular set[s] of [macro] values”, and the bijective association 
of the thusly defined macro states with macro regions of finite volume (Werndl & 
Frigg 2015b, 1225): “a system’s microstate uniquely determines its macrostate. 
Every macrostate J is associated with a macroregion v4 consisting of all F ∈ vD  
[with vD  denoting the energy hypersurface, i.e. the complete available phase space 
for a constant energy] for which the system is in J.” The consequence of this 
construal is that macro values always jump upon the micro state crossing 
boundaries between macro regions. Assuming that the thermodynamic evolution of 
macro states is to be recovered, jumping macro values, especially upon tiny changes 
of the micro state, seem inadequate. Yet, the partition of phase space into disjoint 
macro regions of finite, non-zero volume with fixed, sharp boundaries, as 
prescribed by the usual framework, results in models describing jumping macro 
states. 
 
This issue, merely sketched so far, I call the discontinuity problem (DP) of the 
standard framework of BSM. It will be discussed in detail in the following. At this 
point, I should probably put some emphasis on the fact that DP only pertains to 
models resulting from the usual framework of BSM, and explicitly not to the target 
systems described by those models. To be perfectly clear: I am not claiming that the 
physical systems themselves suffer from DP, i.e., that they always undergo 
discontinuous macroscopic change, if they undergo macroscopic change at all. 
Rather, only the models that describe them entail these unavoidable 
discontinuities. This, in itself, would even be unproblematic. Per se, there is nothing 
wrong about models allowing only for discontinuous change. DP arises only if we 
want to have these models adequately describe systems that undergo continuous 
macroscopic change. So, what DP actually refers to, is the discrepancy between 
what we want or expect from these models, and what they are able to deliver.41  
 
41
 One might be tempted to put into question whether DP really poses a problem: aren’t most (if not 
all) models deficient in some or other respect? If so, why think that the deficiency of BSM’s models is 
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In what follows, I will first give a quick overview of ‘The usual presentation of BSM’. 
Next, I will make some ‘Remarks on macro regions and partitioning phase space’, 
wherein I describe and formalize the central conditions for the usual way of 
partitioning phase space, i.e. the no-overlap condition and the exhaustive-cover 
condition. I then describe in some detail ‘The discontinuity problem as it arises from 
the framework of BSM’ and discuss ‘BSM as a fundamental theory in light of the 
discontinuity problem’. Afterwards, I present some ‘Hints of digression from the 
usual’ as found in the recent literature. In ‘Against sharp boundaries of macro 
regions in phase space’ (I), (II) and (III), I provide three arguments making explicit 
the consequences resulting from DP. Equipped with a proper understanding of the 
problem, I will discuss two possible solutions in ‘Towards an alternative’: ‘Removing 
exhaustive-cover’ and ‘Removing no-overlap’. Both shall turn out to be 
unsatisfactory. For ‘A different solution’, I then suggest making a conceptual switch 
‘From macro regions to worlds’. The latter shall be defined by a relation of sufficient 
similarity. In ‘Introducing a new framework for BSM: Some conditions’, the concept 
shall be explicated and formalized. I will discuss ‘Some anticipated worries’ 
regarding the new framework and show how it solves DP as encountered within the 
old framework by going ‘Back to the example’ used before. Finally, I will discuss 
issues regarding ‘World size, the equilibrium world, and entropy increase’ before 
closing with the ‘Conclusion’ of the chapter. 
 
III.1 The usual presentation of BSM 
 
Let’s start our investigation of the discontinuity problem sketched above by taking a 
closer look at the framework of BSM as it is usually presented, e.g. in discussions of 
approach to equilibrium:42 We are interested in a (classical) system comprised of : 
constituents that move through physical space. The micro state of the system – a 
 
problematic? I will respond to this after introducing DP. I am going to argue that DP is particularly 
pressing if one regards BSM as a fundamental theory, as Frigg & Werndl (2019) do. 
42
 Roughly following the presentation in Frigg & Werndl (2012, 101f.). 
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complete specification of the positions and momenta of all the constituents 
involved in the system – is represented by a point F in its 6:-dimensional phase 
space v. If the energy of the system is constant, the phase space volume available 
to the system is reduced to a (6: − 1)-dimensional energy hypersurface vD. Sub-
regions within vD  are specified such that they correspond to different macro states 
J'  – specified by particular macro values taken on by macro variables, see above – 
of the system: The sub-region in vD  corresponding to a macro state J'  is the set of 
all F ∈ vD  that instantiate J'  and called the macro region v4*. Macro regions v4*  
form a partition of vD: they cover all of vD  and do not overlap. A macro state of 
special interest is J#E, the equilibrium state, instantiated by any micro state F ∈
v4-.  (and counterfactually instantiated43 by all micro states F ∈ v4-.).44 Given the 
standard Lebesgue measure, the volume of sub-regions of vD  can be assessed and 
hence is rendered comparable. It is usually said that (Frigg & Werndl 2012, 102) “for 
gases v4-.  is vastly larger […] than any other macro-region, a fact also known as the 
‘dominance of the equilibrium macrostate’ […]; in fact vD  is almost entirely taken up 
by equilibrium microstates. For this reason the equilibrium state has maximum 
entropy.”  
 




 “Counterfactually instantiated” in the sense that at any time, only one micro state is actualized, 
and thus only one micro state actually instantiates the macro state, but the actualization of the other 
micro states in the same macro region would instantiate the same macro state, if they were 
actualized instead. 
44
 Answering the question (Werndl & Frigg 2015a, 19f.) “under what circumstances […] an 
equilibrium state exists?” is not as simple as the usual mantra, according to which the equilibrium 
state is simply the macro state corresponding to the largest macro region, might suggest (ibid., 26, 
their emphasis): “for an equilibrium to exist three factors need to cooperate: the choice of macro-
variables, the dynamics of the system, and the choice of the effective state space Z [e.g. the (6N-1)-
dimensional energy hypersurface, as opposed to the full state space, i.e. 6N-dimensional phase 
space (my remark)]. The cooperation between these factors can take different forms and there is 
more than one constellation that can lead to the existence of an equilibrium state. The important 
point is that the answer to the question of existence is holistic: it not only depends on three factors 
rather than one, but also on the interplay between these factors.” Werndl & Frigg (2015a) provide 
detailed arguments, to which the reader is referred. For our purposes, it is safe to assume that an 
equilibrium macro state exists, for even if not, the issue of macroscopic change upon the micro state 
crossing boundaries between macro regions remains. 
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Of special importance for our present purposes is the notion of macro regions and 
their partitioning phase space (ibid.): “From a macroscopic perspective, the system 
is characterised by a set of macrostates J' , y = 1,… ,z. To each macrostate 
corresponds a macro-region v4*  consisting of all F ∈ vD  for which the system is in 
J'. The v4*  form a partition of vD, meaning that they do not overlap and jointly 
cover vD.” Frigg et al. (2016, 4.1) summarize the key feature of the correspondence 
between micro states and macro states in a short statement: “to every given 
microstate F there corresponds exactly one macrostate”. 
 
For one thing, this means that F either instantiates a certain macro state J'  or 
another macro state J7, but never both. Since macro states J'  and J7  correspond 
to macro regions v4*  and v4/, respectively, F must not belong to two macro regions. 
This we call the no-overlap condition: 
 
∀F∀v4',7 	¬ GF ∈ v4* ∧ F ∈ v4/H ; 	y ≠ }  (no-overlap) 
 
For another, it means that macro regions exhaustively cover the available phase-
space volume vD. All micro states must instantiate exactly one macro state, read as: 
every micro state must instantiate some macro state, and hence belong to some 
macro region. It cannot belong to no macro region at all. Hence, all of vD  must be 
covered by macro regions (“they … jointly cover vD.” (Frigg & Werndl 2012, 102.)) 
Let’s call this the exhaustive-cover condition: 
 
∀F∃v4*3F ∈ v4*6  (exhaustive-cover) 
 
Taken together, no-overlap and exhaustive-cover ensure that there is always some 
macro state instantiated, that this macro state is internally consistent, i.e. that a 
micro state never instantiates two (or more) distinct macro states at the same time, 
and that macro regions are not fuzzy: while it might be the case that there is some 
uncertainty or even complete ignorance about which macro state a given system is 
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actually in – if only because the respective macro values haven’t been 
measured/observed – we can always be sure that its actual micro state F is located 
in some macro region or other, i.e. in one (exhaustive-cover) and only one (no-
overlap) macro region v4*, and that thus, one and only one macro state is 
instantiated at any given time. After all, fuzzy boundaries would mean that the 
actual micro state does not always belong to a certain (i.e. to one and only one) 
macro region. Being located at the fuzzy boundary, F could belong to v4*, to v4/, to 
neither, or to both.45 The latter option “both” is excluded by no-overlap. The option 
“neither” is excluded by exhaustive-cover. Hence, it must belong to either one of 
the former. In other words: boundaries of macro regions are sharp. 
 
These considerations about the overlap and fuzziness of macro regions – or rather: 
these stipulations of their impossibility – are reflected in the schematic pictorial 





 For an illustration of fuzziness, think of the paradigmatic example of the fuzziness of clouds. Clouds 
can be said to be fuzzy: it is not always clear whether a certain water molecule belongs to a certain 
cloud, to another cloud, to neither, or to both. The – quite literally – fuzzy nature of clouds renders it 
difficult to provide a clear and uncontroversial answer. 
46
 I thank Sheldon Goldstein and the publisher of Annalen der Physik for the permission to reproduce 
this figure. It first appeared in Goldstein et al. (2017). Copyright Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA. 




As can be seen, macro regions cover all of phase space, do not overlap and have 
sharp boundaries. 
 
III.3 The discontinuity problem as it arises from the framework of BSM 
 
It has been stated before (see above) that macro regions in phase space are of 
finite, non-zero volume, and that there is a finite number of macro regions in a 
partition. Why is that so? First, let’s answer the question why macro regions must 
have a finite, non-zero volume. The reason for this lies in the way BSM works. The 
Boltzmann entropy function – K,(J') ≔ r,log	[Ç(v4*)]47 – relies on the volume of 
macro regions in order to assign different entropy values to different macro states 
of a system. Recall, for example, what (Frigg & Werndl 2012, 102) say about the 
entropy value of the equilibrium state and the volume of the corresponding macro 
region: “for gases v4-.  is vastly larger […] than any other macro-region, a fact also 
known as the ‘dominance of the equilibrium macrostate’ […]; in fact vD  is almost 
 
47
 Cf. Frigg & Werndl (2012, 102), Werndl & Frigg (2015b, 1225). 
arbitrariness in the choice of  (X) shrinks and becomes less relevant. A natural choice





and to take as  (X) the  ⌫ containing X. That is,
SB(X) = SB(⌫) := k log vol ⌫ . (4)
We will give more detail in Section 3. Boltzmann’s definition (2) is often abbreviated
as “SB = k logW .” In every energy shell there is usually one macro set  ⌫ =  eq that
corresponds to thermal equilibrium and takes up by far most (say, more than 99.99%)





Figure 1: Partition of phase space, or rather an energy shell therein, into macro sets  ⌫ ,
with the thermal equilibrium set taking up most of the volume (not drawn to scale).
Reprinted from (Goldstein et al., 2017b).
An immediate problem with the Gibbs entropy is that while every classical system
has a definite phase point X (even if we observers do not know it), a system does not
4
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entirely taken up by equilibrium microstates. For this reason the equilibrium state 
has maximum entropy.” Now assume, contrary to this, that macro regions in fact 
were of volume zero. The entropy function then would assign to macro states no 
well-defined entropy value. A theory allowing for such models would hardly be able 
to accomplish the things BSM does, and certainly wouldn’t deserve the name BSM. 
For example, arguments about the relation of entropy change and the arrow of 
time would be completely blocked. This consequence, especially for the purpose of 
discussing the framework of BSM as it stands, is unacceptable. So indeed, it seems 
safe to say, in accordance with the way BSM is standardly presented, that macro 
regions in BSM are construed as having finite volume greater zero. 
 
Let’s move on to the second part of the statement above: there is a finite number 
of macro regions in a partition. The reason for that is rather simple. As we have just 
seen, macro regions, as construed within the framework of BSM, are of finite, non-
zero volume. It is trivial that the finite volume of phase space available to a system 
can only be partitioned into a finite number of compartments – macro regions – 
given the latter are of finite, non-zero volume (and do not approach zero volume). 
But why, one might want to ask, do we even assume that the available phase space 
volume is finite? If it would be infinite itself, we’d be able to partition it into an 
infinite number of compartments, despite the latter having a finite, non-zero 
volume. However, it is unreasonable to assume an infinite phase space volume for 
at least many of the systems BSM wants to model. Think, for example, of the 
paradigmatic gas in a box. Clearly, the spatial degrees of freedom each constituent 
has are bounded: particles can only move within the box (itself of finite volume). 
BSM wants to be able to model such cases, so it is uncalled for to simply assume 
that BSM only models systems that aren’t limited to a finite spatial volume. 
Likewise, for finite temperatures, the momenta of the particles can only take on 
values within certain limits. Accordingly, the phase space volume of the entire 
system is restricted to be finite, if very large. And once we have a finite volume of 
phase space, it is impossible to partition it into an infinite number of compartments 
with finite, non-zero volume. So the number of macro regions must be finite. 
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Now that we have established that there is a finite number of macro regions, we 
can already see that, in models of BSM, there can only be a finite number of 
different macro states. Macro states and macro regions, as I have said before, stand 
in a one-to-one correspondence. That is, the mapping between macro regions and 
macro states is bijective. But it is impossible to map a set containing an infinity of 
elements – let alone a set containing an uncountable infinity of elements – 
bijectively onto a set containing a finite number of elements. Accordingly, it is 
impossible to bijectively map a set containing infinitely many macro states onto a 
set containing finitely many macro regions. So if we have a finite number of macro 
regions, we are forced to let them correspond to only a finite number of different 
macro states. In fact, the number of macro states and the number of macro regions 
in the model must be equal: there are precisely as many macro states as there are 
macro regions, and this number is finite. 
 
Having established that there is a finite number of different macro states, we will 
now find that there is a finite number of different sets of macro values in the 
models resulting from the usual framework of BSM. Macro states, as defined above, 
are specified by sets of macro values. The simplest case, of course, is if this set of 
macro values specifying a macro state only contains one relevant element, such 
that we can ignore the rest. Take, for example, some macro states that differ only in 
their temperature macro values. In this case, we can ignore other macro variables: 
they are assumed to take on identical values for the different macro states. Since 
there is a finite number of different macro states in the model, and these macro 
states differ in their temperature macro value, there is a finite number of different 
temperature macro values. The reason for this is similar to the one we just 
discussed in the case of macro regions and macro states: the set of different macro 
states, since the latter are specified by temperature macro values, stands in a one-
to-one correspondence to the set of different temperature macro values. So with a 
finite number of different macro states, there is a finite number of different 
temperature macro values specifying the former. 
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Now, it is important to recognize that different macro regions must correspond to 
different macro states, and thus to different macro values. For if different macro 
regions would correspond to the same macro state, i.e. to identical macro values, 
they wouldn’t be different macro regions in the first place. Such macro regions, 
corresponding to the same macro state, would be combined into one macro region. 
This is a consequence of the one-to-one correspondence between macro regions 
and macro states in the framework of BSM. In effect, different macro regions must 
correspond to different macro states, and, a fortiori, to different (sets of) macro 
values. In the simplified example, where we are only concerned about the 
temperature macro value, i.e. assume that all other macro values are identical for 
the different macro states, this means that different macro regions must 
correspond to different temperature macro values. But as we have established, 
there is only a finite set of different temperature macro values. What, then, does it 
mean for a finite set of temperature macro values to consist of different 
temperature macro values? It means that, if we take the difference between any 
two of the values taken from this set, this difference must be non-zero. That is to 
say: take any pair of macro values from the finite set of macro values, and subtract 
one from the other. The result must always be different from zero, for if it was zero, 
the two values would be identical. (They also can’t arbitrarily approach each other, 
because the set of macro values is not a continuum.) It is unreasonable to assign 
identical macro states, i.e. macro states not differing in their macro values, to 
different macro regions, as argued before: those macro regions would be combined 
into one macro region, such that, in the end, macro regions and macro states 
remain in a one-to-one correspondence, and likewise macro regions and (sets) of 
macro values. 
 
So what we are left with is a finite set of different macro values, each specifying a 
different macro state, corresponding to different macro regions. But if all pairs of 
elements of the set of macro values are different in that the subtraction of any one 
of them from any other results in a non-zero difference, then the transition 
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between two macro values, i.e. between two macro states, i.e. between two macro 
regions, is always modelled as discontinuous: any non-zero interval on the reals 
contains an uncountable infinity of real numbers. And since any two macro values 
from the set of macro values assigned to macro states, and thus to macro regions, 
must differ, they must be separated by a non-zero interval, which can’t arbitrarily 
approach zero, because the number of different macro values must be finite. So the 
transition between any two macro values from this finite set of macro values must 
be discontinuous. A fortiori, the transition between any two macro states must be 
discontinuous, and accordingly, the transition between any two macro regions 
results in a discontinuity. So we can say that the transition of the micro state from 
one macro region to another, corresponding to the instantiation of different macro 
states, and thus of different (sets of) macro values, always results in a discontinuity 
(in the standard framework of BSM). To illustrate this, imagine the temperature 







As long as the micro state wanders through a macro region v4*, the temperature 
macro value P(<) = P4*  remains absolutely constant, according to the model. So 
the graph shows a continuous, straight line, representing the constant temperature 
macro value. But at the precise instant the micro state crosses the boundary and 
moves into another macro region v4/  – call this instant <FGH<<'IJ – the temperature 
macro value changes to P(<) = P4/. Then, as long as the micro state stays in this 
macro region, the temperature macro value again remains absolutely constant, so 
the graph again shows a continuous, straight line, representing this different 
temperature macro value. Thus, the graphed function, at <FGH<<'IJ, contains a 
discontinuity. And this discontinuity is not removable, as is easily shown: consider 




P(<) of the function for < approaching <FGH<<'IJ from the 
left side, i.e. for the time during which the micro state moves through the first 
macro region v4*. The value of this limit is the temperature value before crossing 
the boundary: É- = P4*. Now consider the limit ÉK = lim%→%
01233*45
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P(<) of the function 
for < approaching <FGH<<'IJ from the right side, i.e. for the time during which the 
micro state moves through the second macro region v4/, traced backwards. The 
value of this limit is the temperature value after crossing the boundary, ÉK = P4/. 
Since P4* ≠ P4/, the limit from the left side and the limit from the right side are 
unequal as well: É- ≠ ÉK. So there exists no single limit. So the discontinuity at 
<FGH<<'IJ indeed is a jump discontinuity. 
 
This is how the discontinuity problem arises from the usual framework of BSM. As I 
have said before, DP consists in the discrepancy between the expectation that 
thermodynamic macro values change continuously, and the fact that, in the usual 
framework of BSM, continuous change of macro values can’t be modelled. So it 
neither consists solely in the fact that BSM is unable to model continuous change 
alone, nor does it contain the claim that in nature, or in thermodynamics, or in 
reality, macroscopic change is always discontinuous. The discontinuity we 
encounter in BSM’s models is an artefact resulting from the way the framework is 
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set up: partitioning phase space into a finite number of macro regions, standing in a 
one-to-one correspondence with different macro states, the latter themselves 
standing in a one-to-one correspondence with different sets of macro values, such 
that, in the end, the elements of a finite set of macro regions stand in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the elements of a finite set of sets of macro values – – this 
partitioning, judged from the thermodynamic viewpoint, where continuous change 
of macro values is allowable, is an idealisation (see below). One might reasonably 
prefer a framework that is able to avoid it. 
 
The discontinuity problem of BSM is put into sharp relief when regarding BSM as a 
fundamental theory, as Frigg and Werndl (2019) do. They differentiate between 
fundamental and effective theories of statistical mechanics (SM), classifying BSM as 
the former, and Gibbsian statistical mechanics (GSM) as the latter (ibid., 425 and 
435): “BSM is a fundamental theory while GSM is an effective theory. This means 
that BSM provides a true description of the systems within the scope of SM; GSM 
offers an algorithm to calculate values defined by the fundamental theory. The 
algorithm is often easier to handle than the fundamental theory and provides 
results where the fundamental theory is intractable. As every effective theory, GSM 
works only within a certain domain of application.” “Asking whether GSM provides 
a correct fundamental description of the world, or, if the answer to this question is 
negative, trying to revise GSM so that it does provide such a description, is a 
mistaken endeavour. Effective theories do not offer fundamental descriptions; they 
are calculatory devices of instrumental value; no more and no less.” 
 
By contrast to effective theories, fundamental theories are supposed to provide 
correct descriptions of the world (ibid. 431): “BSM is quite unlike GSM [...]. 
Dynamical considerations occupy centre stage in BSM. It introduces macrostates 
with corresponding macroregions, and then defines equilibrium in explicitly 
dynamical terms (namely as the macrostate whose macroregion is such that, in the 
long run, the system’s state spends most of its time in that macroregion). […] 
[U]nder the assumption that the world is governed by Newton’s equation of motion 
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[…] the dynamics considered in BSM is the true dynamics at the fundamental level: 
the unabridged and unidealised dynamics with all interactions between all 
microconstituents of the system. Equilibrium results from macrostates that are 
defined in terms of macrovariables that supervene on the true microdynamics of 
the system, and where a system fluctuates away from equilibrium it does so as a 
result of the true underlying dynamics. In a classical world the theory gives a full 
account of all this – nothing is left out and nothing is averaged over. BSM provides 
the complete fundamental theory of SM systems.” 
 
III.4 BSM as a fundamental theory in light of the discontinuity problem 
 
Above, I have promised to respond to the claim that DP isn’t problematic after all. 
To this, I shall come now. 
 
First, I need to distinguish between two types of functions models can have, and the 
way in which they can be deficient. 
 
The first type of function of models is to “represent a selected part or aspect of the 
world, which is the model’s target system.” (Frigg & Hartmann 2020, 1., my 
emphasis.) Scale models have this function. They are (ibid.) “down-sized or enlarged 
copies of their target systems. A typical example is a small wooden car that is put 
into a wind tunnel to explore the actual car’s aerodynamic properties.” Whether a 
model fulfils its representational function successfully depends on the application. 
The wooden car model might be successful in representing the aerodynamic 
aspects of the real car, but it certainly fails in representing the real car’s material 
composition (cf. ibid.). It is deficient in the sense that it doesn’t represent all 
aspects of the real car. With respect to the intended application, this deficiency isn’t 
problematic. There, its function is to represent a certain aspect of the real car, not 
all of them. 
 
 72 
A different type of function of models is to describe a target system that falls within 
the domain of description of a given theory or theoretical framework. For example, 
a system of two massive objects orbiting each other in empty space is a target 
system that falls within the domain of description of Newtonian classical mechanics. 
Models describing a target system often entail approximations or idealisations. 
Borrowing the distinction from Norton (2012, 210), “an approximation is an inexact 
description of a target system.” For example, using Newtonian mechanics to 
describe the target system of two objects orbiting each other in empty space results 
in a model ignoring relativistic effects. This amounts to an approximation. “An 
idealization”, on the other hand, “is a real or fictitious system, distinct from the 
target system, some of whose properties provide an inexact description of some 
aspects of the target system.” (Fictitiously) modelling the above two-body target 
system as a system of two point-like masses would be an idealization. This model 
isn’t merely an approximation. It also has a representational function in that it 
represents the aspects “mass” and “position” of the target system in a fictitious 
system of point-like masses. Different functions of models aren’t necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Approximations are deficient in virtue of being inexact, and the 
same is true for idealisations, for they entail approximations. Idealisations however, 
because they are systems themselves (if only fictitious ones), may also be deficient 
in virtue of not representing all aspects of the target system. Again, these 
deficiencies aren’t problematic, as long as the model fulfils its intended function. 
 
The function of BSM’s models is of the second type. They describe some aspects of 
a target system, e.g. of a gas in a box, that falls within the domain of description of 
BSM. To be more precise, they describe the macro evolution of a thermodynamic 
target system, e.g. during approach to equilibrium. BSM’s models are an 
idealisation in that they replace the actual target system with a fictitious system 
that can only instantiate a subset of the macro states the target system can assume. 
Their representation of the time evolution of the target system, in other words, is 
deficient in virtue of not representing all aspects of it. This idealisation entails also 
an approximation: BSM’s models ignore the actual macro values of the target 
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system’s macro variables at any given time and approximate them by assigning 
fixed macro values for finite intervals of time. 
 
Now this approximation is unproblematic. (I figure the presumption that DP might 
not actually be a problem originates from this fact.) If the model is too crude, if the 
approximation is too inexact, we may always impose a more fine-grained partition. 
However, that BSM’s models are idealisations with respect to the possible macro 
states a target system can take on becomes problematic when adopting a realist 
stance towards BSM and taking it to be the fundamental theory, as Frigg & Werndl 
do. Working “under the assumption that the world is governed by Newton’s 
equation of motion”, they regard BSM as a “true complete fundamental theory”. As 
Norton points out, one would expect the less fundamental theory to be an 
idealisation of the fundamental theory, not the other way around (Norton 2012, 
211): “Realists, however, regard the antecedent theory as an idealization of the 
successor theory.”  
 
This is not to argue against Frigg & Werndl’s position. I think it is well justified to 
regard BSM as the more fundamental theory. And if I had to be realist about either 
standard BSM or classical, i.e. pre-statistical, thermodynamics, I'd choose the 
former over the latter. But that doesn't do away with the fact that there is 
something odd with BSM, that its models are idealisations with respect to the 
possible macro states a system can take on. This oddness is the discontinuity 
problem of the standard framework of BSM. I think it can be avoided by adopting a 
new framework, as presented below, and those who want to be realists about BSM 
in particular should be eager to consider it. 
 
III.5 Hints of digression from the usual 
 
As we have seen, the construal of phase space partitioning within the framework of 
BSM, with sharp boundaries between a finite number of non-overlapping macro 
regions of finite, non-zero volume, leads to the discontinuity problem. At the same 
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time, this construal seems to be standard. However, there are hints to be found in 
the literature, showing that not everyone considers it to be entirely unproblematic. 
Goldstein et al. (2019, 4) remark that phase space partitioning is not as 
straightforward a procedure as one might think: “v(Ü) is the set of all phase points 
that ‘look macroscopically the same’ as Ü. Obviously, there is no unique precise 
definition for ‘looking macroscopically the same,’ so we have a certain freedom to 
make a reasonable choice”. And later (ibid., 28), introducing the idea of “‘fuzzy’ 
macro sets”, i.e. fuzzy macro regions: “The point here is to get rid of the sharp 
boundaries between [macro regions] as the boundaries are artificial and somewhat 
arbitrary anyway.” I agree with Goldstein et al.’s verdict that boundaries are 
“artificial”. As we have seen above, they are an artefact, resulting from the way the 
framework of BSM is set up. 
 
Here is Wallace (2018, 19) taking a similar line regarding the arbitrariness of phase 
space partitioning in BSM: “the macrostate partition at the heart of Boltzmannian 
statistical mechanics is […] vulnerable to these criticisms [(concerning the adequacy 
of coarse-graining), A.E.] […] Consider some standard descriptions of the coarse-
graining: ‘[W]e must partition [phase space] into compartments such that all of the 
microstates Ü in a compartment are macroscopically indistinguishable[.]’ (Callender 
1999, p.355). ‘Everyday macroscopic human language (that is) carves the phase 
space of the universe up into chunks.’ (Albert 2000, p.47) If pushed, I suspect 
Boltzmannians would reply that it is not the epistemic indistinguishability of 
macrostates that is doing the work, but rather the possibility of writing down robust 
higher-level dynamics in terms of macrostates, and largely abstracting over 
microscopic details”. Wallace’s argument here is a tu quoque: If the Gibbsian 
approach can rightly be criticized for coarse-graining, then the Boltzmannian 
approach can rightly be criticized for partitioning phase space into macro regions. 
We are not concerned with the Gibbsian approach, so this discussion shall not 
further distract us. The point to be made is merely that others see a potential for 
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criticism of the BSM framework as well, and locate it at the same juncture as I do: 
the partition of phase space into macro regions with sharp boundaries.48 
 
III.6 Against sharp boundaries of macro regions in phase space (I): Crossing 
boundaries 
 
Apart from a few hints and remarks like those just presented, there is, at least to my 
knowledge, a surprising lack of literature discussing the issue at hand. In particular, I 
haven’t found the discontinuity problem being made explicit anywhere. In the 
following, I shall therefore try to make it apprehensible myself, through a series of 
examples revealing its consequences. 
 
Imagine a system of interest, e.g. a gas in a (sealed, insulated) room. Modelling it in 
the usual way, we have a partition of the relevant, i.e. energetically available phase 
space vD, including sharp boundaries between macro regions. These macro regions 
correspond to different macro states of the gas, such that, if the micro state of the 
gas is located within a certain macro region, the gas instantiates the macro state as 
 
48
 Consider also the following exchange between Sheldon Goldstein and Daniel Sudarsky during the 
former’s talk Gibbs vs. Boltzmann Entropy at the Chimera of Entropy summer school in Split in 2018 
(my transcript):  
Daniel Sudarsky: “Something that has bothered me all the time: consider that partition that you have 
[the usual partition with sharp boundaries]. Then consider a collection of points that are 
approaching the boundary from the two sides. I cannot imagine being able always to differentiate 
between them [... inaudible]”. 
Sheldon Goldstein: “You are right. So maybe you need to develop a better scheme which is more 
realistic, so you don't have sharp boundaries. [...] You are quite right; in a better world than ours, 
somebody will have done that. Maybe somebody has some kind of fuzzy notion of macro state. But 
you don't want to introduce that here [in the context of a heuristic discussion of entropy and 
approach to equilibrium], which will just complicate things. But you are completely right, there isn't 
that realistic division between [macro regions]: ‘Oh, these points over here look like equilibrium, go 
epsilon further, doesn't look like equilibrium anymore.’ That, obviously, is unrealistic. But if you want 
to get an understanding of the phenomena you should make that idealisation.” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jU838SXBrv4, 00:52:30 – 00:53:40)  
Of course, I am aware that such a statement, made in the context of a presentation, must not be 
mistaken for the “official” position of the speaker. That is, I don’t assume that Goldstein (or 
Sudarsky) would have made the same or a similar statement in a published paper. (Neither do I 
assume that they wouldn’t make such statements in a published paper. After all, Goldstein et al. 
2019 call a partition with sharp boundaries “artificial”.) Nevertheless, I take Sudarsky’s question and 
Goldstein’s reply as a further hint to the effect that the way phase space is partitioned in the 
framework of BSM isn’t unanimously viewed as entirely unproblematic. 
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specified by its corresponding macro values. Hence, the actual micro state of the 
gas determines its actual macro state. Let’s say that, in its initial macro state J& at 
<&, the gas is confined to a certain corner of the room. Let the system evolve until 
the gas has spread out and evenly fills the whole room. This state we call J#E and 
mark with the time stamp <#E. Clearly, the micro state representing the system 
must have evolved and crossed some boundaries. To simplify the picture, imagine 
that there are only two macro states: J& with the gas in the corner, and J#E with 
the gas spread out. Accordingly, there are two macro regions, v4!  and v4-..49 Since 
the gas has changed its macro state from residing in the corner to filling the whole 
room, its micro state must have wandered from v4!  to v4-.. Hence, it must have 
crossed the boundary between these macro regions. Now zoom in on the phase 
space region where the micro state crosses the boundary between v4!  and v4-.. 
There is a precise instant when this happens, namely when the micro state lies 
exactly on the boundary. Let’s mark this instant <FGH<<'IJ. Here comes the problem: 
Just before <FGH<<'IJ, the micro state is in v4!, such that it is instantiating the macro 
state J&, with the gas in the corner. Just after <FGH<<'IJ, the micro state is in v4-., 
such that it is instantiating the macro state J#E, with the gas spread out. Hence, the 
continuous evolution of the micro state over just a tiny distance in phase space, 
such that it crosses the boundary, amounts to a rather dramatic discontinuity in the 
macro state of the gas: at <FGH<<'IJ, the volume jumps from a rather small value (the 
gas confined in the corner of the room) to a comparatively large value (the gas 
spread out over the entire room). Yet, judging from the viewpoint of 
thermodynamics, as well as from considerations about the speeds at which gas 
particles usually move – at finite speeds, certainly – we’d expect a small, continuous 
evolution of the micro state only to amount to an accordingly small, and likewise 
continuous evolution of the macro state. After all, the continuous change of the 
micro state around <FGH<<'IJ might represent nothing but the displacement of one 
measly particle by a few microns. Such a tiny, continuous difference between micro 
 
49
 This, of course, is an overly simplified scenario, but it is helpful to make my point. 
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states before and after <FGH<<'IJ, one should think, can hardly account for the 
tremendous discontinuity between macro states J& and J#E.50 
 
One might want to reply that this strange correlation between the microscopic and 
macroscopic evolution of the system is due to the overly simplified example we 
used. Certainly, there are not only two macro states, and, accordingly, not only two 
macro regions with one boundary between them. Our graining is way too coarse. 
But bear in mind: irrespective of how many macro regions we introduce in 
accordance with equally many macro states we care to distinguish, the boundaries 
between macro regions are always sharp, and macro regions are of finite number, 
corresponding to a finite number of different macro states of the gas. So whatever 
we do, as long as we have finitely many macro regions of non-zero volume, 
corresponding to finitely many different macro states, we will always encounter the 
same problem: a small, continuous change in the micro state of the gas, while 
crossing the boundary, will amount to a discontinuous change in its macro state. 
 
III.7 Against sharp boundaries of macro regions in phase space (II): Shifting 
boundaries 
 
Here is another, related example making the discontinuity problem explicit. This 
time, we are not dealing with a micro state wandering through phase space, 
thereby crossing boundaries between macro regions, leading to sudden, 
discontinuous change of the macro state. Instead, we are exploiting the 
arbitrariness of the partition itself. (Recall Goldstein et al.’s (2019, 4) remark above: 
“there is no unique precise definition for ‘looking macroscopically the same,’ so we 




 One might have the further question: in which macro region does the micro state reside at 
-89:;;<=>? Which macro state does it instantiate? In general: to which macro region do boundaries 
between macro regions belong? The considerations above, discussing the discontinuity at -89:;;<=>, 
might suggest that the volume macro variable at this point can take on any value whatsoever, and 
that thus the boundary doesn’t belong to any particular macro region exclusively. 
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Imagine a partition of the available phase space of a system, and different micro 
states therein. Particularly, imagine two macro regions v4*  and v4/, corresponding 
to different macro states J'  and J7, and separated by a sharp boundary. Now add 
to this picture three arbitrarily yet purposefully selected micro states, F/, F), F8. 
Let’s say that F/ lies somewhere in the middle of v4*. Put F) arbitrarily close to the 
boundary, but still in v4*. F8 shall reside equally close to the boundary, opposite 





Just like a tiny, continuous change of the micro state shouldn’t amount to anything 
but a tiny, continuous change of the macro state, a tiny change of the partition 
itself, i.e. a small shift of the boundaries of macro regions, should not amount to a 
model representing a completely different physical situation. Yet, in our example, 
this is precisely what will happen. Move, say, the boundary between v4*  and v4/  a 
wee bit towards v4*, such that the volume of v4*  decreases ever so slightly, while 
the volume of v4/  increases by the same amount. Make it so that now F8 and F) lie 





This new, slightly different partition seems an appropriate correction to the 
previous one, at least at first sight: the micro states F) and F8, always residing 
extremely close together, are now grouped into the same macro region v4/, 
thereby instantiating the same macro state J7. The relatively remote micro state F/ 
remains in its original region v4*. From a macroscopic point of view, F) and F8 are 
now “macro-identified” in that they are taken to instantiate the same macro state. 
This macro state is different from the macro state instantiated by the fairly remote 
F/. 
 
But all is not well. A tiny change of the partition, these examples show, amounts to 
models representing completely different physical situations on the macro level 
while nothing on the micro level changes: before the boundary shift, F/ and F) 
were regarded as instantiating the same macro state J', while F8 was instantiating 
J7. After the shift, F) and F8 are instantiating the same macro state J7, while F/ is 
still instantiating J'. So in case F) becomes actual, it makes a huge difference in the 
model whether the boundary has been shifted or not. At the same time, nothing in 
the target system’s micro state has actually changed: F) specifies the exact same 
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micro state as before the shift of the boundary. The disagreement between the two 
models, despite describing the same microscopic situation of the same target 
system, is evident. 
 
And there is more: F/, F) and F8 have been arbitrarily selected. They are just phase 
points, like any other. So why not select another micro state, call it F0, also 





We face the same problem as before. So the “correction” of the partition turns out 
to be no correction after all. Shifting boundaries around, in effect, is just shifting 
around a discontinuity; it is shifting the problem to a slightly different location, 
thereby making the underlying problem more evident. 
 
Sharp boundaries between macro regions in phase space, as these examples should 
have illustrated, are just as artificial as the border between the Netherlands and 
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Belgium.51 There is a line, drawn arbitrarily, but in its immediate vicinity, on both 





III.8 Against sharp boundaries of macro regions in phase space (III): Entropy 
 
There is yet another, related issue arising from sharp boundaries that at least 
deserves mentioning. Recall from above (Frigg & Werndl 2012, 102): “in fact vD  is 
almost entirely taken up by equilibrium microstates. For this reason the equilibrium 
state has maximum entropy.” In the usual framework, the Boltzmann entropy 
function is generally defined as a function assigning an entropy value to macro 
states, depending on the volume of their respective macro regions: K,(J') ≔
r,log	[Ç(v4*)]. The larger the volume, the higher the entropy. Thus, the largest 
region, i.e. the equilibrium region, is assigned the highest entropy. Accordingly, 
increase of Boltzmann entropy of a system52 is described by the micro state moving 
 
51
 Incidentally, the border between Belgium and the Netherlands has shifted as recently as 2018. See 
Stone (2018). 
52
 Boltzmann entropy of a system is defined as follows by Werndl & Frigg (2015b, 1225): “The 
Boltzmann entropy of a system at time -, 2?(-), is the entropy of the system’s macrostate at -: 
2?(-) ≔ 2?45@(%)6, where 7(-) is the system’s microstate at - and 5@(%) is the macrostate 
supervening on 7(-).” Cf. also the almost identical definition in Frigg & Werndl (2012, 102). 
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to regions of larger volume (Goldstein et al. 2019, 19): “increase of Boltzmann 
entropy means that the phase point [F] moves to bigger and bigger macro sets 
[v4*].” 
 
In a partition, different macro regions usually have different volumes, such that the 
micro state, upon traversing the boundaries between macro regions of different 
volume, instantiates a macro state of different entropy. So, like other macro values, 
as discussed above, entropy changes in a jumpy fashion. Upon the micro state 
moving from a smaller macro region to a larger one, entropy jumps from a lower to 
a higher value: the entropy function becomes discontinuous. By contrast, it stays at 
a constant value while the micro state wanders through a macro region, not 
crossing any boundaries. This behaviour, like the discontinuous behaviour of other 
macro values in BSM’s models, might come as a surprise. Wouldn’t we expect there 
to be a continuum of allowable entropy values, and that, while moving from one 
value to another, the continuum between them is instantiated, just like we would 
expect other macro values to evolve continuously? At least, it doesn’t seem 
implausible to say that entropy and its change ideally would be described by a 
continuous function, and not by a function that assigns the same entropy value to 
all micro states within one finite time interval of evolution, i.e. the time interval 
during which the micro state traverses a macro region, and then another, different 
value during the finite time interval of traversal of the micro state through another 
macro region, with discontinuous jumps at the boundaries. But this is how entropy 
behaves in the models as they result from the standard framework. Arguably, this 
way of modelling entropy change is at odds with the continuous macro state 
evolution assumed for target systems classical BSM seeks to describe. As before, 
the origin of the issue can be traced back to the method of partitioning phase space 
into a finite set of disjoint macro regions with sharp boundaries and non-zero 
volume. 
 
III.9 Towards an alternative 
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As we have seen, phase space partitioning with sharp boundaries poses a problem 
for modelling continuous macroscopic change in the usual framework of BSM. I now 
shall revisit the examples given above while not assuming exhaustive-cover or no-
overlap. As has been argued, these conditions, together with the requirement that 
macro regions are of non-zero volume, result in sharp boundaries. Let’s see if, upon 
excising them, one at a time, the discontinuity problem vanishes. 
  
III.9.1 Removing exhaustive-cover 
 
I’d like to start with removing exhaustive-cover. Recall this condition: every micro 
state must belong to some macro region: ∀F∃v4*3F ∈ v4*6. Removing it allows for 
models in which there are micro states that do not belong to a macro region: 
∃F∀v4*3F ∉ v4*6. Regarding the partition, this means that there are regions of 







Via the correspondence between macro regions and macro states, phase points in 
those regions do not instantiate a macro state. Admittedly, a rather strange result. 
While wandering through phase space, it could well be under these conditions that 
a micro state moves from a macro region to such a “non-region” and on to a macro 
region again, which would mean that, in between instantiating two macro states, 
for some time, no macro state would be instantiated. But clearly, the constituents 
of the gas haven’t lost their properties, all of a sudden. The phase points within 
such a non-region still describe the same microscopic features of the same system 
as the phase points in normal regions do: all the positions and momenta of all the 
system’s constituents. Clearly, it is not the micro state of the gas that is responsible 
for this strangeness. 
 
One might be tempted to think of these non-regions as transition regions between 
others. Think, again, of the gas in a room. The coarseness of the initial partitioning 
with only two macro regions can be reduced by introducing a “non-region” 
between these two. Let’s call the resulting macro regions v4*, v4/  and v4C-DE--4  
(figure 8). That is all fine and well. The initial partition, after all, was too coarse. But 
observe that now, the so-called “non-region” shows its true face: it is by no means a 
non-region, corresponding to no macro state at all. Instead, the points it contains 
instantiate a macro state JL#%M##I between the initial state J'  and the final state 
J7. All the strangeness vanished. Even so-called non-regions are regions. In other 
words: there are no non-regions in phase space. Taking this route, exhaustive-cover 






Apart from the strangeness of having non-regions in phase space, even if one 
regards them as a perfectly normal feature of BSM’s models, one would be facing 
the same discontinuity problem as before, and even more drastically. In transitions 
from ordinary regions to ordinary regions, a jump discontinuity between macro 
values appears. In transitions from ordinary regions to non-regions and vice versa, 
an essential discontinuity appears: one of the limits É- or ÉK (see above) doesn’t 
exist, since non-regions don’t correspond to macro values. So there is not just a 
discontinuous jump between different macro values, but a jump from a macro value 
to an undefined value or vice versa, making the issue explicit even more drastically. 
 
As an interim result, it can be noted that it seems impossible to do away with the 
exhaustive-cover condition. For one, the resulting “non-regions” turned out to be 
either absurdities, rendering the discontinuity problem even worse, or to be 
ordinary regions after all. In any case, the problem we wanted to solve remains. 
 
III.9.2 Removing no-overlap 
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So let’s try keeping exhaustive-cover and excising no-overlap instead. No-overlap, 
recall, says that every micro state can belong to only one macro region: 
∀F∀Γ4',7 	¬ GF ∈ v4* ∧ F ∈ v4/H ; 	y ≠ }. Removing this condition, hence, allows for 
microstates that belong to more than one macro region: ∃F∃Γ4'∃Γ4/ GF ∈ v4* ∧
F ∈ v4/H ; 	y ≠ }. This results, accordingly, in overlap regions of phase space that 





A micro state within such an overlap region v4* ∩ v4/  is in v4*  as well as v4/, and 
therefore instantiates both, J'  and J7. As long as these have the same macro 
values, all is fine. However, they can’t. As per usual, since macro states are specified 
via macro values, and correspond to macro regions, macro states being specified by 
the same macro values are identical macro states, i.e. there is only one macro state, 
corresponding to one macro region. In other words: macro regions corresponding 
to identical macro states form a union into one macro region. So, whenever we 
want to speak of different macro regions, they must correspond to different macro 
states. And that, in turn, means that an overlap region of two different macro 
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regions corresponds to two different macro states. Accordingly, every micro state in 
an overlap region instantiates two different macro states at the same time, which is 
an inconsistency. 
 
To provide an extreme example of this equally strange result, recall our simple gas 
example. Imagine that there is some overlap vHN#GOP+ = v4! ∩ v4-.. If the micro 
state is in vHN#GOP+, it is in v4!  and v4-.. Accordingly, the gas is concentrated in the 
corner (J&) as well as evenly spread out over the whole room (J#E) – an 
inconsistency even worse than the problem we are trying to solve. Hence, one 
should abstain from excising no-overlap as well. 
 
III.9.3 A different solution? 
 
Removing either exhaustive-cover or no-overlap from the usual framework results 
in severe problems. So they should be kept. Yet, at the same time, leaving 
everything at status quo provides no solution to the discontinuity problem as it 
arises from sharp boundaries between a finite number of macro regions of non-zero 
volume. Consequently, we must ask ourselves whether a framework in which a set 
of phase points, i.e. a macro region, corresponds to one and the same macro state 
is a good one. Tweaking the framework’s conditions didn’t result in the solution we 
had hoped for. Maybe, then, it is time to consider adopting a different one, which is 
what I am proposing in the following section. 
 
III.10 From macro regions to worlds 
 
Instead of disjoint macro regions as described above, I suggest employing an 
alternative way of carving up phase space – something that, to some extent, 
resembles macro regions, yet differs in important respects. In order to avoid the risk 
of confusion with ordinary macro regions, these new sets of phase space points 
shall be called worlds. They will be defined by a relation of sufficient similarity (SS), 
in a way to be made precise shortly. As a result, there no longer will be a partition 
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into a finite number of macro regions of non-zero volume and with sharp 
boundaries, where different macro regions stand in a one-to-one correspondence 
to different macro states. Once the idea that we don’t need such a partition has 
grown upon us, an adequate correspondence between the continuous evolution of 
the micro state and the thermodynamically expected, continuous evolution of the 
macro state can be recovered. 
 
Contrary to the micro states contained in a standard macro region, the micro states 
in a world do not all instantiate the same, i.e. identical macro states. (Some do, 
namely those representing permutations of identical constituents.)53 Instead, the 
construal of worlds is based on the notion of indistinguishable macro states, which 
defines a broader class: identical macro states are certainly indistinguishable, but 
indistinguishable macro states are not necessarily identical. This, to some, might 
seem as an unfavourable introduction of subjectivity54 into the framework. 
Speaking of indistinguishable macro states triggers the question: indistinguishable 
for whom or what? However, replacing sameness with indistinguishability allows 
the resulting models to represent continuous macroscopic change, in accordance 
with the continuous evolution of the micro state, and with target systems for which 
a thermodynamic description is adequate. So there clearly are some advantages. In 
the end, it will be for the reader to decide whether they prefer a framework that 
contains no reference to distinguishability, but is unable to model continuous 
macroscopic change, or a framework that is able to model continuous macroscopic 
change, but refers to indistinguishability. 
 




 For a discussion of the permutation of identical constituents/particles, see below. 
54
 The term “subjectivity” might actually be a bit misleading. What I am going to provide is an 
objective description that takes into account matters of perspective. There is nothing subjective 
about this description itself. Cf. Hemmo & Shenker (2012), who emphasize that macro states, and 
hence partitioning into macro regions, are objective, despite being observer-relative, and Callender 
(1999, 370), pointing out that “the coarse graining used to define [Boltzmann entropy] does not 




III.10.1 Introducing a new framework for BSM: Some conditions 
 
Most importantly, by developing this new framework, I want to avoid the 
discontinuity problem as it arises from the old framework. To achieve this goal, my 
construal of worlds as sets of micro states in phase space should avoid the 
imposition of sharp boundaries between different worlds, each corresponding to a 
particular macro state, such that macro values jump discontinuously upon the micro 
state crossing such boundaries. That, however, is not to say that worlds may not 
have any boundaries at all. In fact, they may even have sharp boundaries. But these 
boundaries must differ from those we encounter in the old framework in that 
crossing them does not result in discontinuous macroscopic change. This will be 
made possible by allowing worlds to overlap, without micro states in the overlap 
instantiating inconsistent macro states, as is the case for overlapping macro regions 
in the old framework (see section Removing no-overlap). In order to avoid such 
inconsistencies, a micro state in an overlap must not instantiate different macro 
states. As shown above, micro states in overlapping macro regions would 
instantiate different macro states (which is why there can’t be overlapping macro 
regions in the old framework). This is due to the fact that the finite set of different 
macro regions is bijectively mapped onto the finite set of different macro states: 
each macro region corresponds to exactly one macro state, and vice versa. So, to 
avoid inconsistent instantiations in the overlap of worlds, worlds must not 
correspond to exactly one macro state, and macro states must not correspond to 
exactly one world. Rather, worlds shall correspond to a set of macro states that are 
indistinguishable55 from a given macro state. This set can be a continuum of macro 
states, which, as we will see, enables modelling continuous macroscopic change. Of 
course, the reasonable stipulation that every micro state instantiates exactly one 
macro state will not be touched, for this would undermine supervenience of the 
macro state on the micro state. Accordingly, since worlds are sets of micro states, 
 
55
 Relative to a given “resolution power”, see below. 
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and are supposed to correspond not to one, but a continuum of macro states, the 
micro states within a world cannot all instantiate the same macro state, as the 
micro states in macro regions do. Instead, micro states within a world will be 
related in that they all instantiate macro states that are indistinguishable from a 
given macro state. This feature will be expressed in the relation “sufficient 
similarity” (SS), pertaining to micro states: a world, then, will be defined as a set of 
sufficiently similar micro states, such that all micro states in a world instantiate a 
macro state that is indistinguishable from a given macro state. 
 
It should be mentioned that already in the old framework, macro states trivially can 
be indistinguishable – namely if they are identical. Because of that, and because of 
how the relation SS is defined via indistinguishability, micro states in the old 
framework can be sufficiently similar as well. In fact, since all micro states in a 
macro region instantiate the same macro state, all micro states in a macro region 
are sufficiently similar to all other micro states in the same macro region. Here, we 
already encounter an important difference between worlds and macro regions. The 
micro states in a world are not necessarily sufficiently similar to all other micro 
states in that world. It is merely required that they be sufficiently similar to what I 
call the “central” micro state of a world, around which the world is defined. Take, 
for example, some arbitrary micro state. It certainly instantiates a macro state. If we 
want to construe a world around this micro state, we merely require that all micro 
states in this world be sufficiently similar to that micro state in that they instantiate 
a macro state that is indistinguishable from the macro state instantiated by the 
selected micro state. This does not entail the requirement that all micro states in 
the thusly construed world instantiate macro states indistinguishable from the 
macro states instantiated by all other micro states in that world. It is very much 
allowable that some micro states in a world instantiate macro states that aren’t 
mutually indistinguishable. Hence, not all micro states in a world are necessarily 
sufficiently similar to all other micro states in the same world. At the same time, 
micro states from different worlds may be sufficiently similar in that they 
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instantiate indistinguishable macro states. In other words: both relations, 
indistinguishability as well as sufficient similarity, are nontransitive. 
 
Let’s make things reasonably precise. 
 
First, supervenience of the macro state on the micro state is claimed. That is, if the 
macro state changes, the micro state must change as well. In other words: every 
micro state instantiates exactly one macro state.56 Formally: 
 
∀F'∃!J': (J'F')	57 (supervenience) 
 
Read: For every micro state F'  there is exactly one macro state J'  such that F'  
instantiates J'. 
 
Like before, macro states are defined via sets of macro values. Saying that macro 
states are indistinguishable means that it is impossible to tell them apart based on 
these macro values. So the question arises: when, exactly, is it impossible to tell 
macro states apart based on their macro values (and when is it possible)? When are 
macro values similar enough? In order to answer these questions, I must elaborate 
the way in which macroscopic distinguishability depends on “resolution power”58.  
 
Saying that macroscopic (in)distinguishability depends on resolution power means 
the following: observers and measuring instruments have certain limitations with 
respect to their capabilities to differentiate between different macro states. 
 
56
 According to Frigg & Werndl (2011, 125), supervenience of the macro state on the micro state is “a 
basic posit of the Boltzmann approach”. In this respect, the new framework doesn’t differ from the 
old one. See also Frigg (2008, 3.2.1) and Werndl & Frigg (2015a, passim), and recall Frigg et al. (2016, 
4.1) from above: “to every given microstate 7 there corresponds exactly one macrostate”. 
57
 ∃! denoting unique existential quantification – “there is exactly one” – as opposed to normal 
existential quantification with the quantifier ∃ – “there is (at least) one” – allowing for the possibility 
that there is more than one. Unique existential quantification is used for brevity. It can be expressed 
in terms of normal existential quantification: instead of formulating the supervenience condition as 
∀7<∃!5<: (5<7<), one can equivalently write ∀7<∃5<: <5<7< ∧ ¬∃5F45F7< ∧5< ≠ 5F6@. 
58
 Borrowing the term from Hemmo & Shenker (2012), without necessarily meaning the exact same 
concept as they do. 
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Depending on their abilities/precision, to which I refer as their resolution power, 
two given macro states, specified by different macro values, might be 
distinguishable for a given observer/instrument, or not. Thus, macroscopic 
(in)distinguishability is observer- or instrument-relative in that it depends on the 
abilities or limitations of the observer or instrument: relativeobserver59 to a given 
observer and/or instrument with a certain resolution power, certain macro states 
are distinguishable (or not). Accordingly, for indistinguishable macro states, it is not 
claimed that they are specified by identical macro values, as it is done for same 
macro states in the old framework. Indistinguishable macro states may differ in 
their macro values. For example, the macro states J/ and J) might differ in 
temperature values P/ = 23.542°C and P) = 23.543°C. But with a limited 
resolution power on the order of ΔP = 0.1°C, they are, with respect to 
temperature, rendered indistinguishable, despite being different. Already on a 
conceptual level, it seems reasonable to not regard different macro states as the 
same macro state, even if they are indistinguishable. Macroscopic 
indistinguishability being relativeobserver comes on top: in principle, a being like 
Laplace’s Demon can distinguish between all possible micro states, and thus all 
macro states. And in the example given, even a human observer can render the 
macro states in question distinguishable, if they increase their resolution power, for 
example by using a better thermometer. Thus, it seems unreasonable to identify 
macro states based on their indistinguishability, which is a contingent, observer-
relative, matter of fact. Nevertheless, macro states can be grouped together via 
their indistinguishability. For example, if one measures or prepares the temperature 
of a system to be 23.5°C in accordance with a certain resolution power, one may 
pretend that this is the precise macro value, namely	23.5000. . . °C. Thus, a precise 
macro state is specified, even though it is practically impossible to measure or 
control to absolute precision. Generally speaking, the formal specification of macro 
states via macro values is not limited by resolution power: one is free to be 
arbitrarily precise when specifying macro states. Irrespective of that, due to limited 
 
59
 I write “observer” as a shorthand for “observer and/or instrument”. 
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resolution power, other macro states, differing in macro values only to an extend 
that cannot be resolved, are rendered indistinguishable from the precise macro 
state specified. Via this indistinguishability, macro states can be grouped together 
with a given macro state, without identifying them with the latter, or with one 
another. 
 
Having established that macroscopic (in)distinguishability is observer-relative, the 
question above can be answered: macro states are distinguishable iff, given a 
certain resolution power, an observer/instrument can distinguish between their 
respective macro values. For example, J/ and J) might actually have different 
temperature macro values P/ = 23.542°C and P) = 23.543°C, but given a 
resolution power of ΔP = 0.1°C, these macro values can’t be distinguished through 
observation or measurement. In this sense, they are indistinguishable. 
 
With the notion of macroscopic (in)distinguishability made clear, worlds can now be 
introduced into the framework. First, sufficient similarity between micro states is 
defined via macroscopic indistinguishability of macro states (where “≎” denotes 
macroscopic indistinguishability): 
 
∀F',7: íF7KKF' ↔ ∃J',7 GJ7F7 ∧ J'F' ∧ 3J7 ≎ J'6Hî (sufficient similarity) 
 
Read: For all pairs of micro states F',7: F7  and F'  are sufficiently similar iff there are 
macro states J'  and J7  such that J7  is instantiated by F7, J'  is instantiated by F', 
and J7  and J'  are indistinguishable. 
 
It is then possible to construe a world R'  as the set of all F7  that satisfy SS with 
respect to a given F': 60 
 
60
 One might think that defining worlds around a central micro state is somewhat odd. But the idea is 
not at all new. Take Reichenbach (1956, 71) for an example, even calling this method “natural”: “The 
distinction between microstates and macrostates […] leads to a natural grouping of microstates. 
Given a microstate AG, the macrostate B to which it belongs is well determined: B includes all those 
microstates A< which are macroscopically indistinguishable from AG.” Note the slight differences in 
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∀F'∃R' G∀F73F7 ∈ R' ↔ F7KKF'6H  (world membership) 
 
Spelled out in terms of indistinguishable macro states, world membership reads: 
 
∀F'∃R' ï∀F7 íF7 ∈ R' ↔ ∃J',7 GJ7F7 ∧ J'F' ∧ 3J7 ≎ J'6Hîñ 
 
For all micro states F'  there is a world R'  such that, for all micro states F7, F7  is a 
member of R'  iff there are macro states J'  and J7  such that J7  is instantiated by 
F7, J'  is instantiated by F', and J7  and J'  are indistinguishable. 
 
Under this construal, micro states instantiating indistinguishable macro states 
belong to the same world. 
 
A few remarks are in order before moving on. First, it is worth stressing that SS is a 
reflexive and symmetric but nontransitive relation. It inherits these relational 
properties from the notion of macroscopic indistinguishability, itself being 
nontransitive. Hence, worlds, as defined via SS, are not equivalence classes, as 
disjoint macro regions in a partition are. While all micro states F7  in a world R'  are 
sufficiently similar to the central micro state F', it is not necessary that all F7  in said 
world mutually satisfy SS.61 
 
terminology. What Reichenbach calls a “macrostate” is a set of micro states and thus would be called 
a macro region in the old framework. But actually, since it is only required that the A< be 
macroscopically indistinguishable from a given AG, i.e. that they satisfy SS with respect to AG, the 
resulting set is not a macro region, but a world in our sense: not all A< necessarily are 
macroscopically indistinguishable on Reichenbach’s construal. Unfortunately, Reichenbach didn’t 
seem to realize that, once worlds – macrostates in his terminology – are defined around a given 
micro state via a similarity relation, it is only a small step towards overlapping worlds. 
61
 For an illustrative example, think of the height of people: When Amy and Berta are of the same 
height, and Berta and Chris are of the same height, then necessarily Amy and Chris are of the same 
height. Sameness is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation. Not so similarity. If Amy and Berta 
are of similar height, and Berta and Chris are of similar height, then it could be that Amy and Chris 
are of similar height, but it is by no means necessary. Hence, other than sameness, similarity is 
reflexive and symmetric but nontransitive. Likewise, the case of macroscopic indistinguishability: 
even if I am unable to notice the difference in temperature of a gas at different times t and t’, and 
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Second, F'  is called the central micro state of the world R'. In this vein, every micro 
state is the central micro state of its own world, and conversely, every world has a 
central micro state. One might want to know how to find the central micro state 
and its world, given only a macro state, specified via certain macro values. 
Practically, due to macro states being distinguishable relativeobserver to a certain 
resolution power, this is impossible, but also unnecessary. One can easily specify a 
macro state to arbitrary precision, simply by fixing macro values. By contrast, it is 
not at all easy to specify a precise micro state: one would have to fix the values of 
all (relevant) degrees of freedom of all constituents of the system of interest in 
order to specify a unique point in phase space. This is unfeasible. The best one can 
do practically is to prepare a system such that it is in a macro state indistinguishable 
from the specified macro state, according to a given resolution power. The actual 
micro state of the system so prepared is then sufficiently similar to other micro 
states which, counterfactually, instantiate macro states that are indistinguishable 
from the specified one. Alternatively, one can measure the macro values of the 
system and take them as the specification of the macro state. The system will 
certainly be in some micro state, instantiating a macro state indistinguishable from 
the one specified. For all practical purposes, this is enough. If one wants to close in 
on a specific micro state, the preparation of the system must become better, or 
resolution power must be increased, such that the world of sufficiently similar 
micro states becomes smaller. But since practically, resolution power is limited, it is 
practically unattainable to find a specific micro state this way. 
 
Let’s move on with building the framework. Earlier, for the old framework, we have 
seen that regions of phase space not corresponding to any macro state – what I 
have called non-regions – are rather absurd: every point in phase space precisely 
 
unable to notice the difference in temperature of the same gas at t’ and t’’, I might be able to notice 
the difference in temperature of the gas at t and the gas at t’’. Hence, despite the gas at t and t’ 
being macroscopically indistinguishable (with respect to temperature), and the gas at t’ and t’’ being 
macroscopically indistinguishable, it does not follow that the gas at t and t’’ is macroscopically 
indistinguishable. 
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describes a possible micro state and thus, via supervenience, (counterfactually) 
instantiates a macro state. But as soon as a micro state instantiates a macro state, it 
is part of a macro region (in the old framework), or of a world (in the new 
framework). Hence, every possible micro state is part of a world. This is called 
exhaustive cover: 
  
∀F'∃R'(F' ∈ R') (exhaustive cover) 
 
Exhaustive cover immediately follows from world membership, sufficient similarity 
and supervenience: take world membership and set F7 = F', such that 
∀F'∃R'(F' ∈ R' ↔ F'KKF'). That F'KKF'  is satisfied can be seen from its analysis in 
sufficient similarity: ∀F': GF'KKF' ↔ ∃J'3J'F' ∧ (J' ≎ J')6H. That, for every F', 
there is an J'  such that it is instantiated by F'  is seen from supervenience, and J' ≎
J'  is trivial. So ∀F'∃J'3J'F' ∧ (J' ≎ J')6 is satisfied. So F'  is sufficiently similar to 
itself: F'KKF'. And since the quantification ranges over all F', all F'  are members of 
the World R'  around F', i.e. of their own world. Thus, phase space is exhaustively 
covered by worlds. 
 
However, this is not to say that every micro state belongs to only one world. Via 
world membership, spelled out in terms of macroscopic indistinguishability, all 
micro states instantiating macro states indistinguishable from a given macro state 
belong to the same world. Phase space is covered by worlds, and every micro state 
is a member of its own world. With these worlds also containing other micro states, 
it immediately follows that worlds overlap. The possibility of a micro state being a 
member of different worlds is one of the discerning features of the new method of 
carving up phase space. Iff a micro state FA belongs to worlds R' ,R7, it lies in their 
overlap ó9*,/ = R' ∩R7: 
 
∀FA∀R',7 GFA ∈ ó9*,/ ↔ FA ∈ R' ∧ FA ∈ R7H (overlap) 
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Like world membership before, overlap is spelled out in terms of indistinguishable 
macro states: 
∀F',7,A∀R',7 ∶ íFA ∈ ó9*,/
↔ ∃J',7,A3JAFA ∧ J'F' ∧ J7F7 ∧ (J' ≎ JA) ∧ (J7 ≎ JA)6î 
 
From this, it can be easily seen that, if there are micro states F', F7  and FA, 
instantiating – via supervenience – macro states J', J7  and JA, and JA is 
indistinguishable from both J'  and J7, then there is an overlap of worlds R'  and 
R7  containing the micro state FA. It is important to note that for this result, it is not 
necessary to assume that J'  and J7  are indistinguishable. 
 
The converse can be seen just as easily: if there is an overlap containing an FA, then 
there is a macro state JA that is indistinguishable from both J'  and J7, even if the 
latter two are distinguishable. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates these results. Two micro states, F'  and F7, instantiate 
distinguishable macro states, J'  and J7. One can think of this picture as 
superimposed snapshots of the micro evolution of a system, at different times. Say, 
for example, that F'  is the micro state of the system at time <, and that F7  is the 
micro state of the system at a later time <==. The picture represents a case in which 
our resolution power is good enough to distinguish between the macro states 
instantiated by F'  at < and F7  at <==. Accordingly, F'  is not in R7, which would render 
it sufficiently similar to F7, and likewise, F7  is not in R'. During its evolution from F'  
to F7  in the time interval	[<, <==], the micro state traverses the overlap ó9*,/. Let’s 
pick out FA as the micro state at time <=, between < and <==. Any FA in the overlap 
will do. Since it is in the overlap, it instantiates a macro state JA, that, with the 






The phase points F', F7  and FA in figure 10 are drawn at a significant distance, 
because they each represent the micro state of a system at different times <, <=, <==. 
The picture drawn is an overlay of “snapshots” at these times. But it is easy to 
imagine the continuous trajectory of the actual evolution of the micro state through 
phase space during the time interval [<, <==] instead. This trajectory being 
continuous – as is assumed for the micro-state evolution in the old as well as in the 
new framework – contains an uncountable infinity of micro states. And since all 
these micro states instantiate a macro state, the uncountably infinite set of micro 
states in the trajectory bijectively corresponds to an uncountably infinite set of 
macro states instantiated, and thus, to an uncountably infinite set (of sets) of macro 
values bijectively corresponding to the set of macro states. So the issue that gave 
rise to the discontinuity problem in the old framework – the issue that there was an 
uncountable infinity of micro states that couldn’t be mapped bijectively onto a 
finite set of macro states, and the set of macro states had to be finite because there 
had to be a finite set of macro regions, and the set of macro regions had to be finite 
because the available phase space is finite and macro regions had to have non-zero 
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volume, and macro regions had to have non-zero volume because the Boltzmann 
entropy function assigns entropy values to macro states based on the volume of 
their corresponding macro regions, and entropy of different macro states is 
required to take on different values in order to even speak of entropy increase – 
this issue seems to have vanished completely. In the new framework just proposed, 
we likewise want to be able to speak of entropy increase, so we likewise have to 
have worlds of different volumes, so we likewise have to have worlds of non-zero 
volume. But by contrast, models in the new framework aren’t restricted to a finite 
number of worlds by these requirements, because there are as many worlds as 
there are micro states, and there are as many worlds as there are micro states – 
despite worlds having non-zero volume – because worlds can overlap, and worlds 
can overlap because the micro states they contain don’t all instantiate the same 
macro state, but merely ones that are indistinguishable from a given macro state. 
Because of all this, change of macro values doesn’t have to be modelled as 
discontinuous in the new framework, as opposed to the old one. Using macroscopic 
indistinguishability instead of sameness, it is possible to avoid models in which the 
evolving micro state, in order to instantiate different macro states, must cross a 
boundary at which macro values jump. In models resulting from the new 
framework, the micro state can wander through phase space without crossing such 
boundaries, instantiating indistinguishable macro state after indistinguishable 
macro state, until, at the two far ends of its continuous trajectory, it does 
instantiate distinguishable macro states. 
 
One might be tempted to think that accounting for limited resolution power would 
solve the discontinuity problem already in the old framework: simply make the 
partition so fine-grained that neighbouring macro regions correspond to different, 
yet indistinguishable macro states. Then, the transition of the micro state from one 
to the other wouldn’t result in a noticeable discontinuity. This latter claim, speaking 
of noticeable discontinuities, is correct. However, it doesn’t solve the discontinuity 
problem. DP doesn’t arise merely because of noticeable discontinuities, but because 
of discontinuities simpliciter, whether noticeable or not; because the old framework 
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cannot possibly model continuous change of macro values. It can’t because there is 
only ever a finite set of allowable macro values in a given model, and a finite set of 
macro values cannot possibly be mapped bijectively onto a continuum of macro 
values as present in thermodynamically described target systems, and likewise, 
onto a continuum of micro states in a trajectory through phase space. This remains 
an idealisation – no matter how fine-grained the partition – that is problematic 
especially when regarding BSM as a fundamental theory (see above). By contrast, 
the new framework is able to model continuous change of macro values because it 
actually allows for a continuum of macro values to exist in its models, and this 
continuum can be mapped bijectively onto a continuum of micro states in a 
trajectory, and, trivially, onto a continuum of macro values as present in target 
systems that are adequately described by thermodynamics. 
 
In short, as long as the micro states in a macro region are all supposed to instantiate 
the same macro state, the discontinuity problem arises. The new framework 
doesn’t solve it merely by taking into account resolution power, but by replacing 
macro regions with worlds, sets of micro states that instantiate macro states 
indistinguishable from a given macro state, but not necessarily the same, such that 
worlds can correspond to a continuum of macro values. Indistinguishability 
between macro states alone doesn’t imply that a set of macro values is a 
continuum. But at least, the new framework is able to model such cases. In solving 
the discontinuity problem, all the crucial work is done by replacing a finite set of 
macro regions with an uncountable infinity of worlds. 
 
So much for a general overview of the proposed framework. In the following 
section, I would like to demonstrate its capabilities by applying it to the familiar 
example of a gas spreading out in a room. 
 
III.10.2 Back to the example 
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Suppose there is an initial micro state F& instantiating J& with the gas concentrated 
in the corner of the room. The set of sufficiently similar micro states, via world 
membership, forms the world R& around F&. Let F evolve away from F&, such that 
the gas is spreading out: F/ instantiates a slightly, but noticeably more spread out 
macro state of the gas, J/. Since J/ is macroscopically distinguishable from J&, F/ 
is not a member of R&. But it certainly is a member of its own world, R/. Despite 
F/ and F& residing in different worlds R& and R/, we can select F/ such that their 
worlds do overlap: there are (uncountably many) micro states between F& and F/ 
that meet the world membership condition of both, R& and R/. They make up the 
overlap ó9!,+. Let’s pick out one of them, FQ. The macro state JQ  it instantiates is 
indistinguishable from J&, such that FQ  is part of R&. But JQ  is also 
indistinguishable from J/, such that FQ  is part of R/. So, when F evolves from F& 
to FQ, and hence the instantiated macro state changes from J& to JQ, this change 
is unnoticeable. When F then moves from FQ  to F/, the macro state changes from 
JQ  to J/, but again, this change is unnoticeable. Yet now, F instantiates J/, which 
is noticeably different from J&. So, through a series of unnoticeable changes, the 
macro state has changed noticeably. In this fashion, we can describe the gas in its 
evolution from residing in the corner to being spread out over the whole room, 
through a series of unnoticeable changes that together account for the very 
noticeable difference between the initial state and the equilibrium state. And 
remember that the micro states we are referring to in this example are merely 
selected snapshots from a continuous trajectory, containing an uncountable infinity 
of actual micro states, instantiating an uncountable infinity of macro states. From 
such an uncountably infinite set of micro states, we can always select a finite set of 
three micro states that behave in the way just described for F&, FQ  and F/. 
 
III.10.3 World size, the equilibrium world, and entropy increase 
 
So much for the continuous change between macro states. But how about the sizes 
of worlds? In particular, is R#E, like v4-., still dominant, i.e. “vastly larger than any 
other [world]”, such that the accessible phase space volume is “almost entirely 
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taken up by equilibrium microstates”? Given the special interest in J#E, will F#E and 
its world R#E turn out to be special? Can the approach to and remaining in this 
special world still be explained in this framework? Is the change of entropy over 
time now continuous? A few considerations are important. 
 
First, we must state clearly what determines Boltzmann entropy. In the old 
framework, it was assumed that all micro states in a macro region instantiate the 
same macro state. Endowing phase space with a suitable measure for macro 
regions (Frigg & Werndl 2011, 125f.), “the Boltzmann entropy of a macro state J 
[…] measures the portion of the system’s ô-space [i.e. phase space] that is taken up 
by microstates that correspond to J”. In other words, it depends on the volume of 
the macro region corresponding to a given macro state. Thus, Boltzmann entropy 
can be assigned directly to a macro state (Frigg & Werndl 2012, 102): “The 
Boltzmann entropy of a macrostate J'  is K,(J') ≔ r, logöÇ3Γ4*6õ (where r, is the 
Boltzmann constant), and the Boltzmann entropy of a system at time <, K,(<), is the 
entropy of the macrostate of the system at <: K,(<) ≔ K,3J$(%)6, where F(<) is the 
microstate at < and J$(%) is the macrostate corresponding to F(<).”  
 
For the new framework, we can retain the latter definition of the entropy of a 
system at time <, but the definition of the entropy of a macro state must be slightly 
altered: it must depend on the volume of worlds, not on the volume of macro 
regions. Accordingly, Boltzmann entropy in the new framework is assigned to a 
given macro state J'  by considering not only J'  itself, but all macro states that are 
indistinguishable from J'. This means that we have to take into account the set of 
all micro states that instantiate macro states indistinguishable from J', i.e. the 
world R': K,(I#M)(J') ≔ r, log[Ç(R')]. 
 
It is a distinctive feature of the new framework with overlapping worlds that the 
sum of the volume of all worlds is infinite. Since every micro state has a world of 
non-zero volume around it, and there are infinitely many micro states in a given, 
finite volume of available phase space, there are infinitely many worlds of non-zero 
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volume in a finite volume of phase space. But this does not impede the possibility of 
comparing the sizes of individual worlds with each other, or with the volume of the 
available phase space. For example, for a particular equilibrium macro state, we 
should still be able to say that the world consisting of all micro states instantiating 
macro states indistinguishable from it is larger than worlds consisting of micro 
states instantiating macro states indistinguishable from a given non-equilibrium 
macro state, and thus assign a higher entropy value to the former. Likewise, since 
the volume of worlds remains comparable to the volume of the available phase 
space in total, we should still be able to say that, for example, a particular 
equilibrium world covers almost all of the available phase space volume, while 
other, non-equilibrium worlds, don’t. 
 
Note that the equilibrium world R#E is defined around the micro state F#E that 
instantiates the equilibrium macro state J#E. There is nothing that enforces the 
selection of this particular equilibrium micro state, or this particular equilibrium 
macro state. After all, there is a continuum of them. As long as a micro state 
instantiates a macro state indistinguishable from equilibrium, any will do. 
Nevertheless, we might be able to search for the “best” F, if we want or need to. 
Just select one micro state that instantiates a macro state indistinguishable from 
equilibrium, and then shift it around, until, via world membership, the volume of its 
world is maximized. This way, a unique “best” F and a unique equilibrium world is 
selected. The thusly selected equilibrium micro state may be called the “true” 
equilibrium micro state. Of course, whether the actual micro state of a system in 
macroscopic equilibrium is precisely the true equilibrium micro state (with almost 
certainty, it isn’t) or just one sufficiently similar is irrelevant for all practical 
purposes. 
 
Lastly, approach to and remaining in equilibrium for long time periods have 
essentially the same explanation in the new framework as in the old: because of 
their relative sizes, the micro state is more likely to evolve from smaller worlds into 
larger ones, and ultimately to end up in the equilibrium world, where it tends to 
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stay. It goes without saying that, nevertheless, fluctuations out of equilibrium are 
still possible, despite being incredibly unlikely. Yet, the new framework differs in 
this respect, too. Remember the issue of discontinuous Boltzmann entropy increase 
addressed above: with the micro state moving from one macro region to another, 
both being differently sized, the entropy value changes discontinuously. Now, for 
the new framework, this is not necessarily so: whether Boltzmann entropy changes 
continuously or not, together with the continuous evolution of the micro state, 
depends on whether the volume of the world actualized changes continuously or 
not. Showing that it really does lies beyond my abilities. But at least, the new 
framework doesn’t rule out this possibility, by contrast to the old framework, where 




I have presented the discontinuity problem of the standard framework of BSM, and 
argued that an alternative way of partitioning phase space into overlapping worlds 
is called for, given one wants to avoid it: on the hitherto usual method of 
partitioning phase space into finitely many macro regions of non-zero volume, 
macro values are always modelled to change in a discontinuous fashion, if they 
change at all. This is at odds with both the continuous evolution of the micro state, 
and the expectation that a framework employed for modelling classical 
thermodynamic phenomena should be able to model continuous change of macro 
values. 
 
I tried to fix this issue by excising no-overlap and exhaustive-cover from the old 
framework. This didn’t bring about the results we had hoped for. Removing the 
latter resulted in “non-regions”, which subsequently turned out to be ordinary 
macro regions after all. But even if one insists that they are not ordinary, the 
problem of discontinuous change upon the micro state crossing boundaries 
between macro regions remains. Removing no-overlap, on the other hand, resulted 
in the micro state instantiating inconsistent macro states at the same time. 
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Hence, I proposed an alternative framework, featuring overlapping worlds as a 
replacement for macro regions, and allowing for macro states to be 
indistinguishable despite being different. The key features of the new framework 
made it possible to have micro states, residing in the overlaps of worlds, 
instantiating macro states indistinguishable from macro states that themselves are 
mutually distinguishable. In this fashion, the macro state of a system can change 
continuously, without jumps between macro values, and in accordance with the 
continuous evolution of the micro state. The framework presented, it seems, is 
indeed a viable alternative to the old one, solving a central, albeit hitherto largely 
overlooked problem of the latter. 
 
It goes without saying that much more work needs to be done if one really wants to 
establish the new framework as a superior alternative to the standard framework. 
So far, it is merely a proposal, sketched in broad strokes. To develop into a full 
theory, its details need to be worked out. That, however, lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The primary objective I pursued with this chapter was to introduce and 
develop the concept of overlapping worlds. This will be needed in the following 
chapter, where I provide an account of how so-called world histories are formed 
from the discontinuous actualizations of universal particle configurations in Minimal 
Bohmian Mechanics. There, what I have called the discontinuity problem arises 
even more severely: how can discontinuous actualizations of the configuration of 
the universe be reconciled with the seemingly continuous histories we experience? 
To do this, I propose to employ the notion of overlapping worlds. My reason to first 
introduce and develop this concept for BSM is simple: if I want to use a certain 
concept in order to reconcile an actually discontinuous micro dynamics – and thus 
an actually discontinuous macro dynamics – with seemingly continuous 
phenomena, this concept should also be employable to reconcile an actually 
continuous micro dynamics with what not only seems to be continuous 
phenomena, but, in classical thermodynamics, are assumed to be continuous 
phenomena. I have used BSM as a test bed for the concept of overlapping worlds, 
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to be applied to the case of MBM’s discontinuous actualizations in the following 
chapter. 
 
IV. Worlds in a stochastic universe 
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that, from the way the usual framework of 
BSM is set up, the discontinuity problem arises, and that it can be tackled by 
adopting an alternative framework, allowing for phase space to be carved up into a 
continuous set of overlapping worlds rather than a finite, discontinuous set of 
disjoint macro regions. The framework thus construed allows for modelling 
continuous change of the macro state of a system, in accordance with the 
continuous evolution of its micro state, and the expectation (from thermodynamics) 
that the evolution of macro values at least possibly should be continuous.  
 
A similar, despite different problem arises for MBM. Here it is not the continuous 
evolution of the micro state that is at odds with the unexpected, discontinuous 
evolution of the macro state. Rather, the evolution of the micro state in MBM, i.e. 
the evolution of the universal particle configuration ;, is always discontinuous: the 
configuration randomly jumps through configuration space, thereby instantiating 
different worlds, one at a time. Successive actualizations of ; at different times are 
not linked up by (continuous) trajectories. Thus, successive worlds aren’t linked up 
either. On this, Bell’s charge against his Everett (?) theory, and likewise against 
MBM, is based: if worlds – i.e. configurations in his terminology – at different times 
aren’t linked up, and only actualized for an instant, then reference to the past as 
well as to the future, from within such a world, is empty. Bell (1987b, 135-136): 
“there is no association of the particular present with any particular past. […] 
Everett’s replacement of the past by memories is a radical solipsism – extending to 




Bell has a point. It is difficult to explain the common appearance of history evolving 
consistently over time based on individual, mutually independent, internally static 
configurations. Barbour, as mentioned earlier, has attempted to provide such an 
explanation, employing his concept of time capsules. However, as I will argue, it is 
not easy to reconcile this view with our current best understanding of how 
appearances arise. Simply put, our current best theories suggest that any 
experience supervenes on processes happening in the brain, rather than from 
static, unchanging states. This is at odds with Barbour’s proposal, for his time 
capsules are such static states, and he claims that the experience of history 
unfolding is due to the brain comparing snapshots from within such static states. To 
reconcile FAPP-continuous macroscopic change – the history of the universe 
unfolding consistently – with randomly actualized configurations at the 
fundamental level of description, is the problem I am going to tackle in this chapter. 
A suitable link between configurations must be provided, despite their stochastic 
dynamics. For this, I will employ the notion of worlds in the sense developed for 
solving the discontinuity problem of BSM.  
 
In the chapter introducing MBM, I have presented the solution Dürr and I have 
chosen in our recent paper manuscript, based on Barbourian time capsules and 
FAPP-classical world branches. Neither in this thesis so far, nor in our manuscript 
has this been spelled out in great detail. In the following, I am going to present my 
critique of the time-capsule approach, arguing that it is not necessary to account for 
macroscopic appearances, in particular macroscopic change, from within individual, 
static configurations. At the same time, I will give a detailed account of how FAPP-
continuous, historically consistent world histories can emerge from MBM’s 
stochastic and discontinuous micro dynamics, in accordance with the branching 
structure of the WF. 
 
IV.1 Worlds from the wave function vs. worlds from the particle configuration 
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Following the usual presentation in the Many-Worlds community62, worlds can be 
identified with decoherence-induced, quasi-classical branches of the WF. Dürr and I 
have adopted this notion for our approach. However, to some this approach might 
look a bit unnatural, given that MBM, as a Bohmian theory, is (at least something 
similar to) a primitive ontology theory63, with the Bohmian particles as the 
fundamental building blocks of material objects. Hence, it could be argued, the WF 
should not play the central role in defining the notion of a world within the MBM 
framework. Instead, the notion should be defined in terms of the primitive of the 
theory – the “empirical substructure” in van Fraassen’s (1980, passim) terminology. 
 
However, it is to be feared that an argument brought forward against standard 
BM64 carries over to MBM: it can be argued that the particle configuration in 
standard BM is superfluous theoretical structure. If this holds for MBM, particles 
and their configurations should not be the basis upon which the notion of worlds is 
defined, for superfluous structure can be easily excised, thereby rendering said 
definition of worlds meaningless, and a fortiori undermining the concept that is 
supposed to account for the appearance of a consistent history in MBM. Let’s 
assess this argument, headed ‘Many worlds in denial?’, by retracing Valentini’s 
(2010) and Brown’s (2010) exchange. 
 
IV.1.1 Many worlds in denial? 
 
This argument from the particle configuration being superfluous theoretical 
structure has to do with the ontological roles ascribed to the two parts of the 
complete state description in BM. The latter is often read realistically not only with 
respect to the configuration, but also with respect to the WF. Recall the discussion 
 
62
 Of which Wallace, in particular with his (2012), is one of the most prominent representatives. 
63
 With primitive ontology theories being theories that provide a realist reading of some (value 
definite, usually with respect to position) variable – the so-called primitive variable – of their 
formalism that refers to the fundamental stuff in physical space or space-time that makes up the 
world and everything in it. See Allori (2015) for a review of the approach, and my discussion in an 
earlier chapter. 
64
 Cf. Valentini (2010) and Brown (2010). 
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of the two-space reading above: because the WF, together with the particle 
configuration, is part of the complete state description and indispensable for the 
dynamics as well as the initial distribution of the latter, it should represent 
something physical. On this basis, the WF is interpreted as “an ontological – that is, 
physically real – complex-valued field ú(ù, <) on configuration space” (Valentini 
2010, 479).65 And because of this being “ontological” of the WF, one could be lead 
to believe that BM is Many Worlds in denial (ibid.): “If one takes pilot-wave theory 
seriously as a possible theory of the world, and if one thinks about it properly and 
carefully, one ought to see that it really contains many worlds – with a superfluous 
configuration q appended to one of those worlds.”66 Even unoccupied 
branches/wavepackets, according to this argument, should refer to something 
physical. Take, for example, two wave packets Ψ/ and Ψ), resulting from a 
branching process of an original Ψ. They are said to not differ in terms of physicality 
(ibid., 493): “the motion of Ψ/ represents a world every bit as bona fide as the 
world represented by Ψ)”. Valentini (ibid., 495, 497) argues to the contrary: since 
there really is only one “true history”, i.e. only one wave packet endowed with the 
particle configuration, and it can be decided within pilot-wave theory which one 
that is, it is clear that there is only one real world and “the alternative trajectories 
are mathematical, not ontological.” Hence, following Valentini, BM is not many 
worlds in denial. 
 
As Brown (2010, 510 ff.) notes in his reply to Valentini, it is not necessary to 
subscribe to such a “dualist” particle-wf-ontology in the first place. In fact, one 
might be better off by adopting the Everett interpretation and not buying into the 
Bohmian particle ontology at all. On that, Brown is right: at least prima facie, one 
doesn’t have to adopt the Bohmian ontology. However, for our purposes, i.e. for 
 
65
 Note that Valentini bases his discussion on de Broglie’s original pilot-wave theory, which doesn’t 
speak of a quantum potential, and in this respect is closer in spirit to what is nowadays called 
Bohmian Mechanics than Bohm’s original theory (see the distinction above). The latter was 
formulated by Bohm much later. Most importantly, however, Valentini is committed to an 
ontologically thick reading of the WF, as opposed to other proponents of BM. 
66
 Note that this and the following quotation isn’t Valentini arguing against BM, but his presentation 
of the argument brought forward against BM. 
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answering the question whether the configuration is superfluous in MBM, it is 
inadmissible to take over Brown’s verdict regarding standard BM and 
straightforwardly apply it to the case of MBM. Also, even if Brown is right and BM 
indeed is many worlds in denial, such that the particle configuration is rendered 
superfluous, it is questionable whether this carries over to MBM. Both, BM and 
MBM, can feature a realist interpretation of the WF. And insofar a realist 
interpretation of the WF invariably renders the configuration superfluous, MBM 
falls prey to this objection as well. However, there are different ways in which 
things can be said to be real. In other words: there are variants of realist 
interpretations of the WF, and presumably, it depends on the variant whether the 
argument applies.  
 
So, what precisely does a “realist interpretation” of the WF amount to in BM and 
MBM, respectively? Valentini likens the WF in BM to the electromagnetic field in 
Maxwell’s formulation of electromagnetism (Valentini 2010, 480): “This provides a 
particularly good parallel with pilot-wave theory. A charged test particle, placed in 
an external electromagnetic field E(x, <), B(x, <), will follow a trajectory x(<). One 
would normally say that the field is real, and that the realized particle trajectory is 
real; while the alternative particle trajectories (associated with alternative initial 
positions x(0)) are not real.” The viability of such a realist reading of the 
electromagnetic field in Maxwell’s formulation of electromagnetism 
notwithstanding, this suggests that the WF is viewed as being ontologically on a par 
with the particle configuration: both are regarded as equally real, just like particles 
and the electromagnetic field are regarded as equally real.  
 
Brown also regards the WF as real, but in a particularly strong sense. He seems to 
view the WF as a kind of substance, or at least as something sufficiently substance-
like, in the sense of a bearer of real, physical properties. Brown & Wallace (2005, 
525) emphasize this point in response to Holland: “Quantum mechanics, in our 
view, has both substance and form before the introduction of hidden corpuscles.”  
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As Brown (2010, 513) writes, in order to avoid the many-worlds-in-denial attack, 
“what is really needed is an argument to the effect that the wavefunction does not 
have such potency as the Everettians attribute to it”, with “potency” meaning the 
WF being able “on its own to account for physical systems, apparatuses, people, 
etc.”, in other words, to play the role of a substance bearing contingent properties: 
if the WF alone is substance enough to do all that, the introduction of a further 
substance in the form of particles indeed seems unnecessary. 
 
It can certainly be denied that the WF must be regarded as a substance, or a 
substance-like entity. Yet, if it is regarded as such, strong arguments are required 
for maintaining that the particle configuration adds necessary (read: non-
superfluous) structure to the theory. Irrespective of that, MBM avoids this objection 
from the outset. With its particular interpretation of the WF, it doesn’t share the 
Bohmian WF’s risk of being interpreted as a substance or substance-like: 
ontologically, the WF and the particles in MBM are not on a par. Only the latter play 
the role of a substance, while the former is regarded as encoding a dispositional 
property of the universe to actualize certain configurations. (Alternatively, adopting 
a nomological interpretation as discussed above, avoids the problem even more 
clearly.) Hence, concerns about substance dualism that apply to BM, as discussed by 
Valentini and Brown, do not carry over to MBM. More to the point, not being a 
substance itself, the WF alone cannot contain many worlds, or anything, for that 
matter: unless assuming a realist stance regarding properties without bearers, the 
WF in MBM is not enough to account for appearances including physical systems, 
people, etc., given material substance of some sort is required for that. Hence, 
MBM is not many worlds in denial. 
 
In short: if material substance is required, then either the WF itself is substantial, in 
which case the configuration is superfluous, or the WF is not substantial, in which 
case the configuration is not superfluous. Since for MBM, we do require material 
substance, and do interpret the WF as not being substantial, the configuration is 
not superfluous. So the objection does not carry over to MBM. The upshot of all 
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these considerations is that MBM evades the risk of having its basis for the 
definition of worlds undermined. The fear that this might be the case is unfounded. 
 
IV.1.2 Psychophysical Parallelism 
 
As has just been argued, the substance or substance-like entity in MBM’s ontology 
accounting for appearances is not to be found in the WF, but in the particle 
configuration. Whether one adopts this view, ultimately, is a matter of interpretive 
choice: one can instead choose to think of the WF as a substance, thereby rendering 
the configuration superfluous. Then, one should consider adopting the Everettian 
view. Both options are viable. But in any case, this decision has some import on how 
to define worlds within the resulting framework: Everettians must construe worlds 
from the WF. There is nothing else. In MBM, we are best advised to construe worlds 
from configurations, for they are the substance. And further down the line, deciding 
to take either the WF or the configuration as the basis on which to define worlds 
amounts to deciding for a stance on psychophysical parallelism (PPP): one must 
decide which part of the ontology of a theory shall be regarded as corresponding to 
an entity that can figure as an observable and that represents the physical that 
parallels the psychological in psychophysical parallelism. As Barbour (1999, 226) 
puts it: “Any scientific theory must establish a postulate of psychophysical 
parallelism: it is necessary to say what elements of the physical theory correspond 
to actual conscious experience”. 
 
In the Everett interpretation, as Barbour points out, the individual branches of the 
WF fulfil that role. In MBM, on the other hand, worlds defined over configurations 
fulfil it. Barbour (1999, 302) and Bell agree with this choice: “Now, what did Bell 
regard as the physical counterpart of psychological experience? Is it in the wave 
function, as Everett and many others have assumed, or in matter configurations? 
Bell, like myself, opts for the latter: ‘It is ... from the Fs [(the configurations)], rather 
than from E, that in this theory we suppose ‘observables’ to be constructed. It is in 
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terms of the Fs that we would define a ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ – if we were 
pressed to go so far.’ [(Bell 1987a, 128)]” 
 
Let’s dwell a bit on that notion of psychophysical parallelism (PPP). As Heidelberger 
(2003) shows, PPP can be understood in several ways, ranging from a mere 
correlation between the physical and the mental that bears no metaphysical weight 
and allows for a strict substance dualism, to the idea that everything physical has 
some mental aspect to it (panpsychism). In between lies the idea that the mental is 
an aspect of some physical things, like, e.g., brains (Heidelberger 2003, 238): “The 
mental and the physical are [...] two different aspects of one and the same entity” 
(double aspect PPP).  
 
Barbour doesn’t really say where exactly in this spectrum he locates his own 
account of psychophysical parallelism. On the one hand, he speaks of 
correspondence between elements of the physical theory and conscious experience, 
which suggests a rather weak form of PPP. On the other hand, it seems clear that he 
has a specific physical structure in mind, i.e. the brain, the different states of which 
correspond to experience, thereby suggesting a somewhat stronger PPP (Barbour 
1999, 26.): “However, there is increasing evidence that certain mental states and 
activities are correlated with certain physical states in different specific regions of 
the brain. This makes it natural to assume, as was done long ago, that there is 
psychophysical parallelism: conscious states somehow reflect physical states in the 
brain.” Also (ibid., 266): “It is well known that much processing goes on in the brain 
and, employing normal temporal language, we can confidently assert that what we 
seem to experience in one instant is the product of the processing of data […].” 
 
I will come back later to that issue when discussing its bearings on the construction 
not only of worlds, but world histories; if one adopts a form of PPP that makes 
claims stronger than mere correlation between the physical and the mental, and if 
one considers the findings of modern neuroscience, an account that conceives of 
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world histories in terms of processes of change between configurations rather than 
individual configurations alone suggests itself. 
 
But before further discussing PPP and its import on the construal of world histories, 
we must tackle the question what a world in MBM is supposed to be. After all, 
world histories are supposed to consist of instantiations of worlds, standing in an 
appropriate relation to each other. What that relation is will be spelled out later. 
First, we must account for the relata featuring in said relation. As has been argued, 
worlds, in the framework of MBM, should best be defined in terms of particle 
configurations. However, they must not be identified with individual configurations 
simpliciter. The following paragraph will develop this approach. 
 
IV.2 What is a world? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to Minimal Bohmian Mechanics, MBM stems from 
Bell’s Everett (?) theory. However, comparing them closely reveals that the two are 
far from being the same theory, for they differ in an important aspect – their 
construal of worlds. The just mentioned identification of worlds with individual 
configurations simpliciter is what Bell had in mind when developing – and 
immediately rejecting – his Everett (?) theory (Bell 1987a, 133): “Thus 
instantaneous classical configurations F are supposed to exist, and to be distributed 
in the comparison class of possible worlds with probability |E|)”. Note that Bell 
uses the terms “configuration” and “world” interchangeably: possible worlds – not 
to be confused with possible worlds as in Lewis’ (1986) modal realism – are simply 
configurations currently not actualized. Actualized configurations, accordingly, are 
the same as instantiated worlds. In short: for Bell, individual, instantaneous 




 See also his usage of the term at other places in his 1987a: “Let this ‘world’ be simply a large 
number C of particles” (127); “the initial configuration 7 is chosen at random from an ensemble of 
configurations” (129); “a comparison class of possible initial worlds” (129); “a hypothetical ensemble 
(of worlds!)” (129). 
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We would be ill-advised to simply adopt Bell’s notion of a world, for it is this 
identification of worlds and individual configurations that leads him to his objection 
of temporal solipsism, and, a fortiori, to his rejection of the Everett (?) theory. We 
must be careful that MBM does not fall prey to the same objection. The problem of 
temporal solipsism has been introduced earlier. It is the reason for Dürr’s and my 
construal of worlds, or rather: world histories, in terms of world branches. To 
summarize the issue: once worlds are identified with individual configurations as in 
Bell’s account, as soon as the configuration changes, a different world is 
instantiated. And with this change between individual configurations being 
discontinuous, worlds are isolated from each other, not only in configuration space, 
but also in time. On this construal, no connection between worlds can be had. 
Reference to events future and past – from within a given world – is empty. Worlds, 
then, have no history in any meaningful sense of the word. 
 
The solution to this problem presented in Dürr & Ehmann (ms) probably isn’t quite 
satisfactory, in that it lacks a detailed description of how our experience of 
temporal history emerges from instantaneous configurations: our world branch is 
actualized infinitely many times in each finite time interval, but how exactly the 
individual actualisations are connected, other than by being in the support of the 
same world branch, hasn’t been made clear yet. Besides, relying too heavily on the 
branching structure of the WF for the definition of worlds defies the purpose of 
adopting a Bohmian particle ontology, and doesn’t chime with an interpretation of 
the WF as encoding a dispositional property. 
 
Time capsules, on the other hand, do provide an explanation of our temporal 
experience. But it can be contested that this explanation is ideal, especially if we 
aren’t forced to assume that there is no external, universal time. Barbour’s time-
capsule approach will be discussed in greater detail shortly. For now, it shall suffice 
to say that we want to construe worlds differently.  
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In order to avoid Bell’s criticism, our notion of worlds has to be able to do more 
than worlds in Bell’s sense, identified with individual configurations, can 
accomplish. At the same time, we must not resort to time capsules or Everettian 
world branches alone. It goes without saying that, in the end, we want to be able to 
recover the (quasi-classical) manifest image from the scientific image. As Bell (1987, 
125f.) points out, “classical concepts have not […] been expelled from physics. On 
the contrary, they remain essential on the 'macroscopic' scale, for ‘... it is decisive to 
recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical 
physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical 
terms' [(Bohr 1949)]. Thus contemporary theory employs both quantum wave 
functions E and classical variables F, and a description of any sufficiently large part 
of the world68 involves both”. Accordingly, I don’t deem it enough for MBM to give 
an account of the microscopic goings-on. An explanation must be given as to how, 
at least in principle, macroscopic appearances, including the phenomenon of 
continuous macroscopic change over time, can emerge from the latter. In other 
words, we must “save the phenomena” by providing an account of psychophysical 
parallelism for MBM. Since we do not rely on Barbour’s time capsules, individual 
configurations alone aren’t a suitable choice for this purpose. 
 
Instead, we have to construe worlds in a way that allows macroscopic objects to 
(quasi-)persist over change of configurations, but which also leaves room for their 
change based on the change of configurations. What we need is a notion of worlds 
that is able to macroscopically group together configurations that are different 
microscopically, such that worlds of finite, non-zero volume in configuration space 
can be construed. In the previous chapter, we have developed such a notion of 





 Presumably, this instance of the term “world” does not refer to a single configuration, but the 
universe in total. 
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Just for the sake of argument, let’s preliminarily define a world in MBM as a 
collection of configurations generated from “coarse-graining” over possible 
configurations such that the resulting collection 
 
(WORLDMBM) consists of configurations that are macroscopically identical, i.e., that 
instantiate the same macro state of the universe. 
 
Already this preliminary definition avoids the aforementioned problem of Bell’s 
identification of worlds and individual configurations. However, we won’t stick with 
it for long, since it allows for partitioning of configuration space into disjoint sets, 
similar to the partitioning of phase space into disjoint macro regions in the usual 
framework of BSM. Recall that a macro region v4*  in standard BSM is a set of micro 
states F ∈ v all instantiating the same macro state J', and only J'. That is to say: 
Macro regions in standard BSM do not overlap. For reasons extensively discussed 
earlier, this notion of a macro region as an equivalence class in phase space has 
been replaced by a definition of “world” for BSM: a world R'  is the set of all F7  that 
satisfy SS (i.e., are sufficiently similar in the sense of instantiating indistinguishable 
macro states) with respect to a given F': 
 
∀F'∃R' G∀F73F7 ∈ R' ↔ F7KKF'6H 
(world membershipBSM) 
  
According to the new definition world membershipBSM, all micro states in a world 
are required to be sufficiently similar not to all others, but to the central micro state 
F'  around which the world R'  is construed. From this weaker requirement, it 
follows that not necessarily all F7 ∈ R'  are sufficiently similar to each other: SS is a 
nontransitive relation, and only requiring that all F7 ∈ R'  fulfil SS with respect to 
the central F', leaves the possibility open that two other micro states F7 , FA ∈ R'  
do not stand in relation SS to each other. At the same time, a micro state F7  being 
sufficiently similar to a given central micro state F'  and hence belonging to R'  
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around F'  may also be sufficiently similar to another micro state, F(, say, and hence 
belong to the world R( around F(. 
 
This new definition of worlds in the case of BSM allowed for overlapping worlds, 
and hence solved the issue of jumping macro variables despite a continuous micro 
dynamics. In MBM, we don’t have such a continuous micro dynamics. But we still 
need to recover (FAPP-) continuous macroscopic change. I.e., we need to provide 
an account of (FAPP-) continuous transitions between different macro states, 
similar as in BSM. Accordingly, adopting the approach we had developed for BSM 
and applying it to the case of MBM promises to be fruitful. 
 
Thus, we reuse the definition of worlds we developed for BSM and adapt it for the 
MBM framework. Some slight modifications are necessary, though. In MBM, we are 
not dealing with micro states F in 6:-dimensional phase space v (or, for systems of 
constant energy, in the (6: − 1)-dimensional energy hypersurface vD), but with 
configurations ; in 3:-dimensional configuration space ℝ8..  
 
Accordingly, a world R'  in MBM shall be defined as the set of all ;7  that satisfy SS 
(i.e., are sufficiently similar in the sense of instantiating indistinguishable69 macro 




 Being “indistinguishable”, here, is not necessarily to be understood as being indistinguishable for 
some external observer or measuring device. The configuration , usually refers to the configuration 
of the entire universe, understood as everything there is. By definition, there is no observer or 
device external to it. In particular, speaking of (in)distinguishability in this context does not imply the 
existence of a mind for which states are distinguishable or not. Rather, as shall be spelled out in 
some detail later, saying that macro states are indistinguishable simply means that these states do 
not amount to a macroscopic difference for a given macroscopic object (MO) within a configuration. 
Likewise, saying that macro states are distinguishable means that these states do amount to 
macroscopic difference for the MO. Such a MO can be a mind-bearing observer, but it doesn’t have 
to be. 
70
 Despite being suitable for our present purposes, this definition is still somewhat preliminary, for 
the following reason: since our definition of worlds via SS hinges on the notion of macroscopic 
perspective, the meaning of the latter must be made explicit. As we will see, the distinction between 
the micro- and the macroscopic itself is relative – it differs, depending on the system or object in 
question. This, we need to account for in our definition. Likewise, we must be more specific 
regarding the overlap of worlds. Other than for the case of BSM, in order to construe world histories 
in MBM, a special condition on how worlds overlap – overlap proper – must be met. 
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∀;'∃R' G∀;73;7 ∈ R' ↔ ;7KK;'6H 
(world membershipMBM) 
 
Irrespective of the difference regarding the fundamental space within which the 
micro dynamics unfolds, and irrespective of the difference in the micro dynamics 
itself, the feature that worlds defined via SS may overlap, and everything this brings 
with it, carries over from the case of BSM to the case of MBM.71 
  
Despite worlds possibly overlapping, world membershipMBM guarantees – via 
sufficient similarity, and in accordance with our usual experiences – that macro 
states instantiated by configurations belonging to a world don’t contradict the 
macro state instantiated by its central configuration, e.g. by there being dinosaurs 
in Hong Kong in one, but not in the other. In this sense it, suppresses inconsistent 
macro states: the respective configurations, differing to an extent that they 
contradict each other on the macroscopic level, certainly are macroscopically 
distinguishable. Hence, SS does not put them in each other’s worlds. 
Consequentially, the application of SS leads to individuation (separation, 
“branching”) of worlds whenever the grouping of configurations into a world would 
lead to inconsistencies with its central configuration.72 But note that the 
requirement of sufficient similarity does not suppress the grouping of 
microscopically inconsistent configurations into one world: such configurations, 
differing only microscopically while being macroscopically indistinguishable from a 
central configuration, still belong to the world of the latter. This is to say that world 
membershipMBM also guarantees that individuation of worlds in this sense only 
occurs when necessary. Preventing such “over-individuation”, SS avoids the 
problematic identification of configurations and worlds: with a microscopic 
difference being sufficient for the individuation of worlds, every world would 
contain only one configuration, since every configuration differs from every other 
 
71
 Recall from above that SS is reflexive, symmetric and nontransitive. 
72
 Cf. Barbour’s (1994, 408) similar requirement for records contained in time capsules: “A time 
capsule […] appears to contain records of the past, and these records are mutually consistent”. 
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configuration microscopically. Accordingly, worlds could not overlap, which 
ultimately leads to temporal solipsism. For example, on such an account, it is utterly 
unclear how the setup of an experiment and the recording of its results hang 
together (unless we assume that all of this emerges as an illusion from within one 
Barbourian time capsule). It is by avoiding over-individuation that MBM evades 
temporal solipsism. 
 
IV.3 Superpositions in MBM 
 
One should be careful, though, to not confuse the grouping of microscopically 
inconsistent configurations with a superposition. Superpositions are a feature of the 
universal WF and its dynamics. It evolves independently of the actualized particle 
configurations, and likewise of their grouping into worlds. If it contains 
superpositions, it does so irrespective of how configuration space is coarse-grained 
into worlds, and which macro states are instantiated. 
 
Having said this, it might be helpful to see how MBM accounts for interference 
experiments probing superpositions by looking at an example. This might also be 
useful to render the similarities and differences between MBM and some of its 
main competitors a bit clearer. Recall from the introduction to MBM my 
presentation of the measurement problem, following Maudlin (1995). One can 
categorise different quantum theories and/or interpretations thereof based on 
which route they take for the solution of this problem in dealing with the general 
presence of superpositions. In the following, before coming to MBM, I present one 
example from each of these categories: Copenhagen, not accepting the unaltered 
Schrödinger dynamics and modifying it by adding a collapse postulate; Everett, 
replacing (universal) value indefiniteness by value multiplicity (cf. Wallace 2012) for 
“macroscopic superpositions”; and BM, denying completeness of the WF, adding 
Bohmian particles/configurations to complete the state description. From this 
categorisation, we recover MBM’s heritage: it is clearly to be grouped with BM, in 
that it adds particles/configurations to complete the state, rendering the complete 
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state value definite at any given time while accepting the unaltered Schrödinger 
dynamics. Yet, despite being value definite at any given time, MBM’s configuration 
is not determined by configurations at other times, for it lacks the deterministic 
particle dynamics, i.e. the GE, of standard BM. Maudlin (ibid., 13) refers to this as 
the “problem of effect”. MBM solves it by appeal to worlds and world histories. 
Having to make this appeal is the price to pay for the excision of the deterministic 
GE. It results in the fact that, while still being value definite at any given time, 
different world histories, carving out the branching structure of the universal WF, 
are instantiated at random, rendering the theory Everettian to the extent that none 
of the branches of the universal WF shall be forgotten – all of them are actualized 
again and again, although not simultaneously. In this restricted sense, MBM inherits 
value multiplicity from Everett.73 
 
Take the usual single particle/wave packet double-slit experiment: A particle/wave 
packet source that can be set up such that individual particles/wave packets are 
emitted, one at a time; a double slit the particle/wave packet is passing through; 
and a screen for measuring the particle/wave packet position behind the double 
slit. Despite the system generally being in a superposition, we do not observe a 
macroscopic superposition at the screen.74 Now, different theories/interpretations 
tell different stories of what is going on when this experiment is carried out. 
 
According to Copenhagen, the wave packet, travelling through the apparatus, is in a 
superposition, until, upon measurement, it collapses onto definite position state, 
with probabilities according to BR. What counts as a measurement, and accordingly, 
where and when collapse occurs, depends on how we define and divide the 
 
73
 In the less restricted sense as used by the Everett community, MBM does not feature value 
multiplicity: at each instant, only one configuration is actual, thus only one branch or world history 
actualized. Thus, at each instant, there is no multiplicity of values in the Everettian sense. Rather, 
multiplicity in the restricted sense appropriate for MBM appears only when temporally coarse 
graining over finite intervals of time. 
74
 In a single event, that is. Of course, we are “observing” macroscopic superposition, in the sense 
that in a sufficiently large ensemble of single events, events approximately are distributed with Born 
statistics over the screen. That is, after many individual runs of the experiment, an interference 
pattern emerges on the screen. 
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quantum system to be investigated from its environment, construed as classical. An 
experimenter in the lab, e.g., would place the measuring device, in this case the 
screen, on the opposite side of this so-called Heisenberg cut than the system to be 
measured. A colleague of the experimenter, however, might place the cut after the 
first experimenter, thereby treating the latter as part of the system under 
investigation, and so on.75 This is of importance for our considerations: placing the 
Heisenberg cut decides on where and when the collapse of the WF happens. And it 
is the collapse of the WF that is supposed to account for the quantum-to-classical 
transition in Copenhagen, in the sense that it accounts for the fact that we do not 
observe a macroscopic superposition in single events. 
 
By contrast to Copenhagen, Everett does not resort to a collapse postulate in order 
to explain the absence of macroscopic superpositions from our observations. 
Rather, decoherence accounts for the vanishing of interference terms, resulting in 
the branching structure of the WF, i.e. FAPP-independent, quasi-classical world 
branches all of which are realized simultaneously. As is regularly stated, 
decoherence alone provides no solution to the measurement problem, for it does 
not do away with value indefiniteness. Instead, Everett’s solution to the 
measurement problem is the replacement of value indefiniteness by value 
multiplicity for macroscopic superpositions. Universally, superpositions remain. But 
as inhabitants of one such emergent world, we do not encounter macroscopic 
interference, despite superpositions still being present in the universal WF. As 
Wallace (2012, 36f.) puts it: “this, in a nutshell, is what the Everett interpretation 
claims about macroscopic quantum superpositions: they are just states of the world 
in which more than one macroscopically definite thing is happening at once. 
Macroscopic superpositions do not describe indefiniteness, they describe 
multiplicity”. And later (ibid., 38): “If the correct way to understand such 
superpositions is as some sort of multiplicity, then our failure to observe that 
multiplicity is explained quite simply by the fact that we live in one of the ‘worlds’ 
 
75
 Cf. e.g. Schlosshauer & Camilleri (2011) and references therein.  
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and the other ones don’t interact with ours strongly enough for us to detect them.” 
Note that branching via decoherence depends on “magnifying” microscopic 
superpositions (ibid., 99): “branching is caused by any process which magnifies 
microscopic superpositions up to the level where decoherence kicks in”. Everettian 
worlds, thus, are an emergent feature of a higher, macroscopic level of description, 
just like worlds in MBM are. Here, too, the distinction between the micro- and the 
macroscopic is rather vague (ibid, 100): “there is no ‘finest’ choice of branching 
structure: as we fine-grain our decoherent history space, we will eventually reach a 
point where interference between branches ceases to be negligible, but there is no 
precise point where this occurs”. 
 
Standard BM also doesn’t resort to WF collapse, although the notion of effective 
collapse is common. This does not refer to a collapse of the universal WF as in 
Copenhagen, however. It basically means ignoring those branches of the WF that, 
after decoherence, are not effective in guiding the particle on its trajectory, for the 
interference term being vanishingly small. That branch of the WF in the support of 
which the particle resides is then called the effective WF. But again, the universal 
WF does not collapse in BM. As described in Dürr & Teufel (2009, 180), “this 
collapse is not a physical process, but an act of convenience. It is introduced 
because it would simply be uneconomical to keep the ineffective wave functions, 
and the price we pay for forgetting them amounts to nothing”. Here, too, the 
superposition in the universal WF remains, but the particle selects one branch that 
is realized. Which branch that is – unbeknownst to the experimenter, according to 
the usual reading of the QEH – is already determined at the preparation of the 
experiment, i.e. in the particle source. Over the course of many repetitions, slight 
deviations in the preparation correspond to different branches being effective, such 
that different trajectories are realized, resulting in an interference pattern to 
appear on the screen. 
  
In MBM, things are a bit different. The QEH, here, does not provide a measure of 
ignorance about the precise preparation of the particle. Rather, it provides a 
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stochastic guiding law for the actualization of configurations. As we have seen 
above, SS groups different configurations, amounting to a microscopic 
superposition but being sufficiently similar to a central configuration 
macroscopically, into the same world, as long as the superposition has not been 
blown up to macroscopicity by resulting in a macroscopic effect. Decoherence in 
MBM results in branching of the WF, just as it does in Everett and standard BM. But 
neither are these branches all realized simultaneously, nor are any of them 
effectively discarded. Let’s denote the configuration with the particle residing at a 
position within the left slit ;O, and the configuration with the particle residing at a 
position within the right slit ;G. These do not yet correspond to different branches 
being actualized/distinguishable macro states being instantiated, because they are 
macroscopically indistinguishable: via SS, ;G ∈ RO  and ;O ∈ RG. Compare the 
presentation of the Everettian account of this situation above and in particular, 
note the similar appeal to the microscopic-macroscopic-distinction: the quantum 
state is not yet decohered. No magnification of the microscopic superposition has 
taken place so far. Hence, although the notions are vague, it is clear that, in the 
Everettian terminology, branching has not yet occurred. Likewise, in MBM, worlds 
have not yet been individuated, i.e. configurations still lie in each other’s worlds: 
with the particles residing at different positions, but both configurations being 
sufficiently similar to each other, their worlds “contain” a microscopic 
superposition. That is, these worlds overlap76: via SS, ;G ∈ RO  and ;O ∈ RG. It is 
only at a later stage of the experiment, with different macroscopic points on the 
screen lighting up, that configurations ;O(  and ;G(  are macroscopically 
distinguishable77. Other than ;O  and ;G, the former are not sufficiently similar, i.e. 
do not instantiate indistinguishable macro states. Thus, ;G( ∉ RO(  and ;O( ∉ RG(. It 
is at this point where, in the Everettian picture, branching takes place. We see that 
it is not the presence of a superposition per se, but the presence of a macroscopic 
inconsistency, that individuates worlds, both in Everett and MBM. In particular, 
 
76
 As will become clear later, they not only overlap, but overlap properly. 
77
 A reminder: on MBM, configurations at different times are stochastically independent. Hence, one 
must not think that ,I) somehow follows from ,I. That is, it is not possible to infer from the position 
at which the screen lights up the position of the particle at an earlier time. 
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microscopic superpositions alone have no bearing on the individuation of worlds. 
Worlds, and world histories, are thus an emergent feature, like branches in Everett. 
In fact, world histories “trace” Everettian branches. Just like branching in Everett (cf. 
Wallace 2012, 3.11), the individuation of worlds depends on what we take to be 
sufficiently similar on the macroscopic level. 
 
By now, I already have used the terms “microscopic” and “macroscopic” extensively 
without making particularly clear what they are supposed to mean. Let me make up 
for that in the following paragraph. 
 
IV.4 The Microscopic-Macroscopic-Distinction and its import on the construal 
of worlds 
 
It should have become evident by now that the distinction between the micro- and 
macroscopic is not very precise. Worlds, construed via a relation of sufficient 
similarity, spelled out in terms of macroscopic indistinguishability, thus are quite 
pragmatic and relative. They are pragmatic, first and foremost, because it often 
depends on practical limitations between which states we can distinguish, and 
between which we can’t. In the chapter on BSM, I have elaborated that 
macroscopic (in)distinguishability is observer- or instrument-relative: whether two 
macro states can be told apart or not depends on “resolution power” – the abilities 
and limitations of our sensory apparatus, and/or on the precision of the 
instruments we use. In this sense, macro states are distinguishable (or not) 
relativeobserver to a given observer and/or instrument with a certain resolution 
power. 
 
(In)distinguishability also depends on our point of view: from far away, two states 
might be indistinguishable that are distinguishable at close distance. Consider two 
pixels on a computer screen. If one is lighting up, the other is dark, and vice versa. 
Say that, very close to the screen, you are able to tell these states apart. But from a 
certain distance and beyond, you aren’t. Your sensory apparatus doesn’t change, in 
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terms of its abilities (in this case, quite literally the resolution power of your eyes), 
depending on your distance from the screen. But the apparent separation between 
two points is smaller from afar than it is from close by. So at some distance, your 
resolution power doesn’t suffice anymore to resolve the spatial distance between 
the (middle points) of the two pixels. So indeed, it seems that distinguishability does 
not only depend on resolution power, but also on perspective. 
 
Think of everyday phenomena: how far must the moon have wandered over the 
night sky for you to recognize that it now is somewhere different from where it was 
before? How about a snail? The perceived angular velocity of the moon, roughly 
being the same as the true angular velocity of the earth’s rotation around its own 
axis, is about 360°/day. Helix pomatia, at a distance of one metre, and with a speed 
of 4.2 metres/hour, can run 16 full circles around you in the time the moon 
completes one circle. Its perceived angular velocity, from your perspective, is about 
16 times as high as the moon’s. 
 
With distinguishability not only depending on resolution power, but also on 
perspective, the construal of worlds, making use of distinguishability, also depends 
on perspective: configurations that, from your perspective, are distinguishable, and 
hence don’t belong to each other’s worlds, might not be distinguishable from the 
perspective of someone else, or, in general, from the perspective of another being, 
or system.78 This other being might be a million light years away, or as big as the 
solar system, and hence not being affected by the difference between, for example, 
your cat sitting on the couch or sleeping on your bed, just like you are not affected 
by the difference between two slightly different molecular compositions of the 
 
78
 As pointed out above, the notion of macroscopic (in)distinguishability is not reserved for sentient 
beings (consciously) observing differences between macro states. In a broader sense, adequate for 
our treatment of MBM, two states being macroscopically distinguishable simply means that it makes 
a macroscopic difference for a given macroscopic object (MO) which one is instantiated, and 
likewise, two states being macroscopically indistinguishable simply means that it makes no 
macroscopic difference for a given MO which one is instantiated. Such MOs may very well be 
sentient beings, but they don’t have to be. Speaking of “(in)distinguishability” is a convenient façon 
de parler that should not be taken to imply that a (conscious) observer or, in general, a mind of some 
sort or other is of fundamental importance. 
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beast. It is here where the relativity of the terms “microscopic” and “macroscopic” 
enters the scene. It is a matter of perspective, not least of size, what does and does 
not count as micro- or macroscopic. Hence, the usual construal of the microscopic-
macroscopic-distinction as two levels of description, appropriate for two different 
length scales defined in absolute terms, is too simple. 
 
Let’s elaborate on this. Length is a measure usually defined over the positive reals 
(see e.g. Tao 2011), such that lengths, in general, can have any positive real-valued 
magnitude. The definition of a standard unit, which, for length, is the metre, is a 
pragmatic convention. And so is picking out a certain interval of the reals, 
measuring it in terms of some standard unit, and call it “the macroscopic length 
scale” or “the macroscopic realm”. The same goes for the microscopic. Especially in 
descriptions like “the scale of objects that can no longer be seen by the naked eye” 
of the microscopic scale, the pragmatic nature of such assignments shows. See, for 
example, the definition in Reif (1965, 2): “It is useful to introduce a distinction 
between the sizes of systems whose description may be of interest. We shall call a 
system “microscopic” (i.e. “small scale”) if it is roughly of atomic dimensions or 
smaller (say of the order of 10 Å or less). For example, the system might be a 
molecule. On the other hand, we shall call a system “macroscopic” (i.e., “large 
scale”) when it is large enough to be visible in the ordinary sense (say greater than 1 
micron, so that it can at least be observed with a microscope using ordinary 
light).”79 
 
Definitions like this are not only pragmatic, but highly dependent on the 
contingencies of one part of the human sensory apparatus. But there are other 
senses, and modes of sensation, in humans as well as in other beings with different 
sensory abilities. In general, different systems might only be affected by objects (or 
events, or processes) at greater scales or already be affected by objects (or events, 
or processes) at smaller scales than we as humans typically are. This suggests, 
 
79
 Jaeger (2014, 897) also cites this definition and comments: “The appeal of such a notion is not 
surprising, given the dominance of the visual sense in humans”. 
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instead of defining the micro- and macroscopic relative to the human sensory 
apparatus, that we define these notions relative to any two systems in general. 
After all, we are interested in describing systems and their relations to each other, 
whether humans are involved or not. And by doing so, we don’t lose anything. 
What we hitherto have called microscopic, with respect to our sensory abilities, can 
still be called microscopic, as a result of the relation that holds between the system 
we call “us” and the system to be described. On the other hand, though, we gain 
the possibility of using the microscopic-macroscopic-distinction in other cases not 
involving humans or other beings of a certain size. What will matter are only 
relative measures and how things (objects/events/processes) at different scales 
affect each other. 
 
One might be tempted, for MBM, to simply adopt a distinction between the micro- 
and the macroscopic based on decoherence80: a system, then, can be called 
macroscopic once it contains sufficiently many degrees of freedom, or is 
large/heavy enough such that “the environment […] continually interacts with, and 
becomes entangled with, that system” (Wallace 2012, 77). Under such 
circumstances, systems decohere in a sufficiently short time interval, such that 
interference becomes practically irrelevant. However, such a construal does not 
evade vagueness. Recall (ibid., 100): “there is no precise point where this occurs”. 
More importantly though, decoherence is a process that accounts for the branching 
structure of the WF. This is fine for Everett, but not enough for our purposes. With 
the particle configuration as MBM’s referent and basis for its psychophysical 
parallelism, our micro-macro-distinction should be spelled out in terms of objects 
and their constituents as being part of the universal configuration. 
 
Let us therefore adopt the following characterization of the microscopic-
macroscopic-distinction: a scale is called microscopic with respect to another, called 
macroscopic, if change on the level of the former doesn’t necessarily imply change 
 
80
 Cf. also the discussion in the next paragraph. 
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on the level of the latter, i.e., if it is possible that, from the perspective of the 
macroscopic object, nothing has changed despite actual changes happening on the 
level of the microscopic.81  
 
Through this characterization, it becomes clear that, although the distinction is 
dependent on the relation of levels, the relation itself is objective: Whether it 
makes any difference if your cat sits on the bed or on the sofa, is relative to the 
level from which the situation is described. From your perspective, it does make a 
difference. Hence, the difference in the cat’s position, described from the level of 
your perspective, is regarded as macroscopically distinguishable. Changing 
perspective to a relatively large scale can change that status. From the perspective 
of the solar system and the level used to describe it, the change in your cat’s 
position is irrelevant, hence regarded as microscopic. Yet, despite this relative 
dependency on the level of description, it is objectively so that, from your 
perspective, the position of your cat is relevant, while it is not from the perspective 
of the solar system. 
 
IV.4.1 The Microscopic and the Macroscopic Domain vs. the Quantum and the 
Classical Domain 
 
A characterization like the one just suggested can also help to prevent the 
conflation of the “quantum scale” or “quantum domain” with the microscopic, and 
of the “classical scale” or “classical domain” with the macroscopic, respectively. Not 
everything small is quantum, not everything big classical. Rather, we should use the 
terms quantum and classical for phenomena best described by the respective 
theories, independently of the size of the objects involved. Jaeger (2014, 896f.) 
discusses this topic (and traces the history of the use of the term macroscopic): 
 
81
 Note the resemblance of the micro-macro-distinction adopted for MBM, and for BSM (cf. the 
previous chapter), respectively. This is a recurring theme, arguably rendering MBM – as well as other 
particle-based quantum theories adopting the notion of worlds as collections of sufficiently similar 
micro configurations – especially suitable for the replacement of BSM in cases where a quantum 
rather than classical treatment is appropriate (see the following paragraph). 
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“Related to the popularity of this approach [(i.e. the Copenhagen Interpretation)] is 
the widespread assumption, which is often made without circumspection and most 
often made in popular discussions, that the macroscopic realm and the regime of 
classical physics are one and the same, sometimes resulting in the use of the terms 
classical and macroscopic interchangeably. This has occasionally been noted, for 
example, by Żurek in his well known discussion of the attempt to understand the 
transition from quantum-mechanical to classical-mechanical behavior through the 
notion of decoherence[:] ‘In the absence of a crisp criterion to distinguish between 
quantum and classical, an identification of the classical with the macroscopic has 
often been tentatively accepted. The inadequacy of this approach has become 
apparent as a result of recent developments: A cryogenic version of the Weber bar 
– a gravity-wave detector – must be treated as a quantum harmonic oscillator even 
though it may weigh a ton...’ [(Zurek 2002)]” Later, Jaeger (2014, 898) goes on: “To 
reach the identification of the macroscopic with the classical, one would need a 
system being macroscopic as both necessary and sufficient for its being classical. As 
noted in the introduction, however, some quite massive gravity-wave detectors are 
required to be treated quantum mechanically. Moreover, a system’s having large 
quantum numbers, its having large mass, and its having a large spatial extent do not 
always coincide: one example of this would be that of a compact astronomical 
object which is of “microscopic” spatial extent while also being considered 
“macroscopic” by virtue of a large mass – having a Schwarzschild radius of a size 
larger than an atomic nucleus but smaller than an atom.” 
 
These latter remarks suggest that what we have said above about length holds 
analogously for other measures. Defining intervals over the space of possible values 
and calling them the microscopic or macroscopic scale, first of all, is a matter of 
pragmatic convention, usually based on the human senses and everyday 
experiences, which are a contingent matter of fact. That doesn’t change when 
considering other measures instead of length, e.g. mass. A definition based on 
relations between systems can reproduce the common notions of micro- and 
macroscopicity by relating the system of interest to systems roughly of the size, 
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mass, or what have you we encounter in our everyday experience, which can be, if 
wished for, a human being. But it can also reproduce many more, for example by 
relating systems of the type just described to other, much bigger (or heavier) 
systems, a human being to the solar system, say. Suddenly, objects we encounter 
on a daily basis, including other human beings and ourselves, are rendered 
microscopic with respect to the macroscopic solar system.82 As a consequence, it 
becomes almost trivial to explain why it would be wrong to conflate the domains 
thus variably rendered micro- or macroscopic with the domains of quantum or 
classical mechanics, despite the fact that often (not always!), the domain where 
quantum mechanics is adequately used for the description of phenomena is one of 
the small, light, etc., and the domain where classical mechanics is adequately used 
is one of the big, heavy, and so on, with “small”, “light”, “big” and “heavy” as 
judged from the human perspective. 
 
So much for now about the microscopic-macroscopic-distinction. Earlier, I promised 
to come back to the issue of psychophysical parallelism. My claim was that an 
account of world histories in terms of processes of change between configurations 
will suggest itself, provided we adopt a more than minimal version of 
psychophysical parallelism and give some credence to the best neuroscientific 
theories we currently have. To first address these requirements, we shall make a 
short detour, discussing a minor issue with Barbour’s account. 
 
IV.5 A minor issue with Barbour’s account 
 
The issue I identify in Barbour’s account is not a theoretical defect sensu stricto. 
Rather, what I find somewhat problematic is him ignoring, against what seems to be 
his own conviction, the important role that processes, and hence change – as 
opposed to states, individual events or static objects – play when it comes to 
 
82
 Which seems to be an advantage. It can be regarded a theoretical virtue to exclude reference to 
contingencies like the usual size of humans from general descriptions, and another virtue to be able 
to reintroduce them as special cases when of interest. 
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psychological experience and its physiological basis83, and not providing a satisfying 
answer to the question of how, in his account, conscious experience arises from 
static configurations. Processes might not be metaphysically – let alone logically – 
necessary for experience, but modern neuroscience suggests that, at least for us, 
physiologically they are. Given we can trust our best theories, we should believe 
that experience arises from processes, not static states.84 There’s even a 
measurable minimum amount of time required – in our context, this translates to a 
minimum amount of change – in order for consciousness to emerge from an active 
group of neurons.85 We should not sweep this evidence under the carpet light-
heartedly, especially not if we don’t have to. 
 
Over the course of more than two decades, Barbour in his writings86 develops a 
timeless cosmology, including an account of psychophysical parallelism. It bears 
some resemblance, but is far from identical, to the account presented in this thesis. 
As has been pointed out before, it is similar in that it features instantaneous 
configurations at the heart of its ontology, and as the physical basis of psychological 
phenomena: Barbour (1999, 302), following Bell, regards particle configurations as 
“the physical counterpart of psychological experience”. However, contrasting my 
account, he deems individual configurations – albeit somewhat special 
configurations, i.e. time capsules – sufficient to give rise to psychological 
experience. In this respect, Barbour’s account resembles Bell’s Everett (?) theory. 
What’s more, he not only conceives of worlds as individual configurations (like Bell 
did), but also as eternal, static objects. This, I hold, gives rise to concern when it 




 Cf. (Barbour 1999, 266): “it is well known that much processing goes on in the brain and, 
employing normal temporal language, we can confidently assert that what we seem to experience in 
one instant is the product of the processing of data coming from a finite span of time”. 
84
 Despite the common usage of the term “brain state”, especially in the philosophy of mind. Such 
“brain states” are not states in the strict sense of an individual, unchanging micro configuration of 
the brain. 
85
 See, e.g., Sacks (2017, 173ff.) 
86
 Cf. Barbour (1994), Barbour (1999), Barbour (2009) and his recent, unpublished book manuscript 
The Janus Point. 
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Intuitively, one should think: experience, in particular experience of motion, 
requires change of configurations.87 Change in the configuration of what I 
experience as moving – the Kingfisher in Barbour’s example88 – and, at least as 
importantly, change in myself that reflects the change of the object I observe and 
allows me to experience that change. Both, change in the object as well as change 
in the subject – me – require change in the configuration of the universe. So, 
experience, all the more experience of motion, should not occur within individual, 
static configurations. Yet, Barbour in his account construes experience as being had 
from within such configurations. So, given that experience indeed requires change 
of configurations, Barbour’s account is misguided. 
 
For our purposes, we can set aside the question of how exactly change in the 
experiencing subject is supposed to be linked up with change of an external object, 
such as to adequately reflect the latter’s movement. Already the case of experience 
simpliciter is enough to convey the sense in which Barbour’s account is problematic. 
Given there are subjects that have experiences of some sort. Since these subjects 
are part of the universe they live in, and experience seems to require change in that 
which has the experience, it seems to be the case that the configuration of the 
universe should change in order for experiencing subjects to arise. But Barbour’s 
account doesn’t allow for change of the configuration. This poses a problem 
Barbour tries to circumvent by denying at least one of the premises that 1) 
experience requires change within the experiencing subject and 2) change within an 
experiencing subject requires change in the configuration of the universe. I doubt 
that he would object to the second premise: since the experiencing subject is part 
of the configuration of the universe, every change within the former amounts to 
change within the latter, if only on the microscopic level. Instead, he denies the 
intuitive premise 1) and introduces the notion of time capsules: individual, static 
 
87
 Note that this really is just an intuition. Intuitions can be wrong, so without further investigation, 
they never suffice to reject an account. Accordingly, it would be premature to reject Barbour’s 
account just because it doesn’t chime with our intuitions. But they can very well guide us in asking 
the questions that need answering. Personally, I deem it useful to let intuitions tell me where to 
look, but not what to find. 
88
 Barbour (1999), passim. 
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configurations that contain what seem to be records of the past. “Somehow”, by 
comparing the parts of the configuration that are regarded as records, the illusion 
of time flowing is said to arise. Let’s take the existence of such time capsules for 
granted, if only for the sake of the argument. Does this solve the problem? I hold 
that it doesn’t, even though at first glance, one might think that time capsules are 
sufficiently structured to account for experience. But the problem of experience 
without change is merely pushed back a little. It can now be formulated as follows: 
given there are time capsules, how is the operation of comparing several records 
contained in a time capsule supposed to work from within such an individual, static 
configuration? Doesn’t such an operation itself require a process to supervene on? 
Tailored to the case of human experience: how does a brain compare the records 
contained within a configuration while itself being caught in a static state, i.e. 
without itself undergoing change, i.e. without brain processes happening? 
 
Recall that Barbour advocates psychophysical parallelism: experience should 
somehow be correlated with something physical. And indeed, he does name this 
something – time capsules. Accordingly, my objection to Barbour’s account is not 
that he doesn’t meet his own demand to “establish a postulate of psychophysical 
parallelism”. He clearly does that, and from a purely metaphysical or logical 
perspective, there is no problem with his proposal. It could well be the case that 
this “something physical” with which experience corresponds is a single, static 
state: “Above” each time capsule, a mind might “hover” and hallucinate change in 
accordance with the records present in its associated time capsule. Consequentially, 
Barbour’s account does work, under the assumption of such a minimal form of PPP, 
featuring nothing but this unexplained correlation between mind and configuration. 
This amounts to a dualist form of PPP: other than the thin correlation between 
configuration and mind, nothing accounts for them hanging together. Now, my 
worries are that this minimalist PPP is not supported by our current best 
understanding of how the brain gives rise to experiences, and that, on top of that, 
even Barbour himself might envisage a stronger account. But irrespective of that 
latter point, in light of our best theories, one should at the very least provide some 
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good arguments in favour of such an assumption, especially when putting forward a 
theory that so strongly hinges on PPP. Barbour does not provide such arguments. 
To the contrary, his remarks about the relation between brain processes and 
psychological experience even suggest that his idea of how psychophysical 
parallelism works might be far from minimal (ibid., 266): “it is well known that much 
processing goes on in the brain and, employing normal temporal language, we can 
confidently assert that what we seem to experience in one instant is the product of 
the processing of data coming from a finite span of time”. 
 
Charitably assuming that such a product of data processing can be fully present and 
experienced in a single instant, the question remains how the processing bringing 
about this product is supposed to happen within an unchanging configuration. That 
would amount to a process that, qua definition of what a process is, is not a 
process. Barbour, by resorting to explanations as quoted, at least implicitly seems 
to acknowledge that an account featuring more than a minimal form of PPP must 
allow for change of configurations. His qualification “employing normal temporal 
language” does not resolve the issue. Understandably, he resorts to such 
formulations, indicating that his talk of processes is merely a façon de parler, not to 
be taken literally, for there are no literal processes within static configurations. But 
then, he should give an alternative account of how experiences arise, in particular, 
how the brain is able to compare and put into order the several snapshots it 
contains, without real processes happening. But he doesn’t provide such an 
account. All we get (ibid., 266f.) is “the working conjecture […] that when we think 
we see motion at some instant, the underlying reality is that our brain at that 
instant contains data corresponding to several different positions of the object 
perceived to be in motion. My brain contains, at any one instant, several 
‘snapshots’ at once. The brain, through the way in which it presents data to 
consciousness, somehow ‘plays the movie’ for me.” 
 
This sounds rather suspicious. I have no objection towards the idea that the brain 
can at one instant contain several records or ‘snapshots’ of an external object, each 
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representing the latter in a different state. What I find questionable, in addition to 
the qualms already discussed, is the following: the brain in this account is 
presenting data to consciousness/“plays the movie” to the experiencing subject. 
This, taken literally, again amounts to a mind-body dualism that is at least not 
supported, despite not logically being ruled out, by Barbour’s more than minimal 
psychophysical parallelism as reconstructed above. Last but not least, all this is 
supposed to happen “somehow”, which is a rather hand waving explanation, if it is 
an explanation at all. All things considered, it remains utterly unclear how 
experiences are supposed to emerge from a static configuration. 
 
The problem of Barbour’s account seems to be condensable into the following 
argument: in order to account for the illusion of change, he requires an entity – a 
brain – capable of comparing snapshots from within a static configuration. At the 
same time, it stands to reason that this entity can only fulfil this operation if it itself 
undergoes change, i.e., if brain processes can happen. But in a single, static 
configuration, there are no brain processes, and thus no entity capable of 
comparing snapshots from within it. Hence, there is no account for the illusion of 
change. Barbour’s account seems to block itself. 
 
Granted, this argument works only if one doesn’t assume a mind strictly 
independent of any physical supervenience basis. Such an entity could carry out the 
necessary operation of comparing records contained in time capsules. But Barbour 
obviously doesn’t make this assumption, given his requirement for PPP with 
configurations as the basis. After all, assuming an independent mind would render 
the whole effort moot: richly structured time capsules as the physical aspect of PPP, 
the comparison of records from which the illusion of time emerges, all this is 
superfluous if we simply assume some entity capable of having experiences 
independently of the physical basis. Since Barbour deems it necessary to go through 
all this trouble, I deem it safe to say that an entity experiencing independently of a 
physical basis is not what he envisages for his account. Following his own 
presentation, it is the time capsule itself, via its rich internal structure, and not 
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some independent entity, that accounts for experience (ibid., 267, my emphasis): 
“A time capsule […] is so highly structured that it creates the impression of motion.” 
Accordingly, I still see no way out of the predicament Barbour’s account is in. On 
the one hand, he doesn’t allow for change of configurations, because all 
configurations are supposed to be actualized eternally. On the other, he arguably 
assumes a more than minimal form of PPP that is too demanding to work with an 
account that doesn’t allow for change of configurations. Of course, we must 
consider the possibilities that a) I have misinterpreted Barbour with respect to his 
stance on PPP and he in fact deems a minimal PPP with its dualist consequences 
acceptable; and that b) I have read him correctly and he had a more than minimal 
PPP in mind, but would, in light of the considerations above, reconsider and adopt a 
minimal PPP. In both cases, I have no objection against his account. Alas, I would 
not adopt it for MBM, if only for the simple reason that for MBM, we don’t have to 
buy into a minimal PPP and, a fortiori, dualism: MBM allows for change of 
configurations, so we may as well try to come up with an account featuring a more 
than minimal form of PPP, one that doesn’t throw overboard our current 
understanding of how the physical and mental hang together. 
 
In light of all that has been said so far, I suggest considering a theory in which 
psychophysical parallelism is stronger than a mere claim of correlation while being 
compatible with the underlying ontology and dynamics (and with our current best 
theories in neurology and cognitive science). To be precise, we should consider an 
account that allows for change of configurations, in the sense of different 
configurations being actualized at different times, such that experience can arise 
from processes of change rather than from a static entity like time capsules. This is 
not a rejection of Barbour’s account as a whole: the universal WF (or its 
replacement) still could be time-independent. The relevant difference between 
Barbour’s account of the emergence of conscious experience and mine is that I 
don’t assume conscious experience without physical change. So let’s see whether 
we can come up with an account in which experience stems from processes, and 
that is compatible with MBM’s discontinuous actualizations of configurations. The 
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gist of such an account has already been provided, in the form of our definition of 
worlds – via world membershipMBM – above. Now, as announced earlier, we need to 
expand on this definition, and then distinguish between overlap simpliciter and 
overlap proper. This will allow us to construe (FAPP-) continuous world histories 
from successions of individual worlds, instantiated by individual configurations. 
 
IV.6 The macroscopic object 
 
The first problem that poses itself when developing a theory that construes 
experience as emerging from processes rather than static configurations can be 
stated like this: the universe has to know how to change configurations (and choose 
their order) by itself. We cannot rely on a mind to do so. Here is the reason: as 
suggested by our current neurological understanding, cognition, experience, etc., in 
general what we would call “mind”, correspond to brain processes, rather than 
brain states sensu stricto, understood as single, instantaneous configurations. These 
brain processes, as a series of configurations/changes of configurations, occur 
independently of what emerges from them, in the sense that the “emergent” 
feature is not causally affecting its “basis”.89 What has to happen in the universe, all 
by itself and without a mind making it so, is a series of actualized configurations 
that forms a consistent history without macroscopic “jumps”, but that allows for 
macroscopic change over time. Consecutive actualizations of configurations within 
such a history must resemble each other so closely that, macroscopically, i.e. for a 
given macroscopic object within those configurations, the actualization of one after 
the other does not amount to macroscopic change, but actualizations further apart 
temporally may amount to macroscopic change. Only then (which is not to be 
understood as temporal order, but as a conditional conjunctive) can minds emerge, 
 
89
 The reader may think of this as a form of the principle of causal closure of the physical, as it is 
often named (cf. Kim 1993), although in MBM, individual actualizations of configurations, being 
stochastically independent, are not causally connected. The principle in the context of MBM hence 
does not entail that there are causal connections between physical events on the fundamental level. 
It simply means that there are no causal connections between the mental and the physical, in 
particular, that there isn’t anything non-physical causing actualizations and/or grouping them 
together into worlds, in accordance with the double aspect form of PPP we adopt. 
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given the emergence of minds requires processes to happen. Following 
Heidelberger (2003, 236), psychophysical parallelism in the sense of a “double 
aspect theory”, where “the mental and the physical are [understood as] two 
different aspects of one and the same entity” is incompatible with the idea that the 
mind causes the process to happen. Conversely, it is incompatible with the idea that 
the process causes the mind to be (ibid., 238f.): “[Double aspect PPP] is defined as 
noncausal and therefore noninteractionist. But this noncausal interpretation […] 
results from the definition of the psychical and the physical in terms of the 
perspective in which something is given. Viewing the physical as something that 
causes the mental, or vice versa, results from scrambling differing perspectives. […] 
We can demonstrate that distinguishing perspectives is nothing mysterious by 
considering a bent coin. It would be ridiculous to say that a dent on the head's side 
causes a bulge on the tail's side. While both sides of the coin are intimately 
connected, their joint occurrence has nothing to do with causality”. 
 
We now have two options. Either we abandon double aspect PPP, or we show that, 
within our theoretical framework, change is possible without being caused by a 
mind. Frankly, the latter turns out to be rather trivial: within MBM, the 
configuration changes all the time. But change of the configuration simpliciter is not 
enough. It is less trivial to relate configurations to each other in such a manner that 
not only individual worlds, but entire, historically consistent world histories can 
emerge. This is what we will discuss now. 
 
First, we should agree that “brains”, as we usually conceive of them, are but one 
possible way for objects to embody minds within the framework of double aspect 
PPP. In principle, there could be many physical systems from which minds of some 
sort could emerge. We don’t need to go into the details about this here. All we need 
is to agree that mind-bearing physical systems don’t necessarily have to resemble 




What’s more, BEOs aren’t necessary for the construction of worlds and world 
histories from configurations and configurational changes. They are only relevant 
when the phenomenal experiences of mind-bearing beings (such as persons) and 
their emergence within the framework of MBM are under investigation. Abstracting 
from such special phenomena, all we need in the more general case are objects that 
are macroscopic with respect to the level of particles and their configurations – i.e. 
the fundamental, microscopic level of MBM’s ontology – such that they do not 
necessarily undergo macroscopic change as soon as they undergo microscopic 
change, but may be affected by microscopic change such that they do undergo 
macroscopic change. Since BEOs are just a special type of macroscopic objects 
(MO), what we are going to say about the latter with respect to worlds and world 
histories carries over to the former. In addition, BEOs will be able to have 
experiences, while MOs, in general, will not, (unless they are BEOs). 
 
Next, we should make the definition of a world a bit more precise. First of all, we 
need to be clear about what parts of the configuration of the universe are relevant 
to a MO. As we will see, it turns out that ultimately, this is only the part of the 
configuration that makes up the MO itself. Whatever happens outside the MO is 
completely irrelevant to the MO as long as it does not affect the MO, i.e. the part of 
the configuration that makes up the MO. 
 
If that sounds strange at first, think of the prominent brain in a vat scenario.90 
Incidentally, the MBM framework allows for scenarios that lie far beyond the 
outlandishness of this thought experiment. A quick reminder: in the brain in a vat 
scenario, we imagine a brain that is hooked up to a device, let's say a super 
computer, that generates neuronal input to the brain such that the brain 
hallucinates having a body and strolling along a beach, for example, while it actually 
sits in a vat filled with a liquid that provides for all its physiological needs, including 
nutrients, heat, and so on. Neuronal output of the brain is fed back to the computer 
 
90
 See Putnam 1981, ‘Brains in a vat’. 
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and integrated into the simulation, so that the brain doesn't have the impression of 
living a movie, but instead of actually being able to do things with its body, 
manipulate the environment, and so on. 
 
In this scenario, some implicit assumptions are made that, strictly speaking, are 
unnecessary within the MBM framework. 
 
Firstly, we can cut off the connection to the simulation device. Underlying the idea 
that such a device is required is the assumption that a brain needs some input that 
is causally connected to some external system in order to experience either 
something that is not absurd, or even to experience something at all. (Dreams 
might be an attempt to find a counterexample to the latter, although even when 
dreaming, we are not completely deprived of sensory input.) But within MBM, what 
the brain – or BEO, in general – experiences solely depends on either a) the 
configurational state it is in at the instant it is actualized (Barbour) or b) the 
succession of configurational states within the world history it lives in (my account), 
as we will see later. But in any case, the BEO needs no external machine in order to 
experience a walk at the beach. It just needs to be contained in an actualized a) 
time capsule or b) world history in which it just happens to have that experience. 
There is no causal connection to anything external necessary. 
 
Secondly, as an extension of what we have said about the computer, we can get rid 
of the vat, too. Introducing a vat in which the brain receives everything it 
physiologically needs to function properly is only required if we make the (implicit) 
assumption that a brain cannot exist on its own, but must be embedded causally in 
an environment that first of all allows for its existence and functioning. Under this 
assumption, an environment too hot or cold, e.g., would already ruin the scenario, 
for the brain would not function well or even die. 
 
Making this assumption is not necessary in MBM, though. Within each individual, 
static configuration, there is an essential causal independence between the 
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configuration of the particles that make up the BEO (or MO) in question and the 
configuration of the particles that make up all the rest: Whatever exists elsewhere 
within the configuration containing the MO is irrelevant for the MO’s configuration. 
Thus, in principle, it is irrelevant for the existence of the MO, and, over the course 
of many actualizations, irrelevant for its experience (if this MO is a BEO capable of 
experience). In principle, the MO can be the only thing that exists in the universe, 
and still undergo the configurational change it just happens to undergo. And if this 
MO is a BEO, it can, accordingly, be the only thing that exists in the universe, and 
still experience whatever it just happens to experience; it needs no energy, or 
nutrients, or neural input from the outside. Due to the stochastic micro dynamics of 
the particles that make up the universal particle configuration, any object 
composed of a subset of those particles is, in principle, dynamically independent of 
all the other particles and objects in that configuration. So we can imagine a BEO, 
e.g. a brain, floating in outer space while having the experience of strolling at the 
beach. According to the time-capsule approach (a), as soon as this happens the 
right way, i.e. with the configuration of the brain containing the appropriate 
snapshots, this brain would indeed have the required experience. Following the 
world-history approach b), it would take a sequence of changes between 
configurations for the brain to have that experience, but once the strange thing has 
happened and the brain has materialized in outer space, there might as well be 
further actualizations, such that the respective world history emerges. This way or 
that, this scenario certainly is possible, both in Barbour’s account as well as in MBM. 
 
Speaking of world histories, I shall now take the next step towards their 
construction in order to flesh out the remarks above, in which I appeal to their 
existence. As has been noted, in order to account for world histories emerging from 
randomly actualized configurations, we must differentiate between two types of 
overlap between worlds: overlap simpliciter and overlap proper. Only the latter will 
prove to be sufficient for world histories to arise, due to the fact that overlap 
simpliciter does not guarantee a FAPP-continuous evolution on the emergent level. 
To render it clear just when worlds in MBM overlap properly, and when they don’t, 
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we first have to take a look at MBM’s configuration spaces and their inhabitants 
(i.e. possible configurations), for worlds will be constructed from the latter within 
the former. The relevant considerations unavoidably will include some digressions 
into particle metaphysics – particle identity and impenetrability in particular – 
especially in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation in non-
relativistic quantum theories, such as MBM. 
 
IV.7 Configurations and configuration spaces 
 
For a universe of : particles with % degrees of freedom, we can construct a %:-
dimensional configuration space ℝ!.. For physical space with 3 degrees of 
freedom, this amounts to a 3:-dimensional configuration space ℝ8..  
 
Let’s assume for the moment some sort of principium identitatis indiscernibilium 
(PII) for physical particles, stating that particles are regarded as identical when they 
are indistinguishable, and as non-identical when they are distinguishable. For 
particles to be distinguishable, they need some kind of feature with respect to 
which they differ from each other. So, for example, an ontology where all particles 
are featureless, or an ontology where particles aren’t featureless, but all instantiate 
the same features, such that they do not differ despite, must construe them as 
identical with each other. (For the time being, we are ignoring their spatiotemporal 
trajectories, which in some cases might be used to individuate them despite their 
featurelessness, or sameness with respect to their features. We will discuss this 
later.) Contrariwise, for an ontology where all particles are individuated, for 
example by their intrinsic properties, haecceity, or a little label (a rigid designator) 
that is attached to them, there are no identical particles except for the rather trivial 
case of self-identity. In between these examples lies the case where particles 
neither are equipped with primitive thisness or the like, nor are all featureless (or all 
have the same features), but have features – e.g. mass, electrical charge, etc. – in 
which they differ. Via these features, types of particles can be distinguished, e.g. 
electrons and positrons, but unless every particle is equipped with a unique 
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combination of features, or with haecceity, this does not allow for the individuation 
of all particles there are. Two electrons, say, that do not differ in any of their 
features, cannot be individuated, although they are numerically different, and even 
reside at different positions in physical 3-space: just imagine a two-particle 
universe, with the two particles having identical features. If a demon had 
exchanged the particles a number of times, putting each at the position of the other 
and vice versa, without us knowing how often it did that, we would not be able to 
tell whether the particles in the end are at their original positions or had their 
positions swapped. There is nothing that could make any difference between the 
two possibilities. This is what we mean by saying that the particles cannot be 
individuated. 
 
Depending on the system in question and the particles involved, our representation 
of their configurations in configuration space may differ. Let’s start with the simple 
case where all particles can be individuated due to them each possessing a unique 
combination of properties, a label or what have you. In this case, permutations of 
particles always amount to a different configuration. Hence, all of configuration 
space is relevant. For an illustration, we assume a toy universe with two 
individuated particles and one spatial degree of freedom. In this toy universe, the 
complete two-dimensional plane of our configuration space ℝ) is relevant. Since 
particles at spatial positions ù/ and ù) are individuals qua their discerning features, 
configurations ;(ù/, ù)) and ;=(ù/, ù)) (where particles have changed places, i.e. 
have exchanged their position values, such that ù) takes on the value of ù/ and vice 
versa) are discernible as well, hence distinct. They amount to different facts. 
Consider the following example (figure 11): One particle resides at ù/ = −1.5 and 
another at ù) = 1. In configuration space, this configuration is represented as the 
point ;(−1.5,1) (the blue dot). Now let them change places, such that ù/ = 1 and 




Figure 11: Configuration space ℝ! of two discernible particles with one spatial degree of freedom. The orange 
and blue dots represent two distinct configurations, despite the fact that in both configurations, the same two 
spatial locations are occupied. 
 
But what if we are dealing with indiscernible and hence identical particles at ù/ and 
ù)? ; and ;= then should amount to the same configuration, since it doesn’t make 
any difference whether one is at −1.5 and the other at 1 or vice versa. That is to 
say, mere permutations of identical particles do not individuate configurations. 
Hence, when representing configurations of identical particles, our configuration 
space is structurally richer than the possible particle configurations it represents. 
 
Arguably, given identical particles, one should use reduced configuration space to 
represent meaningfully different possible configurations.91 To make the formal 
representation and what it represents match again, we reduce the full configuration 
space such that the superfluous structure is ignored. For an illustrative example 
 
91
 However, the consequences this has for the WF and its evolution, for the assessment of 
probabilities, etc., I cannot oversee. In the following discussion of the reduction of configuration 
space, I therefore only take into account issues of particle identity. Whether, when using a reduced 
configuration space, the rest of the formalism has to be adapted, and if so, whether that’s possible, I 
leave to the (mathematical) physicists. 
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(figure 12), we can do this by simply mapping every configuration below the 




Figure 12: Identical configurations are mapped onto each other in order to reduce superfluous structure. 
 
For higher dimensional configuration spaces, we can do similar rearrangements. If 
we expand our toy universe by adding a third particle, say, such that all three 
particles are identical, then there are 3! = 6 possible permutations that amount to 
the same configuration. (In general, there are :! permutations for : identical 
particles, all amounting to the same configuration.) In order to fix that, we get rid of 
all these permutations except one.  
 
If we do this to all possible configurations, i.e. all points in configuration space, we 
arrive at the so-called reduced configuration space representing all possible 
configurations of a given system of identical particles that differ meaningfully, i.e. 
are not mere permutations (Brown et al., 1999, 230): “The ‘reduced’ space ℝ.!/K. 
[…] is the quotient of ℝ.!  obtained by the action of the symmetric group K. (the 
group of permutations P above)”, the latter simply being defined (ibid., 229) as “an 
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arbitrary permutation on the set {1, 2, … , :}” with : being the number of particles 
involved. 
 
IV.7.1 Particle identity, impenetrability, and the desideratum of particle number 
conservation in MBM 
 
In addition to the mere permutations, it is argued that we also have to remove the 
diagonals where particles coincide (ibid., 231), i.e. “all points corresponding to two 
or more particles occupying the same spatial position at the same instant”, resulting 
in the further reduced configuration space ℝ.!/K. − °.  As noted by Brown et al. 
(ibid.), “[this] removal […] is sometimes justified by considering the particles to be 
‘impenetrable’, but of course impenetrability is not a direct consequence of 
indistinguishability.” Rather, as French and Krause (2006, 40) argue, referring to 
Newton, “impenetrability is a fundamental assumption of classical physics and we 
find it explicitly stated in a number of basic texts. Thus Newton characterized the 
elements of his ‘proto’-theory of classical mechanics in terms of (1) impenetrability, 
(2) mobility and (3) the ability to excite the senses.” Nevertheless, impenetrability is 
a metaphysical assumption that might resonate with our intuitions, but needs 
further justification once we want to make use of it in the construction of our 
theories about nature. Consequently, French and Krause (ibid., 41) turn the 
argument around, stating that “for point particles in three dimensions, the regions 
of coincidence in phase space have zero measure, so impenetrability is a reasonable 
assumption.” Brown et al. (1999, 231) are calling this line of argument “standard 
wisdom” when it comes to the construction of reduced configuration spaces, 
referring to Wu (1984, 2104), who argues that “because we are not always 
guaranteed that there is a finite probability for two particles to coincide with each 
other, the so-called diagonal points in ℝ!. […] have to be excluded too.” 
 
However, it is questionable whether this argument from the non-finite probability 
of particle coincidences, and likewise its measure-theoretic analogue brought 
forward by French and Krause, can convincingly justify the assumption that particles 
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are impenetrable: belonging to a region of zero measure and hence being assigned 
a non-finite probability is not to be equated with being impossible. The simple case 
of a system consisting of only one point-like particle should make that clear. 
Wherever this particle is located, the region it occupies is of measure zero, unless 
we assume a coarse-grained cell structure with cells of finite measure for the 
definition of regions in configuration space, assigning a finite region to the particle’s 
location. Consequently, without imposing such coarse graining, the particle has 
probability zero of being where it is. Yet, it is there. Clearly, being assigned 
probability zero or having measure zero are not the same as being impossible. The 
scope of this argument is not limited to the one-particle case. It holds just the same 
for two or more particles coinciding, and in general, whenever we are dealing with 
sets of configurations that have zero measure/are assigned non-finite probability. 
These sets don’t even have to be small, despite their zero measure. The diagonal in 
question, for example, has the same cardinality as the whole of configuration space. 
 
But then, if these configurations are neither impossible a priori nor of negligible 
number, why exclude them from configuration space? In a footnote, Wu (1984, fn. 
12) points to the fact that, if we didn’t exclude the diagonal, we would only be able 
to obtain Bose-Einstein statistics. This type of argument is different from the ones 
we have encountered so far. The question of which statistics is adequate for the 
phenomena to be described is one that can be tackled empirically. If we have to 
reduce configuration space by the diagonal in order to arrive at a model that 
captures the phenomena, then we should do so. On these rather solid grounds, 
then, we may start building a suitable metaphysics for that model, arguing, for 
example, that the fact that the model, by not allowing for the coincidence of 
particles, makes correct statistical predictions, should be taken as evidence that the 
particles in question are impenetrable. 
 
Yet another argument for the subtraction of the diagonal, probably the most 
important one, goes as follows. Let’s say two particles inhabit the same point in 
space-time. Assume that these particles have no discerning features, such that they 
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are rendered identical by the above PII. Then, because of them coinciding, they are 
rendered identical even with respect to their spatiotemporal location, resulting in 
numerical identity, unless we assume haecceity.92 So instead of two particles, we’d 
end up with only one, either featureless, or, given the original particles had features 
at all, e.g. mass, with one particle that has double the mass. In any case, our 2-
particle system would now consist of only one particle, a situation described by a 
completely different model (;, WF, SE) in the first place. This inconsistency could 
only be resolved by assuming primitive thisness/haecceity, which would allow the 
preservation of the number of particles despite their coincidence. But if we are 
assuming haecceity in the case of coincident particles in order to keep : constant, 
why don’t we assume haecceity for particles in general? In fact, I think we would 
have to, not least because we don’t know which particles actually are going to 
coincide in a future configuration, or did coincide in an earlier one. In standard BM, 
we do know these things, since there, particles are assumed to travel on trajectories 
given by the first order GE, which tells us that particles coinciding at one time do so 
at all times – and conversely, that particles not coinciding at one time never do. 
Therefore, in standard BM, once we know which particles are coinciding and which 
aren’t, our knowledge about that fact is stable. Not so in MBM, where, in principle, 
there’s nothing to prevent particles from coinciding at one time and not coinciding 
at others. So, in order to keep : constant, we would need to assume haecceity for 
all particles. Otherwise it would be possible that two or more non-haecceitistic 
particles coincide, thereby reducing :. Hence, we really should assume haecceity 
for particles in general, if we make that assumption at all. But there’s a catch: once 
we assume haecceity for all particles, the reduced configuration space is no longer 
 
92
 Numerical discernibility of coinciding, identical particles is lost, because they are not even weakly 
discernible, which would be sufficient for them being numerically discernible. Saunders (2003, 
293f.), referring to Black’s thought experiment of two iron spheres (Black 1952), provides the 
irreflexive relation ‘x being one mile apart from y’ as an example for a weakly discerning feature: “An 
identity condition may fail even when objects have exactly the same properties and exactly the same 
relations to all other objects and exactly the same relations to each other; […] Call objects not 
absolutely or relatively discernible, that satisfy an irreflexive relation, weakly discernible; […] For an 
example of weakly discernible objects, consider Black’s two iron spheres, one mile apart, in an 
otherwise empty space. […] The irreflexive relation A is ‘. . . one mile apart from . . . ’. It is because 
this relationship holds that we may say that there are two […]”. 
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appropriate to model the :-particle system in question. We’d have to use the 
unreduced configuration space, because particle permutations amount to different 
facts about the world, qua the haecceity of particles. This renders the initial reason 
for the assumption of haecceity absurd. We considered this option in order to be 
able to keep the diagonal while reducing configuration space. But if we make the 
assumption, we block the possibility of reduction in general, with or without the 
subtraction of the diagonal. So once we assume haecceity in order to be able to 
reduce configuration space in a certain way, we can’t reduce at all. Therefore, 
assuming haecceity for that rather formal purpose is a non-starter. Rather, particle 
haecceity, being an independent, metaphysical assumption, requires strong 
justification of its own. Whether such justification can be given I shall discuss now. 
 
IV.7.2 Particle haecceity vs. haecceitism 
 
Following Cowling (2016), haecceitism is the position “according to which the world 
could differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively.” For an example 
related to our discussion, consider, in analogy to Black’s iron spheres, a universe 
consisting of two intrinsically identical particles at some spatial distance. This, in the 
example, is the actual world, and as such, a possible one. Now imagine another 
possible world where these two particles have swapped places. Haecceitism is the 
claim that these two worlds exist in the space of possible worlds, and that these 
possible worlds are different, despite being qualitatively the same. 
 
Based on this characterization, I’d like to distinguish haecceitism from particle 
haecceity, the claim that particles actually differ in spite of sharing all of their 
properties, i.e. that the respective particles do have some non-qualitative 
individuating features to them. Haecceitism with respect to particles, as I am using 
the notion, merely makes the weaker claim that it is possible that they do. At this 
point, it should be made clear again that we are interested in whether or not we 
have good reasons to assume particle haecceity, not so much whether particle 
haecceity, in principle, is possible, i.e. haecceitism. This complicates the issue to 
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some extent. Chisholm’s Paradox, for example, as Cowling (2016) notes, is one of 
the most prominent arguments brought forward in favour of haecceitism. 
Unfortunately, though, it is of not much use for our purposes, for it seems to 
presuppose the individuality of entities in question and their trans-possible-world 
identity (Chisholm 1967, 3): “The [entity] of this world, we are assuming, is identical 
with the [entity] of that one” and “moving from one possible world to another, but 
keeping our fingers, so to speak, on the same two entities […]” are just two quotes 
that point towards this presupposition. In more formal presentations of Chisholm’s 
Paradox, this issue shows, appropriately, in the formalism. For example, the two-
valued predicate J in the presentation given in Forbes (1984) assigns some set of 
properties or constituents ℎ'  to some entity L. While ℎ'  changes, thereby 
representing change of the set of properties or constituents assigned to the entity, 
L remains the same over the entire operation, the latter being the switching 
between possible worlds. It is, by assumption, always the same, individuated entity, 
through all possible worlds. But for our purposes, we must not allow ourselves to 
make such assumptions, for what is assumed here is exactly the subject matter of 
the open question we are discussing in this paragraph. Simply assuming 
individuality and/or trans-world identity would be begging the question. 
 
Other arguments in favour of haecceitism, according to Cowling (2016, 4.1), are 
mostly of the conceivability type, characterized as follows: “Conceivability 
arguments for haecceitism have two steps. The first step requires our success in 
conceiving or imagining certain states of affairs. The second step requires an 
inference from the relevant conceiving or imagining to the possibility of the states 
of affairs in question.” We are not going to discuss these types of arguments here in 
detail, for they do not promise to be exceptionally relevant for the special case we 
are interested in. Generally speaking, when it comes to the question of the 
haecceity of particles, conceivability type arguments roughly will go as follows: (P1) 
It is conceivable that two (spatio-temporally identical) particle configurations differ, 
despite the particles in question being qualitatively identical. (P2) If something is 
conceivable, it is possible. (C) It is possible that two (spatio-temporally identical) 
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particle configurations differ, despite the particles in question being qualitatively 
identical. 
 
Now, regardless of the actual truth-value of P1 and P2, assuming they are true, C is 
true as well. Nevertheless, the argument has no bearing on our issue at hand. It 
might well be that configurations differing only with respect to the primitive 
identity of their particles are conceivable, and it also might well be that, since they 
are conceivable, that they are possible. But the question we have been trying to 
answer is different. It is: do particles actually have primitive identity? Is their 
fundamental nature in fact haecceitistic? We wanted to be presented with good 
reasons to assume particle haecceity. What we got instead was the assertion that, 
given the assumption of some premises, haecceity is possible, i.e., an argument in 
favour of haecceitism, understood as the possibility of haecceity – a conviction we 
shared from the beginning. 
 
We will not ultimately resolve the issues surrounding particle haecceity and general 
haeccetism here. If the reader feels justified to assume particle haecceity for 
Bohmian particles, for them, the issue of particle number conservation of 
coinciding, identical particles in MBM is off the table. Yet, I am unable to find 
convincing arguments in favour of the haecceity of particles. Accordingly, I have no 
justification to make use of haecceity in order to solve the problem. So, particle 
number conservation remains an issue. Maybe we can find a solution by 
investigating so-called space-time individuality (STI) of particles. 
 
IV.7.3 Individuation of particles qua their space-time trajectories 
 
Earlier, I have mentioned the possibility of particle individuation qua space-time 
trajectories. Again, I shall make use of an illustrative example. Imagine a universe 
with all identical particles. At </, we find the particles in configuration ;/. At a later 
time <), we find them in ;). Now, let’s assume that ;/ and ;) are identical, in the 
sense that all points in space that have been occupied by a particle at </ are equally 
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occupied at <). Since particles are identical and thus not discernible through their 
intrinsic properties, the configurations, too, are indiscernible, despite the particles 
having changed places. Yet, so the argument goes, there is a way to tell these 
particles, and a fortiori the configurations, apart: In general, on their way from ;/ 
to ;), particles were travelling on different trajectories. Once we know these 
trajectories, we can regard them as a feature of the particles that renders them 
discernible. French and Krause (2006, 1.7) reconstruct the conditions under which 
such a trans-temporal re-identification of particles via their trajectories can be 
successful. As the first amongst these conditions, they mention spatio-temporal 
continuity of the trajectory. And some pages later, in their discussion of classical 
statistical mechanics (ibid., 2.1), they describe the analogue issue that shows there: 
 
“Given that the molecules are all indistinguishable in the sense of possessing the 
same intrinsic or state-independent properties, some further principle of 
individuality is required in order to even talk about distinct trajectories in the first 
place. Boltzmann, more philosophically minded than many of his contemporaries, 
was completely aware of this issue. In his treatise on the principles of mechanics, 
the very first axiom of mechanics states that indistinguishable particles which 
cannot occupy the same point of space at the same time can be individuated by the 
initial conditions of their trajectories and the continuity of their motion. This, 
Boltzmann insisted, ‘... enables us to recognize the same material point at different 
times’.” 
 
This position is what French and Krause call space-time individuality (STI), and, as 
they note already in the introduction (ibid., 12), “it immediately invites speculation 
as to the nature of the individuating spatio-temporal background. On a relational 
view of space and time, the spatio-temporal locations of physical individuals involve 
relations with other individuals and a possible circularity develops. This may be 
broken by invoking a privileged set of continuants by reference to which all other 
things are individuated. But the nature of this privilege must be spelled out and the 
danger is that STI collapses into some other account of individuality […]. 
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Alternatively, the circularity could be broken by adopting a substantivalist view of 
space and time according to which spatio-temporal properties and relations of 
physical things are reduced to the properties of space-time points. Of course, this in 
turn requires some explication of what it is that confers individuality upon the 
points of space-time themselves.” 
 
We don’t have to delve into these further issues here, for it already should be clear 
why STI, in our case, can’t be utilized for the individuation of particles: there simply 
are no continuous particle trajectories in MBM, so the necessary condition of STI 
isn’t met. Particle individuation via space-time trajectories, thus, isn’t a possible 
solution to our problem. 
 
So, what are we left with? First, as we have just seen, we can’t make use of STI to 
individuate otherwise identical particles within the MBM framework. Second, while 
not being strictly impossible, particle haecceity isn’t a promising candidate either, 
for there are no convincing arguments in favour of this assumption. 
 
Yet, there is the formal requirement within the framework of MBM that particle 
number be conserved, i.e. that : is constant over time, which, without the 
assumption of haecceity, would be violated once particles do coincide. This 
requirement is regarded as a postulate of the framework, and cannot simply be 
dropped, for reasons discussed above. (Recall that two systems with different 
particle numbers would be described by different models.) The reasonable way out 
seems to be to assume that particles in MBM indeed cannot coincide, i.e., are 
impenetrable. Note that this does not contradict the remarks about the relationship 
between indistinguishability and impenetrability by Brown et al. (1999). Indeed, 
“impenetrability is not a direct consequence of indistinguishability.” (231) Instead, it 
is a consequence of 1) the formal desideratum of particle number conservation, on 
the one hand, and of 2) indistinguishability plus 3) the rejection of particle 
haecceity, on the other. Only if we want all three, we seem to be forced to assume 
impenetrability: once particles have haecceity or are distinguishable, 
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impenetrability is not necessary for particle number conservation. But this is true 
only if all particles are distinguishable, given, as we have argued, haecceity is not a 
reasonable option: as soon as some particles are indistinguishable, conservation of 
particle number is prone to failure due to possible particle coincidence. 
Consequentially, impenetrability must be assumed as soon as two or more particles 
of a system are indistinguishable, even if we can distinguish particle types based on 
their intrinsic features. To avoid particle coincidences leading to variations in :, we 
can reduce configuration space not only by the main diagonal, i.e. the 
configurations where all particles coincide, but also by the secondary diagonals, i.e. 
the diagonals of the configuration sub-spaces describing the configurations 
involving two or more, but not all, indiscernible particles. This seems appropriate 
for modelling a universe that is made up of different, distinguishable particle types, 
yet allows for indistinguishable particles within those types. 
 
Conclusively, we can say that reduction of configuration space by the diagonals 
indeed is a formal reflection of the metaphysical assumption of impenetrability. 
But, as we have seen, at least in MBM, the reasoning behind this assumption is not 
as trivial as claiming it to be “standard wisdom” or simply referring to our intuitions. 
Rather, it is a requirement necessary for other desiderata to hold – particle number 
conservation and no particle haecceity – and only so in the case of indistinguishable 
particles.  
 
Now that we have gained some clarity about the fundamental space we are 
operating in, and about the nature of its inhabitants, we finally can approach the 
ultimate definition of worlds in MBM and see how world histories are construed. 
 
IV.8 What is a world? redux 
 
A particle configuration ;' ∈ ℝ8. is a point given by the positions of the : particles 
of a given universe. A world R'(4T) ∈ ℝ8. is an area within the configuration space 
around a configuration ;', containing all possible configurations that, for a given 
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MO within ;', satisfy SS with ;', i.e., that are sufficiently similar to ;', i.e., that are 
macroscopically indistinguishable from ;'  in the sense that change between them 
doesn’t affect the MO macroscopically, i.e. doesn’t make a macroscopic difference 
to it.93 So let’s alter our world membership condition to reflect the MO’s relevance: 
 
∀;'(4T)∃R'(4T) G∀;73;7 ∈ R'(4T) ↔ ;7KK(4T);'(4T)6H 
(world membershipMBM) 
 
Using this condition, we can define the world R'(4T) around ;'(4T), containing the 
MO in question, as the set of all (possible) configurations that, for the MO, are 
sufficiently similar to ;'(4T) in that their actualization doesn’t amount to 
macroscopic change: 
 
R'(4T) = {;7|;7KK(4T);'(4T)} 
 
This world trivially contains ;'(4T), since the latter is trivially sufficiently similar to 
itself. 
 
For defining the world around an actualized configuration at a given time, we 
naturally take for ;'(4T) the configuration actualized at that time. 
 
Note that not necessarily every possible configuration in configuration space has a 
world around it thus defined. There are only worlds where there are MOs, because 
it depends on the MO what counts as sufficiently similar (or not) to the actualized 
configuration. On the other hand, if there is a MO, then there is a world, and if 
there are several MOs, then there are several worlds. Furthermore, if a 
configuration contains several MOs, macroscopically being affected by different 
 
93
 Of course, it is difficult to even make sense of the notion of macroscopic objects in a toy universe 
comprising only two particles in one spatial dimension. This toy universe only serves illustrational 
purposes, to render the underlying principle of the construal of worlds from configurations clear. 
They are equally applicable to universes with many more particles with more spatial degrees of 
freedom.   
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degrees of microscopic change, differently sized worlds emerge from that one 
configuration. 
 
IV.9 From discrete configurations to continuous world histories via 
overlapping worlds 
 
We shall now tackle the distinction between overlap simpliciter and overlap proper, 
and show why only the latter is sufficient for world histories to emerge. Let’s start 
by sharpening our intuitions with respect to overlapping worlds with the help of 
some illustrations. The crucial feature of worlds as defined above is that they 




Figure 13: Two worlds overlapping 
 
Figure 13 shows worlds R'  and RA overlapping in configuration space, with ;' ∉
RA and ;A ∉ R'. This is what we call overlap simpliciter. From the perspective of 
the MO in ;', the actualization of ;A would amount to the instantiation of a state 
differing macroscopically from the one instantiated by ;', and vice versa. In this 
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scenario, no (FAPP-) continuous world history would emerge for the MO. R'  and 
RA, despite their overlap, in this scenario are two quasi-parallel94 worlds. 
 
Only when there is another configuration ;7  actualized within the overlap of R'  




Figure 14: Three worlds, successively overlapping properly, creating a world history 
 
Figure 14 shows the same scenario as figure 13, but now with another configuration 
;7  that is actualized in the overlap of R'  and RA, and that includes both ;'  and 
;A 	in its world R7. Now, a FAPP-continuous world history is possible: Let’s say we 
start from ;'. ;7  lies within R', so if it is actualized, from the perspective of the MO 
in ;', no macroscopic change happens, despite the fact that now, a different 
configuration ;7  is actualized and hence, a different world R7  instantiated. ;'  and 
;7  satisfy SS, so the MO, from its own macro perspective, persists through the jump 
between R'  and R7. The same holds for the jump between R7  and RA: now 
 
94
 „Quasi-parallel” because in MBM, configurations and worlds are actualized/instantiated 
sequentially, so worlds, and likewise world histories, do not exist simultaneously, as they do in 
Everett-style accounts. 
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residing in ;7, the MO is not affected by any change when ;A is actualized. As 
before, strictly speaking from the fundamental level, the configuration changes; and 
in accordance with that, different worlds are instantiated. But from the MOs 
macroscopic perspective, everything remained the same, since ;7  and ;A satisfy SS. 
 
This is essential. During the configurational jump from ;' 	to ;7, the MO underwent 
no macroscopic change. Likewise, during the jump from ;7  to ;A. It macroscopically 
persists through all jumps, although it doesn’t persist on the fundamental level: it 
quasi- or FAPP-persists. Yet, judging from the perspective of the MO in ;', ;A does 
not lie within its world R', so overall, with the actualized configuration going from 
;'  to ;A via ;7, the MO did undergo macroscopic change. Instead of the 
instantiation of two quasi-parallel worlds R'  and RA, the actualization of ;7  qua 
instantiating its world R7  links up R'  and RA in a world history {R' ,R7 ,RA}, with 
;' , ;7 , ;A as their respective central configurations. It is only through such chains of 
actualizations of sufficiently similar configurations, linking up configurations that 
are not sufficiently similar, that MOs undergo FAPP-continuous, macroscopic 
change.95 
 
Let’s make all this a bit more precise. Recall our definition of a world: 
 
R'(4T) = {;7|;7KK(4T);'(4T)} 
 
We now need to know when worlds containing MOs overlap. They do when their 
intersection is non-empty: ó9*(JK),/(JK) = R'(4T) ∩R7(4T) ≠ ∅. Recall our 
 
95
 Isn’t this surprisingly reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s account of “family resemblance” in his 
Philosophische Untersuchungen? (Wittgenstein 1953, §67, my translation): “And we are expanding 
our notion of number, just as we twist fibre on fibre when spinning a thread. And the strength of the 
thread does not lie in one fibre running through its whole length, but in many fibres overlapping.” 
Of course, instead of „expanding our notion of number”, we are expanding world histories, and the 
family resemblance we make use of is the relation SS between configurations: We are twisting “fibre 
on fibre” by having properly overlapping worlds instantiated, and the strength of the resulting 
threat, i.e. the world history, does not “lie in one fibre running through its whole length” – one 
continuous trajectory of the configuration – “but in many fibres [(i.e. worlds)] overlapping”. 
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characterization of overlapping worlds in BSM. There, we said that a microstate FA 
is in an overlap ó9*,/  of worlds R'  and R7  iff it is in both of these worlds: 
 
∀FA∀R',7 GFA ∈ ó9*,/ ↔ FA ∈ R' ∧ FA ∈ R7H 
 
We can easily adapt this to MBM’s configurations: 
 
∀;A(4T)∀R'(4T),7(4T) G;A(4T) ∈ ó9*(JK),/(JK) ↔ ;A(4T) ∈ R'(4T) ∧ ;A(4T)
∈ R7(4T)H 
 
However, this only tells us about overlap simpliciter, i.e. about the necessary and 
sufficient condition for a micro state to be in an overlap region. For our treatment 
of BSM, since we were dealing with a continuous trajectory of the micro state 
through phase space, this was suitable. In such a scenario, the next state 
instantiated lies arbitrarily close to its predecessor, which guarantees that it is in 
the latter’s world and that thus, the worlds instantiated overlap properly. Yet, for 
the discontinuous micro dynamics of MBM, we don’t have such a guarantee. Hence, 
overlap simpliciter is not enough. Worlds must overlap properly, i.e. in such a way 
that their respective central configurations lie within the world around the other 
central configuration: ;' ∈ R7 ∧ ;7 ∈ R'. That is to say, worlds do overlap properly 
when their respective central configurations lie within their overlap, i.e. within the 
intersection ó9*(JK),/(JK) = R'(4T) ∩R7(4T). 
 
Two worlds R'(4T) and R7(4T) overlap properly iff the respective central 
configurations ;'(4T) and ;7(4T) lie within the overlap of these worlds. To express 
this, we write §9*(JK),/(JK): 
 
∀;'(4T),7(4T)∀R'(4T),7(4T) G§9*(JK),/(JK) ↔ ;'(4T),7(4T) ∈ ó9*(JK),/(JK)H 
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Having specified proper overlap, we can now construe world histories. Two worlds, 
despite overlapping properly, don’t make a world history, for the simple reason that 
jumping from one central configuration to the other can, by definition, never 
amount to macroscopic change for the MO. We only arrive at a world history, e.g. 
ℌ9*,/, , once we have proper overlap between worlds R' ,R7  and proper overlap 
between worlds R7 ,RA but not between R' ,RA. There can be more worlds 
overlapping properly in between, but they don’t contribute to the MO undergoing 
macroscopic change. Also, R' ,RA may overlap simpliciter, but not properly. So, we 
want to define a world history as a set of worlds such that all neighbouring worlds 
properly overlap while the first and last world do not:96 
 
ℌ9*,…,4(JK) = ¶R'(4T),R7(4T), . . . ,R*(4T),RI(4T)	U	§9*(JK),/(JK) ∧ §9/(JK),… ∧ …
∧ §9…,M(JK) ∧ §9M(JK),4(JK) ∧ ¬§9*(JK),4(JK)} 
 
Read: the MO’s world history ℌ9*,…,4(JK)  is the set of worlds R'(4T) through 
RI(4T) such that consecutive pairs of worlds overlap properly, but not the first and 
the last world. 
 
Finally, we have arrived at an account of macroscopically FAPP-continuous change 
emerging from fundamentally discontinuous actualizations of configurations via the 
construction of world histories from properly overlapping worlds around individual 
configurations containing MOs. Note that this FAPP-continuous change throughout 
a world history in no way necessitates continuous change between configurations. 
We arrived here starting from the framework of MBM without applying any 
fundamental changes. In particular, the discontinuous, random actualization of 
configurations in configuration space, which arguably is the central and discerning 




 Order of the set of worlds in a world history is implicit via the imposed overlap conditions, such 
that we don’t need to construe the set of worlds in a world history as an ordered set explicitly. 
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A consequence of the emergent nature of macroscopically continuous change, 
MBM comes with the feature that world histories can be interrupted “externally” 
without being interrupted “internally”. That is to say: in principle, between two 
actualizations that belong to one world history as just described, there can lie 
arbitrarily many actualizations that do not belong to that world history. It could be 
the case, e.g., that in the time between ;7/ and ;A/ from ℌ9*+,…,4+(JK)  are 
actualized, ;7) through ;O) from a different world history ℌ9*N,…,4N(JK)  are 
actualized. In fact, arbitrarily many configurations, belonging to arbitrarily many 
different world histories, can be actualized in between the actualization of two 
consecutive configurations of a given world history. The MO in the latter wouldn’t 
be affected. Such, I call an external interruption. The world history can be taken up 
afterwards without noticing, for all individual configurations are static and 
actualized instantaneously anyway. Internally, world histories are insensitive to 
external interruption, as long as the conditions of their worlds overlapping properly 
are met. 
 
How, then, is this proper overlap between the worlds of individual configurations 
guaranteed, such that a FAPP-continuous world history can emerge? Here comes 
into play our treatment of the actualization rate of configurations within a world in 
a finite time interval (cf. II.7): with configurations being actualized at an arbitrarily 
high rate, the expectation value of configurations belonging to a certain world being 
instantiated during the same time interval becomes arbitrarily high as well. Apply 
this to the issue of emergent world histories being FAPP-continuous: given 
arbitrarily many actualizations within a finite time interval, a configuration being 
sufficiently similar to a given configuration is practically guaranteed to be actualized 
within an arbitrarily small amount of time. Once it is actualized, another 
configuration, being sufficiently similar to the second one, is actualized after an 
arbitrarily small amount of time, and so on. Always lying within the world of the 
previous configuration, the consecutive worlds thus instantiated always overlap 
properly, guaranteeing that world histories continue. It hence is unreasonable to 
fear that your world history will end just because no configuration within the world 
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of the presently actualized configuration will be actualized “in time” (as in 
“punctually”). 
 
IV.9.1 Relative frequency of world histories? 
 
Despite, the relative frequencies with which macroscopically different world 
histories are instantiated may very well differ in value. Given an arbitrarily high yet 
finite overall actualization rate, we can, in principle, count the number of 
actualizations within world histories resembling each other with respect to a certain 
macroscopic feature during a finite time interval and build a quotient with the 
overall number of actualizations during that time interval, thus providing a way to 
“measure” the probabilities of such world histories to be instantiated in terms of 
frequencies. This is not to say, though, that MBM’s probabilities are defined in 
terms of relative frequencies. Likewise, this must not be confused with counting 
branches, or counting world histories. World histories in MBM, like world branches 
in Everett, cannot be counted. More on that below (IV.10.5). Instead, these relative 
frequencies are merely reflecting the (dispositional) weight of Everettian world 
branches (cf. Wallace 2012, Ch. 4), providing, so to speak, a specific frequentist way 
of assessing this weight that is not open to the pure Everettian, who thinks of world 
branches as being instantiated simultaneously, with their overall combined weight 
being unity. In short, we are not committing to frequentism with respect to 
probabilities in the usual sense, but merely use it as a tool to assess dispositional 
weights of world branches/propensities of world histories to be actualized. 
 
To flesh this out a little, consider an experiment with two possible, mutually 
exclusive, macroscopic outcomes # and #̅, with probability P(#) = )
8
 and probability 
P(#̅) = 1 − P(#) = /
8
. That is to say, in Everettian terminology, the combined 
weight of all branches in which # occurs is )
8
, and the combined weight of all 
branches in which #̅ occurs is /
8
. For MBM, this translates as follows. If we assume 
some sufficiently high but finite actualization rate in a given time interval, then the 
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 of all actualizations in the time interval considered. Likewise, the totality of 
world histories in which #̅ occurs is instantiated in about /
8
 of all actualizations in 
that time interval. This is merely to convey a sense of what it means for world 
histories to lie in the support of world branches with certain weights, spelled out in 
terms of relative frequencies of actualizations: world histories in the support of 
world branches endowed with greater weights are instantiated “more often” than 
world histories in the support of world branches endowed with lesser weights. 
 
Do these differences in relative frequencies, then, mean that world histories in the 
support of world branches endowed with very low weights practically cannot 
emerge? Such fear amounts to a confusion of relative frequency and actualization 
rate. While the former is approximately stable over all sufficiently high actualization 
rates – i.e., relative frequencies approximately stay the same, independently of the 
actualization rate, as long as the latter is sufficiently high – the actualization rate 
itself can take on arbitrarily high values, such that any world history is actualized 
arbitrarily often, no matter how low the weight of the respective world branch. And 
of course, it should be stated explicitly what is already implicit in the assumptions 
we made about the actualization rate: all this talk of relative frequencies only 
makes sense given the overall actualization rate is finite. If we assume an infinite 
overall actualization rate, as we generally do on MBM, we run into the problems 
familiar from accounts of probabilities in terms of “frequencies” in infinite series of 
events. For example, assume an infinite overall actualization rate, such that in any 
finite time interval, infinitely many configurations are actualized. Then, any world 
history is instantiated infinitely many times in the same time interval. How to 
calculate, from these infinites, a relative frequency? It might be helpful to imagine 
the following: If we were able to look at the universe as described by MBM from the 
outside, but did so only a finite, but sufficiently large number of instants in a given 
time interval, we'd expect to approximately recover the relative frequencies as 
above. If, on the other hand, we don’t restrict ourselves to looking only a finite 
number of instants in that time interval, we don’t recover relative frequencies. 
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So much for now about relative actualization frequencies and their role in MBM. 
We must now come back to world histories, and the ways in which they populate 
configuration space. 
 
IV.9.2 Quasi-parallel world histories 
 
Above, we have described worlds that do not overlap properly as quasi-parallel 
worlds. Quasi-parallel worlds can be linked up by world histories. In fact, as argued 
above, if world histories are to account for macroscopic change, it is crucial that two 
of their worlds do not overlap properly. Otherwise, no macroscopic change would 
emerge, since all actualisations within that history would lie within the worlds of all 
other actualisations. It is for this reason that we included the condition – that two 
worlds within one world history must not properly overlap – into the definition of a 
world history. The linking-up of two worlds not properly overlapping is the whole 
point of world histories, to put it another way. 
 
Just as worlds are said to be quasi-parallel if they do not overlap properly, we can 
define a condition under which world histories are quasi-parallel. The idea of 
defining quasi-parallel world histories as those world histories which do not overlap 
properly suggests itself. But what does it mean for world histories to not overlap 
properly? Is it necessary that no world from one world history, ℌ9*+,…,4+, say, 
properly overlaps with a world from another world history ℌ9*N,…,4N? Or will it be 
sufficient if at least one world each does not overlap properly with a world from the 
other world history, respectively? 
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To get a grip on this, let’s start with the simplest case, in which no world contained 
in one world history properly overlaps with a world from another world history. 
First, we need two world histories97: 
 
ℌ/ = ¶R'/,R7/, . . . ,R*/,RI/	U	§9*+,/+ ∧ §9/+,… ∧ …∧ §9…,M+ ∧ §9M+,4+
∧ ¬§9*+,4+} 
and 
ℌ) = ¶R'),R7), . . . ,R*),RI)	U	§9*N,/N ∧ §9/N,… ∧ …∧ §9…,MN ∧ §9MN,4N
∧ ¬§9*N,4N} 
 
Above, we have specified proper overlap for worlds within a world history. We can 
likewise specify proper overlap for worlds from different world histories ℌ/, ℌ): 
 
∀;'/,')∀R'/,')3§9*+,*N ↔ ;'/,') ∈ ó9*+,*N6 
 
We can now differentiate between four basic ways in which world histories relate 
to each other: 
 
We say that world histories are entirely quasi-parallel iff none of their respective 
worlds overlap properly with any world from the other world history. For this, we 
write ℌ/: : : ℌ): 
 
ℌ/: : : ℌ) ↔ ¬∃R'/,')3§9*+,*N6 
(entirely quasi-parallel) 
 
Accordingly, we say that world histories are entirely overlapping (ℌ/. . . ℌ)) iff each 
world of the first world history overlaps properly with some world from the other 
world history and vice versa: 
 
97
 For sake of readability, from now on we will simply write ℌG instead of ℌO"#,…,&#(())  etc., and leave 
out explicit reference to the MO in indices, always keeping in mind that world histories consist of 
worlds, and worlds only arise from configurations containing MOs. 
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ℌ/. . . ℌ) ↔ ∀R'/ G∃R')3§9*+,*N6H ∧ ∀R') G∃R'/3§9*+,*N6H 
(entirely overlapping) 
 
Word histories are partially quasi-parallel (ℌ/. : . ℌ)) iff not every world from the 
first world history overlaps properly with a world from the other world history or 
vice versa: 
 
ℌ/. : . ℌ) ↔ ¬∀R'/ G∃R')3§9*+,*N6H ∨ ¬∀R') G∃R'/3§9*+,*N6H 
(partially quasi-parallel) 
 
Partially overlapping (ℌ/: . : ℌ)) world histories are such that there are worlds from 
these different world histories that overlap properly: 
 
ℌ/: . : ℌ) ↔ ∃R'/,')3§9*+,*N6 
(partially overlapping) 
 
These basic relations between world histories can be arranged in a diagram I call 











ℌ/. . . ℌ) ℌ/: : : ℌ) 



















The most interesting relation within the square of world histories is probably the 
subcontrary: two world histories can be partially overlapping and partially quasi-
parallel. Stating only the former leaves room for the possibility that the two world 
histories in question are entirely overlapping. Adding the latter, i.e. world histories 
being partially quasi-parallel, eliminates this possibility. Likewise, stating only the 
latter leaves room for the possibility that the world histories are entirely quasi-
parallel. But adding the former, i.e. world histories partially overlapping, again, 
eliminates this possibility. In other words, combining the partially overlapping case 
with the partially quasi-parallel case allows us to specify a case where two world 
histories are overlapping in some regions of configuration space, but parallel in 
others. With this, we have developed the necessary preliminaries to address the 
topic of splitting and merging world histories. 
 
IV.9.3 World histories: Splitting and merging 
 
Let’s take a look at the simplest variant of the case just mentioned, with world 
histories overlapping in one region of configuration space and being parallel in 
another. Recall figure 14 above. Figure 15 is the same, with a slight change in 
indices. To make things simpler (and easier to draw), we imagine that in the region 
where the world histories are properly overlapping, they do so perfectly, such that, 
in this region, they are identical even on the fundamental level. While this is not 
generally so, the condition for overlapping world histories, whether entirely or 




Figure 15: Two (so-far) identical world histories. (Note the indices!) 
 
Now, by adding some more worlds, we can turn this into a picture that contains two 
world histories that are partially overlapping as well as partially quasi-parallel, i.e. 
that fall under the conjunction of the mutually subcontrary cases, ℌ/: . : ℌ) ∧




Figure 16: Two world histories, partially overlapping and partially quasi-parallel 
Here, ;O/ and ;O) both lie within the world of ;A//A) (and vice versa). As such, they 
are continuations of the original world history ℌ/ (and of ℌ), which, from ;'//') to 
;A//A), is identical with ℌ/). But they are not similar enough to lie within each 
other’s worlds. Note that, since worlds RO/ and RO) do not properly overlap, i.e. 
neither ;O/ nor ;O) lies within the world of the other, world histories ℌ/ and ℌ) 
satisfy the condition for partially quasi-parallel world histories. At the same time, 
they satisfy the condition for partially overlapping world histories, since worlds 
R'//') through RA//A) overlap properly. It is because these two conditions are 
satisfied that splitting of world histories takes place. 
 
At first sight, there seems to be something peculiar about this picture: read from 
left to right, it depicts the case of two overlapping world histories (entirely, when 
looking only at R'//') through RA//A)), such that they are FAPP one world 
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history98, splitting into two quasi-parallel world histories. Read from right to left, it 
depicts the case of two quasi-parallel world histories, merging into two overlapping 
world histories. Which way of reading this picture is the right one? Are these world 
histories splitting or merging? 
 
The issue is immediately relieved once we remind ourselves that MBM imposes a 
(temporal) order on its actualizations. To be clear: MBM prima facie does not 
impose a specific order on its actualizations. Configurations are actualized at 
random, i.e. are stochastically independent. Yet, there is only one configuration 
actualized at a given time, and the next one after that, and so on. Thus, the totality 
of actualized configurations is ordered, although this order is not predetermined. 
This ordering carries over to subsets of the totality. Now, focus on configurations 
that contain MOs and thus instantiate worlds. Since all subsets of the totality are 
ordered, subsets containing MOs are ordered as well. And since configurations 
containing MOs instantiate worlds, worlds are ordered, too. If these worlds satisfy 
the conjunction of overlap conditions as specified above, they form a world history. 
Therefore, the worlds making up a world history are ordered. We thus know in 
which direction to read the picture. Assume configurations are actualized in the 
following order (with possibly other configurations actualized in between): ;'//'), 
;7//7), ;A//A), ;O/, ;O), ;*/, ;*). From this order, we know that we have to read 
the picture from left to right. It represents splitting, not merging, of world histories. 
Note two things: 1) The order just specified is not the only one to instantiate 
splitting world histories. Any permutation of the last four elements does, if it 
satisfies ;O/ <L#VHG# ;*/ and ;O) <L#VHG# ;*). That is to say: Within a world 
history, actualizations of configurations are ordered, but it is irrelevant whether in 
between these actualizations, configurations from a different world history are 
actualized or not. Above we have called this external interruption. 2) Ignoring order, 
 
98
 World histories, in the regions where they entirely overlap, are FAPP one world history, even when 
they do not overlap as perfectly as depicted in figures 15 and 16. The reason being that entire 
overlap requires that for every central configuration of one world history, there is another one from 
the other world history that lies within the former’s world. Hence, whenever a central configuration 
of one of their worlds is actualized, the thus instantiated world overlaps properly with a world of the 
other world history, such that this instantiation does not amount to macroscopic change for the MO. 
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there are other possible ways of reading the picture. E.g., starting from R*/ via 
RO/ to RA//A), then splitting into two world histories, R7//7) to R'//') and RO) to 
R*). This and similar possible readings are rendered impossible by the order 
specified before (and permissible permutations).  
 
A remark about the ordering of actualizations is called for. One might want to know: 
what imposes this order? I have said that there is one configuration actualized at a 
time. Does this imply that some kind of external, universal, even absolute time is 
assumed? That is to say, is the order of configurations given by some kind of 
unambiguous “time stamp”, attached to each configuration as it is actualized, that 
corresponds to the universal time parameter as it increases? For this presentation 
of MBM, the answer must be a clear “yes”: indeed, we assume absolute, universal 
time. The time parameter featuring in the time-dependent SE governing the time 
evolution of the universal WF suggests itself for such an interpretation. Yet that this 
assumption is controversial should be clear, too. It is for a reason that Barbour 
adopts a timeless description of the universe, employing the Wheeler-DeWitt 
equation. Whether MBM can be altered to be made compatible with such a 
fundamentally timeless picture of the universe is a question that lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For now, suffice it to say that the assumption of a 
fundamentally timeless universe has implications on the construal of world 
histories. With all configurations actualized eternally, we can no longer refer to an 
external time parameter for their ordering. Hence, the solution applied to the 
question of splitting and merging world histories above is blocked in such a 
universe, unless time somehow “re-emerges” on the level of world histories. But for 
the time being, let’s proceed with our discussion of world histories in MBM, 
assuming universal time, by applying our framework to the double-slit example 
familiar from above. This shall prove helpful in making more graspable how world 
histories emerge from MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics. 
 
IV.9.4 An application of splitting world histories: The double-slit experiment 
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Let’s look back at figure 16, showing the splitting of world histories. We are now 
going to use it to model what happens in the double-slit experiment, according to 
MBM. We start at configuration ;'//'). That is not to say that the world history 
really started there. We pick ;'//') as a starting point for our considerations, 
because it is convenient. When this configuration is actualized, it contains all there 
is in the universe, at that moment in time, from the large scale filaments of galaxies, 
spanning over hundreds of millions of light years, individual galaxies, to our solar 
system and earth, including the laboratory and apparatus set up for our 
experiment, and the particles the behaviour of which we want to investigate. In 
particular, it also contains the experimenter, carrying out the experiment. At ;'//'), 
ever so slightly, they still feel the start button for the apparatus at their fingertip. At 
;A//A), they don’t feel that button anymore. And the actualizations in between, 
;7//7) as an example taken from the infinity of others, account for the transition 
between still feeling the button, in ;'//'), and not feeling it anymore, in ;A//A). 
Let’s say that, at the point in time when ;A//A) is actualized, the particle resides 
within the slit. To be precise: at that point in time, ;A/, with the particle in the left 
slit, has some disposition of being actualized, and ;A), with the particle in the right 
slit, has some disposition of being actualized. (Remember that these configurations 
are merely drawn in the figure as the same configuration, while actually being 
different on the micro level.) With MBM’s arbitrarily high actualization rate, 
configurations sufficiently similar to ;A/ and ;A) and thus lying in the worlds RA/ 
and RA) are instantiated arbitrarily often: the particle jumps back and forth 
between the two slits (and other places, too). At least, that is what MBM’s micro 
dynamics tells us. For the experimenter, it makes no difference where the particle is 
at that moment. It could be somewhere near Andromeda. And, assuming a finite 
probability for the actualization of that configuration, it will be. As long as these 
configurations don’t amount to a noticeable macroscopic difference for the 
experimenter, their worlds overlap properly. This apparent curiosity aside, at some 
point, the experimenter will notice a macroscopic difference: ;*/ and ;*), both 
being continuations of the original world history, but sufficiently different for the 
experimenter to be macroscopically distinguishable, instantiate worlds where the 
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screen is lighting up at different points. Figure 16 conveys the impression that these 
points should be very close together on the screen, given that the distances 
between the configurations represented must be miniscule in configuration space. 
But don’t let the limitations of this kind of representation (and of my drawing skills) 
fool you. You may think of ;*/ and ;*) as being as close or far apart as you like, as 
long as they both instantiate different macroscopic states of the screen, lighting up 
here or there, and likewise, different macroscopic states of the experimenter. Only 
with such macroscopic differences splitting of world histories occurs.  
 
Now, think this on into the future. ;*/’s and ;*)’s world histories are continued 
by the actualization of further configurations. With the experimenter being in ;*/’s 
world history, say, the experiment goes on, and another point on the screen will 
light up, leading to branching of world histories again. And the same, of course, for 
the world history of ;*). Where the screen lights up in the next event, resulting in 
the next split of world histories, is just as random as before, “guided” by the 
universal actualization disposition. But now, the respective world histories already 
contain records of the first event.99 And when these world histories split again, the 
resulting world histories will contain records of the first two events, and so on, until 
each resulting world history, at the end of the experiment, contains sufficient 
records for an interference pattern to emerge on the screen.100 
 
Two remarks are in order. First, note that the fact that these records are present in 
future instantiations must not be ascribed to the proper overlap of worlds in the 
 
99
 Already Bell (1987a, 136, his emphasis) notes that memories and records, telling of different times 
while being contained in one configuration, can be correlated: “We have only our ‘memories’ and 
‘records’. But these memories and records are in fact present phenomena. The instantaneous 
configuration of the 7s can include clusters which are markings in notebooks, or in computer 
memories, or in human memories. These memories can be of the initial conditions in experiments, 
among other things, and of the results of those experiments. The theory should account for the 
present correlations between these present phenomena. And in this respect we have seen it to 
agree with ordinary quantum mechanics, in so far as the latter is unambiguous. 
100
 Interestingly, these interference patterns, although being different in each world history branch, 
can be expected to be roughly the same with respect to their overall structure. They thus grant us a 
glimpse into the goings-on of the underlying, microscopic level, despite the fact that the world 
histories we inhabit only emerge on the macro level, and irrespective of which particular world 
history we inhabit. 
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respective histories alone. Records, in principle, can vanish in a similar fashion they 
appear. It is a contingent matter of fact that some records are stable over longer 
time intervals than others. (The photographic plate that is the screen might vanish 
after a few centuries; geological formations remain for millions of years; memories 
of the dreams I have usually last for less than a minute.) Ultimately, stability of 
records must be attributed to the universal WF and its evolution. However, if they 
are stable, the continuation of world histories via properly overlapping worlds 
guarantees that they are reliable: once a stable record is created in a world history, 
the continuation of this world history will contain this record, too, for as long as it is 
stable, because worlds that don't contain it are macroscopically distinct and hence 
not part of this world history. In other words: within a world history, stable records, 
like those on a photographic plate, do not suddenly vanish. This, although in 
general, the continuation of world histories via worlds overlapping properly does 
not impose any kind of (quasi-classical) dynamics onto the universe. This must stem 
from the dynamics of the universal WF. Proper overlap of worlds alone merely 
guarantees that transitions between worlds are unnoticeable macroscopically, 
despite a discontinuous micro dynamics, thus explaining the FAPP-continuous 
evolution of macroscopic processes. In short: world histories take care of FAPP-
continuity despite a discontinuous micro dynamics of the configuration, while the 
dynamics of the WF (including decoherence) takes care of quasi-classicality.  
 
Second, the example as presented might leave the impression that, on MBM, the 
experimenter/observer does play a special role with respect to the continuation 
and splitting of world histories. Yet, this is not the case. They do play a certain role, 
but only insofar as they are an instance of MOs in general. In particular, it is 
irrelevant whether the MO in question bears a mind, has conscious experience, etc., 
or not. We could as well have left out the experimenter from the description, taking 
the screen itself for the MO. The results with respect to the splitting of world 
histories would have been decidedly similar, since the observer and the screen are 
roughly on the same level of macroscopicity: if world histories split for the screen, 
they split for the experimenter, and vice versa. Then again, viewed from yet another 
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level, on the order of the solar system, say, no splitting of world histories results 
from the experiment as described: for a MO on that scale, it literally makes no 
macroscopic difference whether some screen in some lab on some planet lights up 
here or there. But of course, things could be arranged such that it does. If we were 
to “blow up” the result of such an experiment by linking it to an array of nuclear 
bombs, literally blowing up Mars, for example, iff the first spot on the screen 
appears in a defined region, and not iff it appears elsewhere, that would indeed 
make a macroscopic difference for the solar system. Accordingly, in such a scenario, 
the result of the experiment would lead to splitting of world histories even for the 
MO that is the solar system. 
 
What this example is supposed to make clear in a more graspable way are the 
following three points – and the appropriate conclusion – that have been made 
before: 1. World histories split. 2. Importantly, world histories split, not when some 
microscopic superposition is present in the state, but when the superposition is 
magnified to be macroscopically relevant. 3. What is macroscopically relevant 
depends on the MO in question. In conclusion, the example shows that splitting of 
world histories is an emergent feature. It naturally results from the MBM 
framework, i.e. the Schrödinger dynamics for the universal WF, the interpretation 
of the latter as encoding dispositions for actualizations of configurations, the 
stochastic dynamics of the actualized configuration in accordance with that 
interpretation, and the construal of worlds in terms of regions of sufficient similarity 
with respect to a given configuration, and the MO(s) within it. Accordingly, if there 
are different MOs for which different processes are macroscopically relevant – like 
the screen and the solar system in the example – world histories, upon some event, 
might split or not, because the same event that is macroscopically relevant for one 
MO might be not for another.  
 
Our treatment of splitting world histories might be suggestive of their countability. I 
have previously stated that world histories, like Everettian world branches, are not 
countable. I yet owe an explanation for why that is so.  
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IV.9.5 Counting world histories 
 
World histories are uncountable. An explanation of this fact is easily given in terms 
of entirely overlapping and entirely quasi-parallel world histories. Assume two 
world histories, ℌ/ and ℌ), are entirely overlapping, and a third world history ℌ8 is 
entirely overlapping with ℌ). Even if ℌ/ and ℌ8 don’t mutually satisfy the condition 
for entire overlap, and even when they are entirely quasi parallel, they are 
connected via ℌ), similar to the quasi-parallel worlds at the “ends” of an individual 
world history: ℌ), in this scenario, entirely overlaps ℌ/ as well as ℌ8. Now, is it fair 
to assume the existence of thusly connected world histories? In this example: is it 
fair to assume the existence of ℌ) in between ℌ/ and ℌ8? On MBM’s infinite 
actualization rate, it is. It is even fair to assume that there are infinitely many world 
histories instantiated in between any two quasi-parallel world histories, just as 
there are infinitely many worlds instantiated in between two quasi-parallel worlds. 
But, as has been pointed out before, two entirely overlapping world histories can be 
considered to be, FAPP, one world history. At what point, then, should a world 
history be considered a different one? How far apart must world histories be in 
order to count as two world histories, FAPP? The answer is that they must be so far 
apart that they are entirely quasi-parallel. 
 
Note that both conditions we have made use of rely on worlds as they arise for a 
given MO. In fact, all conditions for the overlap of world histories do. As specified 
above, an MO’s world depends on the MO itself. Hence, which condition is satisfied 
– entirely quasi-parallel or entirely overlapping – also depends on the MO. With this 
dependency made clear, it becomes obvious why world histories cannot be 
counted, at least not without reference to a specific MO. Returning to the familiar 
example: for the MO that is the solar system, there are fewer world histories than 
for the MO that is me. Just which MO we should select as a reference point to count 
world histories is a question that has no unique answer. Rather, it is a matter of 
context. Ultimately, world histories, like the worlds that constitute them, are an 
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emergent feature – they only exist FAPP, from the perspective of a MO. 
Fundamentally, all there is are random actualizations of configurations, following an 
actualization disposition encoded in the universal WF. Despite, or rather: because of 
this, world histories are suitable to explain the manifest image of FAPP-continuous, 
macroscopic processes emerging from the scientific image of a stochastic, 
discontinuous micro dynamics. 
 
IV.10 MBM is compatible with double aspect PPP 
 
As argued above, in order to be compatible with a more than minimal variant of 
PPP, in particular in order to be compatible with double aspect PPP, MBM must 
allow for macroscopic processes from which what we would call a mind capable of 
experiences can emerge. Individual configurations, even if they are time capsules, 
didn’t seem to be enough, for the processes required as the physical aspect of 
mental phenomena, i.e. brain processes, cannot arise from within individual, static 
configurations. Employing FAPP-continuous world histories, we are able to account 
for experiences, including experiences of continuous macroscopic change, despite a 
fundamentally random, discontinuous micro dynamics. Our brains are MOs 
undergoing macroscopic change within world histories. For the latter, we require 
pairs of consecutive configurations to be sufficiently similar as to not affect the MO 
macroscopically by transitioning from one to the other. At the same time, because 
of similarity being a nontransitive relation, a series of actualizations of pairwise 
sufficiently similar configurations can have configurations at its far ends that are not 
sufficiently similar to each other, and thus amount to macroscopic change of the 
MO. If the MO is a brain, this allows for brain processes to happen, from which an 
experiencing mind can emerge, as the psychological aspect of the physical process. 
It is probably worth noting again that we don’t need a mind already in place for 
world histories to form. In particular, it is not necessary that there is a mind (or a 
god, even) comparing configurations in order to see whether they are sufficiently 
similar or not. Sufficient similarity merely requires that two actualisations do not 
amount to macroscopic change of an MO. Whether they do or not, as argued, 
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depends only on the MO in question, not on a mind observing it, or the MO itself 
having a mind. It can undergo change, even in an otherwise completely empty 
universe, deprived of any mental aspect whatsoever. For example, the screen or 
photographic plate in the double-slit experiment is an MO that undergoes 
macroscopic change during the experiment, without itself having a mind, and 
irrespective of whether an experimenter – a special, experiencing type of MO – is 
watching or not. While undergoing change, according to the best theories we have, 
seems to be a necessary requirement for a mind to emerge, neither having a mind 
nor being observed by a mind is a necessary requirement for undergoing change. 
We are thus not in need of a mind for world histories to form – MBM indeed seems 
compatible with double aspect PPP. 
 
V. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In this thesis, I have developed and presented an account of the emergence of 
FAPP-continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the stochastic, discontinuous 
micro dynamics of MBM.  
 
For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM was described, and 
their empirical equivalence established. I presented the conditions under which 
MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology theory, regarded as crucial for the 
acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering 
MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of 
communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. After spelling out the 
desiderata of the PO approach regarding the fundamentality of the primitives of a 
theory, I argued that to achieve compatibility with the PO approach while avoiding 
the problem of communication, MBM’s wave function must be interpreted 
nomologically. That, however, is not to say that I commit myself to this 
interpretation. I merely argued that MBM can be classified as a PO theory, and thus 
as a Bohmian theory, if wished: given a suitable reading of the wave function, MBM 
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satisfies the desiderata of the PO approach. Thus, Bohmians should abstain from 
rejecting MBM for not possibly being Bohmian. 
 
I have discussed the issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious 
problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM. I argued 
that Barbour’s time-capsule approach, adopted for MBM, does not provide a 
satisfactory answer to Bell’s worry. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal 
psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic 
change, while being a reasonable assumption in light of our current best 
neuroscience, is problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, 
understood as highly structured, individual, static configurations containing 
consistent records. As a solution, I introduced worlds, and world histories, as key 
concepts in providing a link between MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics and 
FAPP-continuous macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are 
coarse-grained regions in configuration space, defined as sets of possible 
configurations satisfying a nontransitive relation of sufficient similarity with respect 
to a given configuration containing macroscopic objects. Hence, worlds may 
overlap. They thus allow for FAPP-continuous, quasi-classical world histories to 
form. 
 
To first introduce the notion of overlapping worlds, I discussed their applicability to 
the case of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM). There, for finite available 
phase space volumes, partitioned into non-overlapping macro regions of finite, non-
zero volume, the discontinuity problem of BSM arises: BSM invariably models 
change of macro values in such scenarios as jump discontinuities, at odds both with 
the expectation that macro values should be able to change continuously – 
stemming from the desideratum that BSM be able to model thermodynamically 
described target systems – and with the continuous evolution of the micro state. I 
have argued that overlapping worlds are a reasonable option for replacing the 
disjoint macro regions of phase space. This move solves the discontinuity problem. 
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Having thus introduced and developed the notion of overlapping worlds, and 
demonstrated its applicability to the case of BSM, I adapted the concept for the 
case of MBM, where a similar problem arises: FAPP-continuous, quasi-classical, 
consistent histories (as we seem to live in one) must emerge from MBM’s 
discontinuous, fundamentally random micro dynamics in configuration space, 
thereby avoiding Bell’s charge of temporal solipsism. A special requirement for 
overlapping worlds had to be fulfilled in order for world histories to form: worlds 
must overlap properly. I argued that MBM’s indefinite actualization rate guarantees 
that they do. Along the way, issues pertaining to the microscopic-macroscopic-
distinction, reduction of configuration space, particle identity, impenetrability and 
haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation in non-
relativistic quantum theories, etc., have been examined. I provided a detailed 
explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby 
linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism 
was resolved. 
 
My hope was that by spelling out in some detail how world histories are formed, 
MBM might be rendered more acceptable to those having difficulties imagining 
how the manifest image of the universe we seem to inhabit can possibly emerge 
from the peculiar scientific image of the universe MBM describes. While working on 
MBM for some time now, and discussing it with friends and colleagues, I became 
increasingly convinced that I should at least attempt to make this emergence 
intelligible. I hope I have succeeded, if only to some extent. Certainly, there are 
more questions to ask, and to answer, and to answer more extensively and in 
greater detail, than I could in this thesis. MBM is a new theory, despite descending 
from a decade old ancestor: Bell’s Everett (?) theory. Possibly it was because its 
original inventor – or discoverer, if you prefer – had dismissed his own theory 
immediately, and because he was such an eminent figure, that it never really took 
off. Alas, Bell’s criticism was based on a misguided identification of worlds with 
individual configurations. Had he not made this mistake, MBM by now could have 
been “out there”, as a viable alternative, for decades, possibly developed way 
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further than the juvenile stage it finds itself in as of today. However, Bell did not 
recognize that worlds can – and should – be construed as coarse-grained, and so, 
for the time being, MBM is still a work in progress, with plenty of topics to be taken 
up in possible follow-up projects. For an example, there are interesting questions to 
engage with concerning the personal identity of inhabitants of (splitting) world 
histories: can persons inhabiting remote parts of world histories reasonably be 
identified with one another? What about persons in parallel word histories? If the 
latter are a result from splitting, are there now multiple persons where there was 
one, before the split? Or have there always been several, already before splitting? 
What are the differences, if any, between simultaneously realized, Everettian world 
branches, and MBM’s world histories, with respect to personal identity? I think such 
and related questions might be of interest even to a broader audience, not 
particularly concerned with MBM in itself. Likewise, issues pertaining to the 
relationship between world-history internal time and external, universal time may 
be worth investigating. After all, world histories may be externally interrupted 
without being internally interrupted, as long as their worlds overlap properly. The 
fact that, on MBM, there is no necessary link between fundamental, universal time 
and perceived time (except for ordering actualizations) might inform more general 
debates in the philosophy of time broadly construed. I would like to pick up these 
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